Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

237782.

Washington, August 2, 1985, 2121Z

SUBJECT

• Acting Secretary’s Post-Luncheon Conversation With Moroccan Prime Minister Karim Lamrani.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Following the July 29 luncheon,² a smaller group including Under Secretary Armacost and Assistant Secretary Murphy met in Acting Secretary’s office for a further exchange, nominally on bilateral issues. As at the luncheon, Karim Lamrani was voluble as he stressed Morocco’s preoccupation with Algeria and argued that coincident USG and GOM interests should be translated into significantly higher levels of economic and military assistance for Morocco. End summary.

3. During post-luncheon discussion of nominally bilateral issues, Prime Minister Karim Lamrani spoke emotionally and at length about the perceived threat from Algeria. He epitomized Algerian policy towards Morocco as an “aggressive posture”, constant since Algerian independence. Elementary rules of international morality impede a direct Algerian attack on Morocco; hence, the GOA has chosen to work through the Polisario. The acceptance by the OAU of the SDAR—which controls no territory, has no government or legal institutions, or no identified population—sets a dangerous precedent. Over the past 20 years the Algerians have undertaken incursions into Morocco on four occasions. Recently armed commandos were apprehended coming from Algeria; their mission was to create a “pre-revolutionary climate” in Morocco.

4. The order of battle is 2–10 times in Algeria’s favor, depending on the weapons or force discussed. There is a prospect for more Soviet support for Algeria. Morocco does not have aggressive intent, but Algeria does. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to address the GOM’s minimal military requirements. The JMC is seized with implementation of Morocco’s five year plan. The real problem is one of finance. The GOM is cutting back on social and economic development in order to purchase necessary arms. However, Morocco can no longer bear the cost. There is no hope of help from the Eastern bloc without unacceptable political costs. The USG, as leader of the free world, must look to Morocco’s strategic location and act to preserve our interests there.

5. Despite this threat, the PM stated, the GOM heretofore had not pressed for increased financial assistance. However, it is necessary now to look at the allocation of USG resources in the area. He contended that Morocco is strategically more important to the U.S. than is Israel. Yet, the balance of resource allocation is dols 6 billion (sic) for Israel as opposed to dols 179 million for Morocco. Something should be done to meet Morocco’s needs in keeping with U.S. interests there.

6. Acting Secretary Whitehead responded that the USG is sympathetic to the Moroccan needs and concerns; these will be taken into consideration. Nonetheless, increasing Morocco’s military capabilities if and as the Soviets increase those of Algeria is not the ultimate solution to problems. Both the GOM and the GOA should be aligned with the USG against Soviet influence in the area. The Algerian-Moroccan dispute ultimately should give way to the more important objective of peace in the region. The special, longstanding USG relationship with Israel and Egypt and assistance to those nations serves the cause of peace.

7. The Acting Secretary went on to note USG budgetary problems. With a dols 200 billion deficit our ability to expand assistance is limited. Congress is under pressure to reduce the deficit by dols 50 billion. This year our global assistance will amount to dols 12.5 billion. We will be lucky if we can achieve that amount next year; in fact, we probably will end up with lower global levels. This is not meant to be a negative reaction to the Prime Minister’s presentation, but we do not want to raise GOM hopes. We are aware of the GOM’s needs, and there is a special friendship for Morocco. The USG “will do its best to give careful consideration” to these needs.

8. The PM responded vigorously that Morocco will not be the instigator of any escalation in the Western Sahara. The GOM has no problem with Algeria. In the interest of peace, the GOM acquiesced to Algerian annexation of some of Morocco’s historic territory. Contrarily the Algerians seek to destabilize the regime in Morocco and “to annex Moroccan territory” through the Polisario. Morocco is part of the free world while Algeria’s “true colors” are as natural allies of the Soviets. Karim Lamrani went on to ask rhetorically what would happen if Algeria were to bomb the bases encompassed in our mutual access and transit agreement? If more pressure comes from Algeria, the answer will not lie alone in military equipment. What, the Prime Minister asked, would happen if Morocco were to be lost to the West? Then the cost would be much greater than dols 12.5 billion; the situation would be irreversible.

9. Regarding levels of USG assistance, Karim Lamrani opined that if there is to be a reduction in FY 86, this should be shared proportionately among recipients.

10. In his only volunteered remarks on the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, the PM stated that the Polisario had received support from Algeria and Libya. The Treaty of Union with Libya was designed to stop Libyan support. This issue was of such importance as to warrant an “alliance with the devil”. The treaty succeeded in neutralizing Libyan support, but Algeria has continued to arm the Polisario.

13. The Acting Secretary thanked the PM, then pointed out that the USG believes Libya to be a much greater problem than Algeria. USG would be much more sympathetic if the Moroccan efforts were aimed at Libya rather than against Algeria which we do not perceive to be a serious enemy. Karim Lamrani riposted that Algeria is a fundamental, systemic foe of the West. The Libyan Government is a one man affair “with a mad man at the helm”. The Libyan people on the other hand are good. The USG has been unable to control Qadhafi. Hassan is trying to tame him. The GOM believes Qadhafi is less dangerous than he was a year ago and that he might further quiet down. The PM went on to assert that the reason why the recent TWA hijacking didn’t involve stops in Tripoli was that Qadhafi was conscious that King Hassan would not tolerate any Libyan action to harm the American hostages.

Armacost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850552–0905. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Murphy, Johnson, Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), and James Collins (S/S–O); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information to Algiers, Tunis, Nouakchott, Khartoum, Ndjamena, and USCINCEUR. The document is misnumbered in the original.
2. In telegram 238579 to Rabat, August 3, the Department reported on the discussion during the luncheon, which “was dominated by Karim Lamrani who chose to focus on Syria’s role in the Middle East. He bluntly labeled the SARG as ‘imperialist and hegemonistic’ and a cat’s paw for the Soviets.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850552–0123)