Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, Secretary of State Shultz in New York, and the Mission to the United Nations¹

9028.

Tunis, October 2, 1985, 1217Z

Military address handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With President Bourguiba: Israeli Raid and the American Position. Refs: (A) Tunis 8966,² (B) Tunis 8964,³ (C) Secto 19057,⁴ (D) Secto 19055,⁵ (D) Sebastian-Armacost telecon Oct. 1.⁶

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary. President Bourguiba expressed strong concern and disappointment over U.S. attitude toward Israeli attack, in meeting with me October 2. He was especially disillusioned by White House approval of the raid, expressing view USG must have given advance blessing. I insisted that U.S. had not been consulted nor had we participated in any way, and presented President’s message and talking points in full. Bourguiba pessimistically foresaw U.S. veto in Security Council, which would have “devastating” effect on our relations and show our previous warm words of support to be a “sham.” Prime Minister Mzali, also present, strongly urged U.S. abstention in UNSC.⁷ Habib Bourguiba, Junior, commented separately after meeting that his father was broken-hearted over U.S. attitude, which negated life-long efforts of friendship with U.S. End summary.

3. I was summoned and received for just under an hour by President Bourguiba at Carthage Palace this morning (Oct. 2). Also present were: PriMin Mzali, Special Counselor Habib Bourguiba Jr.; Acting FonMin Mestiri; MinCabinet Chief at Presidency Skhiri. President Bourguiba looked drawn but was calm, spoke at some length and was in full command of his faculties. Atmosphere was courteous but burdened by scope political problem now posed Bourguiba and more generally GOT as friends of the U.S. in Arab world in wake Israeli strike on PLO facility here.

4. President Bourguiba opened by stating that Tunisia’s sovereignty had been brutally infringed by Israeli strike⁸ of which White House Spokesman had approved forthwith. This prompt expression of American support which tended to legitimize the raid against an urban target inhabited largely by Palestinian “refugees” (qte the ‘big cheeses’ of the PLO weren’t there and weren’t caught unqte) and by Tunisians must have had advance American blessing. The United States had thus taken position in favor of Israel—no surprise—but at the expense of Bourguiba and Tunisia, notwithstanding our long friendship and the President’s assurances of U.S. interest in Tunisia’s security and integrity during his last Washington visit and since (viz. in the context of Tunis confrontation with Libya). I interrupted the President at this point to insist that the U.S. had neither been consulted by Israel on the raid nor had had any part whatsoever in it.

5. President Bourguiba went on to deplore both the terror and the tenor of the Speakes statement: What would, what could he say to the Tunisian people in its wake? Habib Bourguiba Jr., manifestly [under?] emotional pressure, then pulled out scrap of paper and read what he described as quotes attributed to President Reagan approving of the raid. (FYI VOA newscast heard here in English at 0700 local Oct. 2 quotes the President’s informal comment to press characterizing raid as justified. End FYI.) This launched President Bourguiba into a rerun of the points already made. I was thereafter invited to respond.

6. I read the President’s message (ref C) carefully translating it into French. Last point elicited reaction from almost everyone present to effect that it was incompatible with position we had taken on the raid. I then used all talkers (ref D) emphasizing once more unilaterality of Israeli act, our non-involvement in any way whatsoever and our desire to work closely with Tunisia in upcoming UNSC consideration of Tunisia’s complaint. President Bourguiba picked up on this point saying he assumed that the outcome of the Security Council proceeding would be an American veto. If so, the effect here would be devastating because the Tunisian people would see in it the confirmation that the U.S. approved of the blow inflicted upon Tunisia and feel that our earlier warm words of support for himself and Tunisia had also been a sham.

7. The Prime Minister then said that, thinking about the future, if we could manage an abstention in the UNSC, it would give the GOT a little something to work with, “a little balm for the Tunisian heart.”

8. President Bourguiba and the Prime Minister then returned to the issue of the White House statement. Could we not have waited to form a judgment? Silence would have been better than this.

9. I then tried, on personal basis, to invite consideration of the scope and seriousness of terrorism as a contextual problem, urging cooperation towards the goal of direct negotiations between the parties to the Middle East conflict as the sole means of extirpating the hatreds on which it fed. It got me nowhere: we had approved the ravaging of Tunisia’s sovereignty and talk of terrorism was an unacceptable excuse. I was then dismissed courteously, the President expressing appreciation for the efforts I would not fail to make to “make people (in the U.S.) understand what we are feeling.”

