Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

329. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Carter) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage)¹

DJSM 1794–85

Washington, September 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• Tunisia Security Situation (U)

1. (S) Reference your memorandum² soliciting comments and recommendations regarding US support to Tunisia in its current crisis with Libya.

2. (S) The following are offered for the circumstances you outlined:

a. (S) Current situation.

(1) Despite the harsh rhetoric from Libya, DIA reports³ that Libya has not moved forces or made any preparations to take military action against Tunisia. We do not rule out further deterioration of the situation, given President Bourguiba’s strong feelings and Qadhafi’s penchant for violence, but our expectation at this point is that Libya will continue to expel Tunisians in the near term, and then the crisis will fade.⁴

(2) This appraisal notwithstanding, President Bourguiba clearly feels exposed in the current situation and would greatly appreciate any support provided during the crisis.⁵ If State and OSD desire, USCINCEUR is prepared to schedule a major USN combatant port visit to Tunis in the near future as a symbol of US support. Admiral Watkins’ visit on 4 September 1985 will also be perceived as a strong signal.

(3) There is little in the security assistance pipeline that could be accelerated. However, sixty-five TOW night sights, which have been identified by our ambassador as a possible priority requirement, could be provided on an expedited basis after depot conversion. The conversion would be necessary because the appropriate configuration, the AN/TAS 4C (Export Model), does not exist in Army inventory. The 65 night sights would be incrementally available during a 45 day period after program implementation. Limited numbers of jeeps, armored personnel carriers, and heavy machine guns could also be provided from SDAF stocks, as well as selected ammunition items. Mortar ammunition, 105mm ammo for the M60A3 main gun, 155mm HE, and limited quantities of 7.62mm linked ammunition are available. Other support would require diversion from Army stocks or active/reserve units. Security assistance funding or Section 506(a) authority would be required for items coming from Army inventory. For those items not coming from Army inventory, security assistance funding would be required.

b. (S) Increased hostilities. The most likely threat from Libya is subversion by agents hidden in the recent flood of deportees. Tunisia’s simmering labor problems are expected to generate strikes and unrest this fall. If Qadhafi orchestrates widespread confrontations like the 1980 Gafsa incident⁶ in conjunction with this unrest, the army would be stretched thin. Ideally in such circumstances, a Franco-Tunisian or Algerian-Tunisian joint exercise that introduced an excess of helicopters and trucks could increase the mobility of the Tunisian armed forces. In circumstances of domestic unrest where Libyan provocations were veiled, it would be best for the US not to have its own forces in Tunisia.

c. (TS) Conventional military attack.

(1) If, however, Libya conducts a large scale offensive into Tunisia, we should be prepared to support a French military response, if requested by the GOT. After the credibility loss France suffered in Francophone Africa last year over Chad,⁷ we believe the GOF would be strongly inclined to assist Tunisia. A US Navy CVBG operating off Libya as intimidation should satisfy both French and Tunisian interests for support of French actions. In the case of smaller scale border raids, Paris is likely to offer increased military assistance but try to avoid direct involvement. In either case, France would resent the US taking the lead.

(2) No specific CONPLAN exists addressing a Libyan attack on Tunisia, although a general retribution-on-Libya plan is in preparation. A CONPLAN to assist Tunisia as directed by NSDD 168⁸ has not been started, pending OSD/State guidance on what joint planning with the French, and perhaps the Algerians, is authorized. Your assistance in coordinating with State on this matter is requested.

3. (U) The above has been coordinated with the Services and DSAA.

P. F. Carter, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0058, 1985 Official Records (Top Secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 2, Tunisia 1985. Top Secret.
2. Reference: ASD /ISA Memo, I/20745/85, 22 Aug 85, “Tunisia Security Situation.” [Footnote is in the original. The memorandum has not been found.]
3. Not found.
4. In telegram 7504 from Tunis, August 21, the Embassy reported that Baly “repeated GOT’s growing conviction that Qadhafi making major effort to destabilize Tunisia. He predicted that more Libyans, including diplomats, would be expelled if expulsion of Tunisian workers continued. Ambassador reiterated that we awaiting GOT’s suggestions on how we might be of help.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850594–0860)
5. In telegram 7605 from Tunis, August 23, the Embassy reported “Minister of Defense Baly called in Ambassador urgently afternoon August 23 to request USG assistance in three areas to help GOT meet Libyan threat,” including intelligence, surveillance aircraft, and TOW night sights. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850601–0923)
6. See footnote 2, Document 288.
7. Reference is presumably to the September 17, 1984, agreement between France and Libya, under which both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Chad. Documentation on the accord is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
8. See Document 53.