Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

1369.

Tunis, February 12, 1986, 0956Z

Department also for D, T and NEA from Ambassador. Subject: Cuts in the Tunisian Military and Economic Assistance Accounts. Refs: (A) Tunis 983,² (B) Tunis 1007.³

1. Secret—Entire text.
Summary and action requested:
Reftels reported GOT reactions to our FY86 funding levels for Tunisia and mission’s hope that reductions could be obviated at the first opportunity from fall-out funds. This message focuses on emerging political cost to us here of our FY86 funding level decision-making and urges earliest restoration of small sum involved. We assume that Congress would be receptive to restoration urged herein given its interest as reflected in legislative history of the appropriation.

2. I should like to register my concern over the impact of our decision-making on ESF and MAP cuts in the Tunisian account. These cuts were triggered by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings⁴ and congressional underappropriation of MAP. They have involved reductions of almost 10 percent in the Tunisian FY86 accounts, as follows:

• (1) FMS–C from $27M [to] $25.839M; (2) MAP from $40M to $33.495M; (3) ESF $20M first to $19.14 and now to $18.974M and (4) IMET from $1.7M to $1.435M.

3. It is obvious that we are talking here about comparatively small sums. Accordingly, my concern centers on the outsize political impact of the event rather than on the pain inflicted by the unanticipated $9M reduction as such.

4. In Tunisia’s case, our reductions, most particularly those (levied beyond the GRH cuts) reallocating resources from Tunisia to Guatemala, fly in the face of support commitments made in general terms by our most senior decision-makers during and following Bourguiba’s visit to Washington,⁵ to the top leadership of this country. They conflict with what we have had to say at high levels following the Israeli raid last October. They contradict our frequently and publicly expressed concern over the threat represented by Qadhafi to our friends and our interests. They symbolically emphasize rather than mitigate harsh and now critical decline in Tunisia’s economic and financial circumstances accelerated by the collapse of oil prices and the resulting socio-political impact on this country’s stability in which we have both a bilateral and a regional stake.

5. This is the more preoccupying since our public rationale is bound to lack credibility in Tunisian ears: We appear to have told them in Washington that these cuts represent “last-minute decisions” which “took everyone by surprise.” We have said that LG Gast, DSAA (then visiting Tunis) was “not even aware of them” and that the cuts were the result “of a purely budgetary approach” divorced from “political reasons.”

6. The Tunisians can scarcely be expected to credit an assertedly apolitical, purely budgetary approach which allegedly comes “as a surprise” to the administration after they have been assured repeatedly at the highest levels of the USG of our willingness to help and continuing interest in their security and stability. No wonder Ambassador Ben Yahia professed himself unable to understand these decisions.

7. I think we need to stand behind the administration’s repeated pledges—even if they were formulated in non-specific terms. Tunisian confidence in our leadership is too precious a commodity to be breached for a piddling sum of money. I know we needed to scrape the barrel and can appreciate how tough it has been to distribute the shortfall but this is a case in which political content of systemic reallocation decisions is too high to rely on the “purely budgetary approach.” In short, the situation here is sufficiently tenuous so that we can ill afford to accept the reduced levels in MAP, IMET (especially IMET) and ESF as final if, as seems likely, cost to us in the GOT will include an additional loss of trust by our friends and exploitation by our opponents of this further indication of U.S. indifference—as they will put it—to Tunisia in its hour of need. I urge therefore that the sum cut be promptly restored. Fallback remains, obviously, positioning the Tunisian account for fallout funds if latter become available but in my book price we may well pay for delay involved in that scenario seems much too high.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. In telegram 983 from Tunis, February 3, Sebastian expressed appreciation that Ussery had said “we will be alert to any opportunities for the administration to restore funds for Tunisia.” Sebastian noted that the Embassy did not want to raise “GOT hopes” regarding additional FY 86 funding but cautioned that “American credibility is very much at issue in any possible restoration of funding levels initially endorsed by the administration.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860085–0150)
3. In telegram 1007 from Tunis, February 3, the Embassy reported that Essebsi had “convoked Ambassador February 3 to complain about the USG decision to cut Tunisia’s FY 86 security assistance allocation” and alluded “to the ‘very regrettable’ reduction he had learned of from his Ambassador in Washington.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860085–0504)
4. See footnote 7, Document 65.
5. See Document 328.