Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

342369.

Washington, November 17, 1984, 1545Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting With Tunisian Defense Minister Baly on November 14.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: Tunisian Defense Minister Slaheddine Baly met November 14 with the Secretary in advance of the convening of the 4th U.S.-Tunisia Joint Military Commission. The discussion focused on the Libyan threat to Tunisia and the GOT’s concern that regional developments, including the Moroccan-Libyan accord and Libya’s troop withdrawal from Chad, would increase the Libyan security threat to Tunisia. Baly also reiterated Tunisian requests for larger levels and increased concessionality of U.S. security assistance. The Secretary told Baly that the U.S. shares Tunisia’s view of the Libyan threat to the region and that the U.S. would do what it could, within severe budgetary constraints, to help Tunisia with its continuing security needs.

3. Baly opened the conversation by expressing President Bourguiba’s happiness over the reelection of President Reagan. President Bourguiba also remembered fondly his last meeting and conversation with Secretary Shultz in Tunisia.² Baly had met with the President just before coming here. He said that the President’s recent heart troubles had constituted a “warning” to be careful, but the President was recovering and doing fine now.

4. Baly went on to express his appreciation for the scope and quality of U.S. assistance. Tunisia needed to develop itself economically, socially and militarily. But Tunisia needs assistance if it is to develop in all three areas. Its defense must be global, a well-equipped army and people. There cannot be just a diplomatic component without a civil and military component.

5. Tunisian foreign policy was based on non-interference but that policy was not shared by other countries. The threat from Libya is blatant. Since the Gafsa incident the Tunisians concluded they must arm themselves. They tried to restore relations with Qadhafi but Qadhafi believes the Tunisian regime must be brought down and that the two regimes cannot coexist. For Tunisia Qadhafi is the enemy. Qadhafi uses every opportunity to reiterate that Tunisia is plotting to harm his regime. Qadhafi will not forgive President Bourguiba for allowing the Nimetz to make a port call in Tunisia after the Gulf of Sidra incident.³ Qadhafi also believes that the May 8 attack⁴ was fomented by Tunisia, plotting with the U.S. and UK. He alleges that the participants received asylum in Tunisia and crossed into Libya from Tunisian territory. Qadhafi accuses Tunisia of boycotting the OAU meeting in Tripoli in order to prevent Qadhafi from becoming president of the OAU.

6. Baly said that the Moroccan-Libyan Union was also directed against Tunisia. Some countries believe that Qadhafi can be reclaimed by improving their relations with him. Tunisia must now face Qadhafi’s hostility against it, the Moroccan-Libyan Union, and European overtures to improve their relations with Qadhafi. Libyan troops that withdrew from Chad are now on Tunisia’s border yelling anti-Tunisian slogans. When Foreign Minister Essebsi went to Libya he was greeted by threats from Qadhafi. The appointment of Masmoudi to the UN is a hostile act inimical to Tunisian interests. Qadhafi has made statements privately and publicly that a union with Tunisia will occur in spite of the Tunisian Government, but not with the Bourguiba regime.

7. Baly went on to talk about the Soviet naval presence in the harbor off the coast of Tunisia. He told the Secretary that Tunisia was an outpost of the West constantly endangered by the Soviet fleet. The Soviets are looking for a warm water port in the Mediterranean. Their presence would pose a serious danger to NATO and provide a base from which to attack Europe.

8. Baly summarized by asking the Secretary to review the terms and mix of our assistance on FMS so that they would be able to bear the costs of their defense. He also stated that President Bourguiba wanted to develop the south of Tunisia, an area in which the Libyans are fomenting discontent.

9. Secretary Shultz told Baly that the U.S. shares the Tunisian view of Qadhafi. We are upset over the union and have made that known to the Moroccans. We don’t share the view of other countries like Italy that Qadhafi will be changed by going along with him. Our strategy is to isolate him. He is a terrorist and an aggressor. The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. wants to be helpful to Tunisia, which is on the front line of the problem. We continually review our programs but are constrained by our budget. The Secretary added that when Finance Ministers come to this country they are always telling us to get our deficits down. On the question of promoting development in the south, the Secretary said he had not been aware of that request. It sounded expensive but as plans were formed we would be willing to talk about that. However, Tunisia should not expect to see large sums of money going into that development. The Secretary added that President Bourguiba should also know that he has a friend in Washington and one who shares his views on Qadhafi.

10. Baly added that the U.S. policy of isolating Qadhafi is made more difficult by actions of those who wish to boost Qadhafi’s image, for example by the Moroccan-Libyan Accord, and the increasing European audience. This has enabled Qadhafi to become more daring toward Tunisia.

11. Participants at the meeting included Arnold Raphel, Thomas Nassif of NEA, Arnold Kanter of PM and M/G Burns of DOD/ISA.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840738–0042. Confidential; Priority, Exdis. Drafted by Nassif; cleared by Raphel, Zweifel, Robert Clarke, Covey, and Robert Ayling (S/S–O); approved by Shultz. Sent for information to Rabat, Paris, and Algiers.
2. See Document 311.
3. Reference is to the August 19, 1981, Gulf of Sidra incident, when, after being fired upon, two U.S. Navy F–14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan SU–22 Fitter fighter jets. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
4. In telegram 135419 to Brussels, London, Rome, Tunis, and Cairo, May 9, the Department noted press reports about “an armed attack on the barracks in Tripoli where Col. Qadhafi is said normally to reside. Department does not, rpt not, have detailed information on the alleged attack, but believes some sort of military action, either by Libyan dissidents or aimed against them, may have taken place May 8 in Tripoli.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840300–0322)