Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

6295.

Tunis, August 24, 1982, 1426Z

SUBJECT

• Tunisia’s Security Needs.

Ref:

• (A) Tunis 6247,²
• (B) Tunis 6202.³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary and action requested. Deteriorating relations with Libya and arrival of PLO contingent from Beirut pose a substantial security burden on Tunisia, for which GOT looks to USG for relief.⁴ Tunisian officials, from Bourguiba on down, have recently cited increased security needs, and this theme can be expected to be raised in upcoming high-level discussions with USG. Although GOT has been cautioned repeatedly that funding level for FY–83 might well be limited to a continuing resolution authority, U.S. security assistance at same level as last year instead of at increased level of $140 million will be a disappointment, particularly in view of current economic weaknesses which make military modernization even more of a burden. Action requested: Recommend Department review question of concessional financing, which could compensate to some degree for lack of increase in new appropriations for Tunisia. End summary.

3. Prime Minister Mzali and Defense Minister Baly, in separate conversations with me August 24, argued strongly for higher levels of U.S. assistance (septels).⁵ Both pointed to severe difficulties in financing military modernization at full levels without additional U.S. help. It is clear that President Bourguiba has issued firm instructions to move ahead rapidly on this issue, but that GOT is hard pressed to find adequate funding within its own budget. (Baly indicated there were no other potential sources of financing at present—e.g., Saudi Arabia.)

4. Our recent conversations indicate that GOT views increased security requirements in light of (A) growing Libyan threat as result of discord over abortive OAU summit⁶ and (B) imminent arrival of 1,000 PLO fighters from Beirut. Tunisians consider that their policies on these issues have benefited U.S. aims, and feel it is therefore logical that GOT should look to USG for additional help under new circumstances. President Bourguiba pursued this general theme in our August 21 meeting (ref A), as did FonMin Essebsi separately and in more detail same day. Interior Minister Guiga, in discussing PLO arrival with us on August 19, also pressed for U.S. help in meeting new security burden arising from PLO presence (ref B).

5. Embassy believes Tunisian security concerns should be taken seriously. We understand that Libyan threats have become more explicit recently, with Qadhafi personally telephoning warnings of dire consequences because of Tunisian unwillingness to support him on OAU summit in Tripoli. Libyan rhetoric against states receiving PLO contingents has also been sharp, as Dept is aware. Of equal if not greater concern to GOT are possible consequences of presence here of 1,000 PLO fighters, who could well create internal security problems over time. We see considerable merit in Tunisian argument that USG has been an important beneficiary of Tunisian policies vis-à-vis both OAU and PLO. We also share Tunisian view that the security burden will be disproportionately heavy in comparison with Tunisia’s modest resources and currently weakened economy.

6. In view of fact that higher levels of security assistance do not appear likely in near term, I strongly recommend that further serious consideration be given to seeking concessional financing for the funds which are being appropriated. Such concessional funding would help ease somewhat Tunisian problems in implementing the military modernization program. In addition, it would provide a clear political signal at a critically important time that the U.S. continues to support Tunisia’s moderation, thereby encouraging the GOT to play a supportive role with respect to Middle East peace efforts.

7. USG will need to be prepared to address Tunisian concerns re the level and terms of U.S. security assistance in upcoming high-level bilateral discussions, such as during Defense Minister Baly’s attendance at Joint Military Commission meeting in September and his subsequent meetings in Washington, as well as during FonMin Essebsi’s expected bilateral at UNGA.

Cutler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820439–0532. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.
2. In telegram 6247 from Tunis, August 21, Cutler reported that, during their August 21 meeting, “Bourguiba asked me to convey to President Reagan congratulations on achieving resolution of Beirut crisis. He was glad Tunisia could play useful role by receiving large number of PLO, including Arafat.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820435–0662)
3. In telegram 6202 from Tunis, August 19, the Embassy reported: “Interior Minister Guiga told Ambassador August 19 of strong Tunisian interest in screening PLO members coming to Tunisia before their arrival.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820431–0600)
4. In telegram 6035 from Tunis, August 12, the Embassy reported: “The announcement late August 10 by Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi that Bourguiba had agreed to a request from Arafat to accept what was described as the ‘first wave’ of Palestinians to evacuate Beirut came as a considerable surprise to Tunisians. It is still early to assess reaction, but many Tunisians, in the political establishment and out, seem to be puzzled and worried. Emotional identification with the Palestinian cause coexists here with a very strong distaste for the politics of the eastern Arabs and a belief that, considerations of principle aside, Tunisia should keep them at arms length.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820419–0208)
5. Records of Cutler’s conversations with Mzali and Baly are in telegram 6359 from Tunis, August 25 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820441–1028) and telegram 6356 from Tunis, August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0455, D820441–0954)
6. Because a two-thirds quorum did not attend, the OAU meeting scheduled for August 5 in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that “most of the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara.” Others had “misgivings about Colonel Qaddafi’s assumption of the OAU membership for 1982–83;” they considered his policies in Africa “too radical.” (Geoffrey Godsell, “OAU Summit Fizzles in Qaddafi-land,” Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1982)