Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

331. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• Call on Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi

Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi expressed to me in strong terms his government’s reaction to the Israeli air strike against the PLO facility near Tunis.² Essebsi was shocked and disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction, which he characterized as supporting or rationalizing the Israelis “aggression” against Tunisia. He asked what our position was.

I conveyed our condolences and sympathy for the loss of Tunisian lives, but told him that a definitive U.S. reaction had to await a fuller clarification of the facts. He expressed appreciation for the condolences, noting with some bitterness that the statements of Larry Speakes³ and other spokesmen had been disappointing in their failure to express any sympathy for Tunisia as a friend of the U.S.⁴

Essebsi went on to make the following points:

— Tunisia considers itself a victim of an act of aggression and “state terrorism” that has resulted in a significant number of innocent dead and wounded, mostly Tunisians (60 dead, 100 wounded at the latest count).

— Tunisia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been violated and its security threatened. Excuses for Israel’s action are not convincing. Tunisia was in no way involved in the actions at Larnaca⁵ and there was no evidence that Tunisian territory had been used to plan or direct that action.

— Tunisia’s policy on terrorism is clear and consistent—it condemns terrorism, whatever its source. Every time the U.S. has been a victim of terrorism, Tunisia has been quick to condemn the act and to express sympathy. The TWA hijacking was only the most recent example. Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the U.S.

— In 1982 Tunisia had acceded to the PLO’s request to receive its headquarters after the U.S. had encouraged it to do so in the context of facilitating a U.S. effort to break an impasse in Lebanon. Its agreement to do so had been a gesture on behalf of peace, not an expression of support for terrorism.

— Israel’s action was clearly directed against the peace process, as its timing (while King Hussein was still in Washington) makes clear. This being the case, all who work for the peace process should condemn the attack as directed not against Tunisia, but against the peace process as a whole.

— Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for condemnation of the act of aggression and of the aggressor and to seek reparations. Tunisia hopes for support from all its friends, including the U.S.

In addition to extending our condolences, I told Essebsi that:

— The USG had no prior knowledge or involvement in the incident.

— We have deplored the cycle of violence in the region, of which this action is an example. It confirms our view that moving the peace process forward is imperative.

— We know that there are people on all sides of the issue who wish to derail the peace process.

— The Israelis see their action as a response to the terrorist incident in Larnaca, for which a PLO faction has claimed responsibility and consequently see their action as directed against the PLO, not against Tunisia. We understand why Tunisia feels that its sovereignty has been violated and recognize that Tunisians have been killed. This we deeply regret.

I assured Essebsi that I would see that his government’s reaction was conveyed to the Secretary and to the President. I reiterated that the rising cycle of violence is of great concern to us because the peace process is its principal victim; that the US had expended a tremendous amount of energy and political capital on the peace process; and that we remain committed to moving the process forward.

Michael H. Armacost⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Quinn initialed the top of the memorandum and wrote: “10/1.”
2. The Department of State received confirmation from the Israeli Government about the attack at 1000 hours. NESA believed that while Israel wanted to “signal” King Hussein of Jordan “that he must crack down on Fatah activities in Jordan,” the “choice of PLO facilities in Tunis as a target instead of PLO targets in Jordan, however, indicates that for the time being Peres’ prime motivation remains to limit the damage that retaliatory attacks inflict on the peace process.” (Spot Commentary, October 1, 1985; Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Israeli Airstrike on PLO camps in Tunisia (9/30/85): (10/01/1985–10/02/1985))
3. In telegram 302819 to USUN, all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, and Beirut, October 2, the Department reported that on October 1, Speakes said in part: “We’re distressed by and deplore the cycle of violence in the Middle East, of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores the urgent need to work for peace in the Middle East. As a matter of U.S. policy, retaliation against terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and expression of self-defense.” He also said the United States was not warned in advance of the Israeli attack. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850699–0582) In telegram 303005 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts and multiple addressees, October 2, the Department transmitted excerpts from the October 1 press briefing, at which Redman commented: “We deeply deplore the rising pattern of violence of which this latest incident is a part. It underscores the need to work on the peace process.” The Department also repeated Speakes’s comment about the legitimacy of self-defense against terrorist attacks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850700–0238)
4. Later that day, Shultz wrote Reagan: “Tunisian Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi made it clear to Mike Armacost today that he was shocked and deeply disappointed by press reports of the U.S. reaction. Essebsi said that he personally did not believe this could accurately represent the U.S. position. Essebsi expressed appreciation for our condolences but said that Tunisia considers itself a victim of an act of aggression and ‘state terrorism,’” and that “Tunisia’s policy to consistently condemn terrorism, whatever its source, and that Tunisia hopes for the same attitude from the U.S. Tunisia has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to ask for condemnation of Israel’s act and to seek reparations.” (Memorandum from Shultz to Reagan, October 1; Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (10/01/85)
5. On September 25, during the Jewish Holy Day Yom Kippur, gunmen from the PLO’s Force 17 unit hijacked an Israeli yacht off the coast of Lanarca, Cyprus, killing all three Israeli citizens aboard.
6. Armacost initialed “MA” above this typed signature.