Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

203796.

Washington, July 3, 1985, 1845Z

SUBJECT

• The Bourguiba Visit: A Wrap-up.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In meetings with the President,² and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,³ President Bourguiba reiterated GOT requests for increased U.S. economic and military assistance at more concessional rates. In a memo prepared by Minister of Planning Khelil, the GOT requested military assistance comprised of 50 percent in MAP grants and 50 percent FMS in concessional credit.⁴ We have responded that the economic/financial problems confronting Tunisia are shared by other countries; we want to do what we can, but cannot say precisely where we will come out. We expressed understanding for Tunisia’s problems in dealing with Qadhafi. Bourguiba and his delegation issued supportive statements on the hostage situation and on the issue of direct talks between Israel and the Arab parties. President Bourguiba also dispatched a separate emissary to Beirut to confer with Nabih Berri on the American hostages. The Tunisians seemed cautiously optimistic about the Middle East peace process. President Bourguiba appeared glad to have had the opportunity to make his aid requests to the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government, but clearly he is reserving judgement on the overall utility of the visit until such time as the administration responds positively to these requests. End summary.

3. During his official visit to Washington, June 14–26, President Bourguiba met with President Reagan, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, House Speaker O’Neill, President Pro Tem of the Senate Thurmond, and other Members of Congress. He also met with the Presidents of the World Bank and IMF, selected business leaders and had a routine medical examination at Walter Reed hospital. Mrs. Wassila Bourguiba, Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, and Minister of Planning Ismail Khelil accompanied the President. The Ministers had separate meetings with NSC, State, Defense, Treasury, Agriculture and AID officials. During the visit, Bourguiba, Jr. also addressed the American Enterprise Institute and the Foreign Minister held a seminar at Brookings.

4. Although his movements were stiff (perhaps from the medication he was taking), President Bourguiba was in excellent health during his visit and in feisty spirits. The results of the medical examinations at Walter Reed indicated that he is in generally good health. In deference to the President’s age, official meetings were scheduled only during morning hours, and with the exception of his call on President Reagan, all meetings were held at the residence of Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia.

5. Through this visit President Reagan, senior administration officials and Members of Congress had an opportunity to send an important signal to Tunis and other North African capitals of the high regard in which they hold President Bourguiba and their concern for Tunisia’s security and territorial integrity. The Tunisians were pleased at the warm reception they were accorded at the White House and the solicitude extended to President Bourguiba. President Reagan was particularly gratified that during the visit Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi issued a statement condemning the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and that President Bourguiba dispatched his Ambassador to Lebanon back to Beirut to confer with Nabih Berri.

6. In connection with President Bourguiba’s visit, Minister of Planning Khelil prepared a memorandum outlining the difficulties confronting the Tunisian economy and requesting increased U.S. economic and military assistance. This memorandum was distributed to various administration officials during calls on Bourguiba and at meetings with the Tunisian delegation. Specifically, the memorandum requested that the U.S. reconsider the phasing out of CIP and development assistance programs for Tunisia, requested an unspecified increase in ESF levels with greater programming flexibility, and urged a reversal in the downward trend of PL480 Title I assistance to be stabilized at 15 million dollars over several years. President Bourguiba stressed the need for a qualitative improvement in military assistance (from 50 percent in MAP grants and 50 percent FMS in concessional credit, an increase in IMET, and a commitment “for coming years” to insure full financing of U.S. military equipment). In his presentation at various stops, Minister of Planning Khelil spoke to the fact that Tunisia is repaying the US 200 million dollars a year, twice what Tunisia was receiving in new aid; he said that without softer concessional terms Tunisia will reconsider continuing its military modernization program with the U.S.

7. Secretary Shultz in reviewing the aid requests noted that similar economic and financial problems confront other governments friendly to the U.S. The Tunisian presentation strengthened U.S. comprehension of the problem and will be studied. The Secretary, Secretary Weinberger and NSC Advisor McFarlane separately answered the Tunisians that “the U.S. wants to be as helpful as possible.” However, no precise commitments were made, and it was stressed that the USG will focus on FY 87 in whatever we might do. President Bourguiba appeared glad to have had the opportunity to make his requests to the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government, but clearly he is reserving judgement on the overall utility of the visit until such time as the administration responds positively to these requests.

8. The Tunisians characterized Libya as a “clear and present danger to Tunisia,” and said that Qadhafi’s threats imposed on them a burden to modernize Tunisia’s military at the expense of agricultural and rural development. Foreign Minister Essebsi noted that traditional Libyan markets for Tunisian exports had been closed and Libyan threats to expel some 100,000 Tunisian workers is a “sword of Damocles.” To forestall such action, it is necessary to sustain a dialogue with Libya. President Bourguiba was more explicit about the Libyan threat, telling President Reagan that Qadhafi is waiting for Bourguiba’s death before attacking. Essebsi thought that in the event of such an attack, assistance would come from Morocco (perhaps belatedly) and Algeria, (portrayed as a not entirely welcome insurer). He emphasized that military preparedness would not suffice to put down instability in Tunisia in the absence of economic reform. Essebsi spoke of the necessity of a Maghrebian “ensemble;” this would be a form of economic community, not repeat not a political union. Essebsi went on to note that the Western Sahara question was the most important issue dividing the North African states.

9. The Tunisians were cautiously optimistic with regard to the Middle East peace process. In the statement to the press following his meeting with President Reagan,⁵ President Bourguiba noted that he had advocated negotiations between Arabs and Israelis within the framework of pertinent UN resolutions as early as 1965 and that his judgement had been vindicated by the Fez Summit. Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi told NEA Assistant Secretary Murphy that the PLO is committed to going forward in the peace process with King Hussein and that the Tunisians support this. He urged quick action to take advantage of the February 11 accord between Hussein and Arafat (i.e., an early meeting between U.S., Jordanian, and Palestinian representatives) and a speedy follow-up meeting with the Israelis thereafter to maintain momentum in the peace process. Caid Essebsi said that in a first phase non-PLO Palestinians are acceptable to the PLO, although it was important for the PLO to be tied into a preliminary conversation. While the PLO might be able to distance itself from non-PLO Palestinians in an initial phase, he doubted that it could do so in a subsequent phase involving the Israelis. He was confident that some formula could be worked out to resolve the problem of representation in Phase I.

10. Comment: Though low-key, the Department believes this visit signalled to the Tunisians and their neighbors that we share the GOT’s concerns about Tunisia’s security and economic viability. It is clear however that they eagerly await a positive response to their pleas for assistance. The measure of success of this visit to GOT eyes will be in terms of additional aid for Tunisia gleaned from an already tight USG budget. End comment.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850471–0504. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Rosemary O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Kirby (NEA/MEN); approved by Zweifel. Sent for information to Algiers, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and Tel Aviv.
2. See footnote 2, Document 327.
3. No record of the Weinberger-Bourguiba meeting has been found.
4. The memorandum, dated June 17 is in Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia President Habib Bourguiba (June 1985).
5. A record of Bourguiba’s remarks is in Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pp. 776–778.