11. Habib Bourguiba Jr., escorted me from the President’s office. Once in the hall he said he needed to tell me what his father could not. Bourguiba Jr. said that the events of which we had expressed approval could kill his father who was brokenhearted. Bourguiba Sr. had held fast all of his life to the ideas of reasoned dialog and alignment with the democratic West. The Israeli raid had made a shambles not only of the PLO compound but of Bourguiba’s life’s work. “How can he continue to defend our friendship? Your position is a betrayal (“il est cocu”).” The Tunisian people are angry. Already the police are feeling the pressure rising against Americans and the Jewish community here. The French are gleefully exploiting the opportunity handed them. Qadhafi is gloating: “that’s what you get for being the friends of the U.S.” We could at least have warned Tunisia of what was coming. It was simply not credible that the U.S. Sixth Fleet, etc., was unaware of an Israeli squadron flying the length of the Mediterranean here.

12. I answered the correspondent’s questions at the exit with a short statement saying I had heard President Bourguiba’s sorrowful views on yesterday’s Israeli raid, had delivered a message from President Reagan and offered verbal amplification of our views. Acting FonMin Mestiri was preparing a separate declaration which seems likely to be hardhitting.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850700–0690. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat, Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Paris, Tel Aviv, Rabat, and USCINCEUR. The document is misnumbered in the original.
2. In telegram 8966 from Tunis, October 1, Sebastian noted that he would meet with Bourguiba and recommended “(a) strong public USG statement condemning raid on Tunisian target and deploring Tunisian casualties, (b) message I can pass to Bourguiba on subject, and (c) a U.S. position in UNSC making clear that U.S. was unwitting, would have opposed raid if asked, supports compensation for Tunisian victims, and condemns cycle of violence which undermines peace efforts.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0104)
3. In telegram 8964 from Tunis, October 1, the Embassy reported: “In relatively friendly atmosphere, GOT has signaled its dismay over Israeli raid. President Bourguiba is convoking Ambassador Wednesday morning. The GOT is fearful that public reaction to the bombing will undermine close ties with the U.S., and hopes the USG will help assuage the Tunisian public. Qadhafi, GOT believes, will attempt to use the incident to condemn GOT and force wedge between U.S. and Tunisia. GOT leaning toward calling for Security Council meeting.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0051)
4. In telegram Secto 19057 to Tunis, October 2, the Department transmitted the text of a message from Reagan to Bourguiba which read in part: “The difficult circumstances through which you and the people of Tunisia have lived during the last twenty-four hours have caused me great sorrow.” After expressing his “heartfelt condolences and sympathy to you and your people,” Reagan closed by reassuring “that the U.S. Government is sincerely devoted to the security and stability of Tunisia and that we will continue to work for these noble objectives.” (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85): (10/01/1985–10/02/1985))
5. Telegram Secto 19055 to Tunis, October 2, included talking points for Sebastian. It reads in part: “The U.S. Government strongly deplores the pattern of violence of which the Israeli attack on PLO facilities near Tunis is a part. Such acts of violence are contrary to our shared objective of a peaceful, stable Middle East” and “this pattern of violence cannot be allowed to harm the positive and mutually beneficial relations between our two countries.” The Department also included the following talking point: “I want to make it clear that the Israeli Government did not inform or consult the U.S. Government concerning this attack, and there was absolutely no, repeat no, U.S. involvement in it.” (Ibid.)
6. Not found.
7. In telegram 9077 from Tunis, October 3, the Embassy reported that “Senior GOT official has accused ‘someone’ in USG of lying in denying foreknowledge of raid. President Bourguiba was also reportedly further angered when told that U.S. had undertaken to ‘dissuade’ Israel from such an act. Although current high-level Tunisian threats to re-evaluate relations with U.S. should be seen partly in current heated atmosphere, U.S. veto in UNSC would accelerate deterioration of U.S.-Tunisian relationship.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Memorandums: Lot 94D92, Nodis October 1985) The United States abstained from the UN Security Council vote, which took place on October 4. (Telegram 2528 from USUN, October 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850710–0833)
8. See footnote 3, Document 331.