Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

310. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

3040.

Tunis, April 18, 1983, 1240Z

For P and NEA from Ambassador Cutler. Subject: Under Secretary Eagleburger’s Visit to Tunisia: Follow-up.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Under Secretary Eagleburger’s visit to Tunisia April 13–15 provided timely, high-level consultations on both bilateral and regional issues. Together with the recent stop here by Agriculture Secretary Block,² Eagleburger’s visit went a long way in assuaging concern among Tunisia’s leaders that traditionally close U.S. friendship and support were showing signs of atrophy; that the U.S. with all its preoccupations in the region, was beginning to take its long-time Tunisian friend somewhat for granted. These anxieties should for now be mostly allayed, although we must anticipate the need for further high-level contacts, particularly as Tunisia faces the increasing uncertainties surrounding transition from Bourguiba to a new political era.

3. Eagleburger’s discussions, reported separately, were notable on several counts.³ First and foremost, they revealed the extend of GOT concerns regarding the future of our military assistance program. Prime Minister Mzali made a particularly impassioned plea, reflecting not only a genuine concern for the fate of Tunisia’s military modernization efforts in the face of continuing Libyan threats, but also the political implications, both international and domestic, of U.S. failure to live up to perceived commitments. Tunisian leaders fear that the perception of faltering U.S. support will serve to encourage Tunisia’s enemies abroad (e.g., Qadhafi), will damage both Tunisian and U.S. credibility, and will subject the government to domestic charges that the highly-touted “U.S. connection” is not paying off. Mzali, Bourguiba’s heir-apparent and an outspoken advocate of close U.S.-Tunisian ties, is particularly vulnerable to such charges.

4. Both Mzali and Defense Minister Baly⁴ also made clear that, in addition to the military and political implications of cuts in U.S. security assistance, the GOT will be faced with serious, unexpected budgetary problems as well. Here the immediate focus is on the payments due in June which, without supplemental FMS/MAP funding or some other form of relief, they claim the GOT will not be able to meet.

5. The Tunisians welcomed Eagleburger’s reiteration of the administration’s commitment to do its best to obtain supplemental funds to increase FY 83 FMS/MAP from its current level of $67 million to the $140 million originally requested. At the same time they were reminded again that obtaining a supplemental would not be easy, given U.S. economic conditions and congressional attitudes. While I doubt Tunisian leaders expect to see the full $140 million, they will be looking for some increase—up to last year’s level of $95 million at a minimum. I consider it important to our interests here that the administration seek all possible ways of effecting some such increase, either through a supplemental or, failing that, through reprogramming. Meanwhile, we should be exploring ways to alleviate the more immediate problem of the June payment gap, preferably by deferring payment pending a supplemental or the availability of FY 84 funding.

6. Considering Tunisia’s financial difficulties, the apparent likelihood of major shortfalls in U.S. security assistance funding, and the political as well as economic importance of maintaining a credible level of support for Tunisia, we should consider other ways by which we might help the GOT. One, which I strongly recommend, is to respond positively and promptly to the GOT’s appeal for additional PL 480 assistance. (Our specific recommendations are contained in septels.)⁵ Another is to respond favorably to the GOT’s proposal that $2 million of Tunisia’s ESF funding be used for financial support of Tunisian students in the U.S. This program, initiated personally by Bourguiba with a view to breaking out of the French orbit and tapping into U.S. technology, carries with it both long-term political and commercial advantages for the U.S. and therefore warrants our support.

7. Finally, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the high-level political consultations mentioned above, I would urge Secretary Shultz to stop here when he visits Algeria later this year. Prime Minister Mzali made an appeal to this effect during his meeting with Under Secretary Eagleburger. A stop here, even overnight of for a matter of hours, would yield significant dividends in terms of our overall political relationship.

Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0115. Confidential; Priority; Stadis.
2. A record of Block’s conversation with Mzali is in telegram 2499 from Tunis, March 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830173–0355)
3. A record of Eagleburger’s conversation with Bourguiba and Mzali is in telegram 3053 from Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0112)
4. A record of Eagleburger’s conversation with Baly is in telegram 3055 from Tunis, April 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0322)
5. In telegram 3360 from Tunis, April 29, the Embassy reported that Cutler and Ahmed Ben Arfa, the Tunisian Secretary of State for International Cooperation, “signed and exchanged letters extending the American offer of blended credit and conveying Tunisian acceptance of the offer.” In a press release, the GOT announced “This arrangement on agricultural credits together with the long-standing PL–480 program represent a continuation of the close relationship between the United States and Tunisia.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830241–0850)