Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

305. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Secto 13072.

New York, October 7, 1982, 0539Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Oct. 5, 1982 UNGA, Bilateral With Tunisian Foreign Minister Essebsi.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: The Secretary received Tunisia’s FonMin Essebsi for half-hour bilateral on Oct. 5. Essebsi raised the Palestinian problem, outlining past and current actions by his government to further a solution lying “between” the Arab League’s Fez Summit plan and the President’s Sept. 1 principles.² Essebsi urged an equitable approach towards the Palestinian people and praised the courage of the President’s principles which have earned Tunisia’s support despite its imperfections “because we have faith in the U.S. and its leaders.” Essebsi also adverted to the threat posed Tunisia’s security by Qadhafi’s Libya and urged additional U.S. efforts on the terms of our credits which, with the absence of tangible help from Saudi Arabia, was onerous to the point of compelling Tunisia to rethink its development plans. End summary.

3. The Secretary received Tunisian FonMin Beiji Caid Essebsi in New York on Oct. 5. Essebsi was accompanied by Tunisia’s Ambassadors to the U.S. and the UN Messrs. Ben Yahia and Slim. Assistant Secretary Veliotes, NEA/AFN Director and Alec Toumayan (interpreter) also sat in.

4. Essebsi opened with congratulations on the Secretary’s accession to his current responsibilities.³ He pointed out that Prime Minister Mzali and MOD Baly had recently come to the U.S. to present Tunisia’s views on key issues—particularly Tunisia’s security situation. Unfortunately, Tunisia’s relations with Libya had been deteriorating for the last three years and Libya is heavily armed by the Soviet Union. His government, Essebsi said, considers Libya at present to be a direct threat. He noted that this threat had compelled Tunisia to plan for the procurement of additional military equipment. This is an expensive undertaking and had forced Tunisia to rethink its development plans. Essebsi pointed out that Tunisia’s Saudi friends have not been helpful materially in this context and even a well disposed U.S. provides military credits only on commercial terms. The FonMin hoped that the U.S. would be willing to make a further effort in 1983 particularly insofar as the terms of its credits are concerned.

5. Essebsi then summarized Tunisia’s involvement in the Middle East problem since 1965 when President Bourguiba pleaded for an equitable solution based on the region’s realities (i.e. Israel).⁴ This Tunisian attitude, which had been and remained a constant, had been well received in the U.S. though not in the early years by the Arab world. In 1982 Tunisia involved herself once more. It backed up American Ambassador Habib’s efforts;⁵ agreed to receive PLO combatants which helped induce other Arab states to do likewise and tried to assist with the development of the Arab League’s Fez peace plan based on President Bourguiba’s ideas of record.

6. Tunisia had noted President Reagan’s Sept. 1 principles “and had worked to assure for them a not unfavorable Arab response.” In part as a result of these activities, the Fez Summit’s Committee of Seven would come here to explore the U.S. principles further and to offer clarification on the Fez Summit peace plan.

7. Tunisia reacted positively to President Reagan’s principles not because they are complete but because they show an American political will to find equitable solutions. The principles, in Tunisia’s view, are incomplete because they call up Israel to deal with Arab countries when they should call on Israel to deal with the Palestinian people. Tunisia fears that the President’s proposals may be seen by some as a continuation of the Camp David Agreements (CDA)⁶ in that they seem to imply a continuation of indirect contacts with the Palestinians, this time through Jordan and Egypt.

8. Tunisia is concerned that in such a case the desired results would continue to fail of achievement. However, the President’s principles recognize a U.S. responsibility for the situation in the Middle East and the Tunisian Government has faith in the US and in its leaders. It therefore feels the need to give the President as much support as it can. This is reflected in the letters which President Bourguiba sent President Reagan⁷ and which, while praising President Reagan’s courage and assuring the latter of President Bourguiba’s support, calls for a (MidEast) solution “falling between the Arab and the American peace plans.” Tunisia has thus acted on this issue with faith in the future while wondering what the future will bring.

9. The Secretary responded that the USG appreciates the constructive initiatives Tunisia has taken which have contributed to a better atmosphere more conducive to a solution in the region.

10. With regard to the CDA there are matters of strategic import to keep in mind. Israel had signed its name to a document calling for the achievement of Palestinian rights and subscribed to a process leading to self-government for the Palestinian people. To abandon CDA would be to let go of this Israeli commitment. That would be a mistake.

11. The Secretary continued that the interpretation given the CDA stipulations by Israel are incorrect. Hence we have cast our proposals in terms of the CDA but give them a different interpretation which, we believe, can lead to a very different situation on the West Bank and Gaza.

12. Political developments, the Secretary said, take place in stages. Problems must first be recognized before they can be resolved and the Israelis now know that there is a Palestinian problem which needs to be addressed. As a consequence, there are now many people planning on how these problems are to be dealt with. It is our view that after the next round of consultations, including the visit to the president of the Fez Summit’s Committee of Seven, the stage of position-taking will have ended and the search for compromises between the positions will have arrived at the negotiating table. It is at this stage, the Secretary said, that it is important for King Hussein with Palestinian support and that of others to be able to enter the talks so that the process originally envisaged can begin to move. When this occurs, people will look to a different future in the region and compromises will become possible.

13. The Secretary then reiterated the gratitude of the U.S. for Tunisia’s help and its hope that Tunisia and its Foreign Minister would keep telling people to be realistic and to become part of the solution rather than remain part of the problem.

14. The Secretary said that we understand Tunisia’s concerns about Libya “and we will support you.” We welcome the strengths of our bilateral ties.

15. In closing, Essebi urged an equitable approach to the Middle East problem. He said that the Israelis clearly are entitled to their security and asserted that this was well understood throughout the Arab world. On the other hand, the Palestinian people are also a reality and are entitled to similar “rights and obligations.” There will be no solution in the region unless there is equity in the treatment of the Palestinian people, he said.

16. Bilaterally, Caid Essebsi said in closing, there are no problems except Tunisia’s problems of security and in this context Tunisia hopes not to have to face its burdens alone.

17. As the Secretary escorted FonMin Essebsi to the door the latter thanked him for the cordiality of his reception and urged him to come to Tunisia. The Secretary said that he would like to do so.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820517–0927. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shultz was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly.
2. See footnote 2, Document 114. Documentation on the initiative is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
3. Shultz became Secretary of State on July 16 after Haig resigned on July 5.
4. During a March 9, 1965, press conference in Jerusalem, Bourguiba had said that Arabs could cooperate with Jews. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXIV, Africa, footnote 3, Document 147.
5. See footnote 2, Document 17.
6. Reference is to the framework of agreements signed by Egypt and Israel on September 17, 1978. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition.
7. See Document 299 and Tab B, Document 301.