Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

2507.

Rabat, March 12, 1988, 1210Z

For Assistant Secretary Crocker from Ambassador. Subject: Discussion With Hassan on Angola. Ref: State 72889.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Pursuant to reftel, I sought and obtained an audience with King Hassan in Marrakech on March 11. I explained that I had sent a message to Washington describing the conversation that had taken place during the Fete du Tron between King Hassan, Ambassador Walters and representatives of the MPLA.³ I told King Hassan that our government was interested in following up on this meeting and obtaining further information.

3. I explained that we had been invited to Luanda soon to discuss the details of the Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) and that if we obtained a detailed calendar for that withdrawal, Assistant Secretary Crocker could travel there soon. I went through the balance of the talking points including our discussions with the Soviets and the MPLA as well as our approach on CTW, UNSCR 435,⁴ and NR in Angola.

4. I asked Hassan whether in his opinion Kito had been speaking for Dos Santos on NR or whether he was speaking for himself. The King’s answer was one word, “both.” He felt that Kito’s associate Mpayo was a powerful player. While he did not outrank Kito, he must be very well placed in the MPLA. Dos Santos is expected to visit Rabat on March 25th for 24 hours. I asked whether the MPLA had responded to King Hassan’s suggestion to bring Dos Santos and Savimbi together. The King acknowledged he had received a response but the response was negative. The MPLA see themselves as a legitimate government and Savimbi as a rebel and therefore did not want to enter into talks with him. The King quipped, “then why do you want me to enter the talks with the Polisario?” King Hassan feels that the question of a Savimbi-Dos Santos meeting is more a conflict of personalities than it is a rejection of meeting with the UNITA representatives. He, in fact, will ask both MPLA and UNITA to select representatives to come to Rabat and meet with King Hassan sometime after the Dos Santos meeting. Savimbi will also be invited soon but Hassan was not sure whether he would do so before or after Dos Santos’ meeting on the 25th. In Hassan’s opinion, there is no question but the MPLA is ready to talk to UNITA but not Savimbi.

5. Hassan denied any efforts to arrange talks between the MPLA and the South African Government and also replied negatively when I asked if he had been in touch with other key African players, e.g., Nigeria, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Kenya, Ivory Coast, on this issue. It seems unlikely King Hassan would not have discussed this with at least one or two of his closer African friends, since it is clear that he sees this as an important African card.

6. He asked me to request two notes verbale that he could have in hand when Dos Santos arrived. They would be from the U.S. Government, one taking a hard line and one taking a moderate line. Whichever one was necessary to use with the MPLA he would use. He told me that he wanted to stay in constant touch with me between now and the arrival of Dos Santos on the 25th. He wanted me to request permission to be received by Dos Santos at that time. (Comment: It is obvious that Hassan has an important need to show he is in fact working closely with the USG on this question. He was frank that we would be doing an old friend a big favor if he was seen as contributing to a resolution of this problem.) I suggested that possibly Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Crocker might be interested in coming to Morocco and possibly during the time Dos Santos was here. Hassan said that he felt that might be too high a profile at this time and that Dos Santos might prefer to be more discrete. I agreed to pass on these messages to Washington and to respond as quickly as possible.

7. Comment: I am happy to continue to assist in these discussions in whatever low-key fashion or otherwise you might desire. I have committed to nothing except that I would make King Hassan’s views and requests known in Washington. It was clear during my monologue on the background of U.S. activities vis-a-vis Angola/Namibia that Hassan was extremely interested. It was quite unusual for him to want to involve me so directly in discussions he was having with another country but on the other hand, understandable given his desire to improve his position with his African neighbors. I leave it to you whether to prepare these notes verbale and if so, what they will contain as well as the decision on any further participation of mine in the discussions with King Hassan and/or Dos Santos. I would not rule out the possibility of suggesting to King Hassan that I bring with me someone from the African Bureau at a level below that of Assistant Secretary if you think that would be helpful and appropriate. Please advise as soon as possible.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D552, Rabat 1988 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.
2. In telegram 72889 to Rabat, March 9, the Department transmitted talking points for further discussions with the Moroccan Government regarding the Angolan/Namibian negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]) Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.
3. Telegram 2232 from Rabat, March 4, contains the message about the Walters-Hassan-MPLA meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880189–0421)
4. Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 435, adopted on September 29, 1978, which called for a ceasefire and UN-supervised elections in Namibia. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 96, 98, 101–103, 112, and 350.