Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

275. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rabat, April 2, 1988

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and King Hassan II of Morocco, Friday, 1 April 1988

The King indicated that he wished to talk to me alone and dismissed the interpreter. After initial pleasantries, and recalling our prior meetings, the King told me how pleased he was with Ambassador Nassif. He considered him to be sensitive, responsive, and knowledgeable. He had heard that Ambassador Nassif was going to leave and hoped that that would not be the case. I told him Ambassador Nassif needed to place his children in school and would probably leave before the end of the year.

In chatting about the American election campaign, the King expressed high admiration for Vice President Bush. Bush had shown great sensitivity at the time the King announced union with Libya, a move he had to make in order to “buy himself two years in the Sahara war”. He sincerely hoped that Bush would be elected President.

The King talked at some length about his relations with Algeria, the sum and substance of which was that he was trying to make some moves to put an end to the feuding between Algeria and Morocco. He felt he was making good progress toward an agreement. He hoped that the UN effort he was pursuing with regard to the Western Sahara could serve as an “umbrella” for such an agreement. He got along well with President Bendjedid, but he had scant regard for Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi, a man who had not participated in the revolution, was an “intellectual” set on trying to prove his worth. Ibrahimi does not want peace.

The King noted that Ambassador Nassif had given him a memorandum on our relationship with Morocco.² The memo was divided into short, medium, and long-term steps. This division was inappropriate. As far as he was concerned, the short-term and the long-term were the same. The relationship between Morocco and the United States should be like a marriage. Once the decision is made the friendship should last forever. Unfortunately, he does not see that kind of commitment coming out of the United States.

The King noted that Morocco was somewhat of an outcast. Many of the neighboring countries were run by the military. Arabs in general preferred single party states to the multi-party system in Morocco. The King needed to feel that the security of his people would be assured once he passes from the scene. To achieve this he needed a special relationship with the United States.

I asked him how we might start to develop that relationship. He responded that as far as he was concerned, the most important thing was for us to let the world know that Morocco was truly America’s friend. This message needs to be spread by “all your leaders and all your Ambassadors”.

I praised the King’s efforts to develop a close relationship with Portugal. The King responded enthusiastically and asked me to help. He said he had already had a visit from Mario Soares who was a “wonderful person”. I urged him to establish relations with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva as well, and he said he would. His fervent hope was that he could develop a triangular relationship: Morocco-Portugal-NATO. Such a relationship would ensure that the West could control the Straits of Gibraltar. Portugal needed to understand that it was a Mediterranean nation as well as an Atlantic nation.

I gave the King a review of our relationship with the Soviets, concentrating on my meeting with Yazov and our Arms Control negotiations.³ The King expressed great sympathy for what Gorbachev was trying to do and said we should help him.⁴ I noted that as far as I was concerned, “the jury is still out on that score”. I noted that Gorbachev was trying to make substantial changes in the USSR, but those changes had yet to impact the military establishment. The King seemed surprised when I told him the Soviets continue to pour out offensive weapons and that I had not seen any visible signs of a change in their doctrine. I noted that it would not serve our purposes to help Gorbachev modernize his economy if the end result were only a more efficient military machine. On the other hand, I agreed we needed to maintain a dialogue with the Soviets. I intended to continue military to military contacts and we were all working very hard to bring about further agreements in the arms control area. The King seemed particularly interested in verification and I walked him through the verification issues involved in START. I also described to him the difficulties of verifying chemical weapon production. He noted that the Iraqis has made a “horrible error” in using a poison gas.⁵

The King had no special message other than the usual plea for a close relationship with the United States. It was clear, however, that he was anxious to talk. He seemed somewhat lonely, almost thirsty for an exchange of views on the state of the world.

Frank C. Carlucci

1. Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: Meetings 03/29/88–04/02/88. Secret. A shorter version of the meeting is in telegram ToSec 60114/104618, April 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880284–0069)
2. Not found and not further identified.
3. In telegram 1860 from Bern, March 16, Carlucci summarized his meeting with Soviet Minister of Defense General Dmitry Yazov, noting that it covered “dangerous military activities, military-to-military contacts, policies and doctrines, and arms control” initiatives between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])
4. Reference is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Documentation on the talks is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I.
5. Reference is to the Iraqi Government’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish city of Halabja on March 16. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988.