Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5625.

Rabat, June 19, 1985, 1100Z

NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy and DAS Nassif. Subject: McFarlane Visit to Morocco. Ref: (A) State 185939;² (B) Rabat 5605.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. While I will, of course, if Washington insists, deliver McFarlane-Hassan message contained in ref (A) and explain to Foreign Minister Filali the cancellation of Mr. McFarlane’s visit along lines contained in reftel, I see certain risks to our interests in hanging the McFarlane cancellation/postponement so directly and completely on our concerns about Hassan’s assumed efforts to bring Chad into the Morocco-Libya union. Doing the latter would, I think, make it difficult to maintain a useful dialogue with Hassan over the period just ahead on issues of common concern. With the strong prospect of a special Arab League summit here in Morocco a few weeks from now, we may find that there are matters of substantial interest that we would want to discuss with Hassan prior to, or in the general context of, such a summit. Similarly, Washington may well wish to consider later the value of discussing terrorism/hijackings in the Middle East with Hassan prior to the convening of an Arab summit. Finally, delivering message as envisaged in ref (A) could complicate, or render null, our attempts to schedule a useful JEC and JMC at an early date.

3. My strong recommendation is that I be authorized to tell Foreign Minister Filali this afternoon (meeting is at 1600 local, 1100 Washington time) that Mr. McFarlane regrets that he cannot visit Morocco at this time but that he hopes to visit at some future mutually convenient date.⁴ We could cite this heavy schedule and current preoccupations (e.g. TWA hijacking) as precluding trip at present. I could then tell Filali in all candor that indications that Hassan had tried to bring Chad into the Morocco-Libya union had also given Washington pause, and that as we think about re-scheduling McFarlane visit at some future date, GOM should assume that Washington will continue to keep Morocco’s actions toward Libyan Union under review.

4. Foregoing approach would, I think, retain the essence of the Washington message (ref A) while encapsulating it in a somewhat more acceptable form on the eve of the Eid al-Fitr holiday. It would also give us a little breathing room as I try to discover from Filali this afternoon just how hard Hassan did, or did not, push the Arab-African Union idea with Habre while the latter was here last weekend. Until I have seen Filali, and in the absence of other reporting, the question arises whether the cautions we earlier expressed to Hassan about bringing Chad into the union may not have slowed him down somewhat when he prepared for meeting with Habre.

5. I plan to try to telephone DAS Nassif on secure phone at OOB to see whether my instructions can be modified along lines of para (3) above. If we fail to make contact, an immediate cable response from Department would be appreciated.

6. I recommend that telegrams on this topic continue in Exdis, or more restrictive, channel.

Kirby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850428–1038. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.
2. See Document 242.
3. In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 18, Kirby asked the Department to provide “information relating to the reasons for the McFarlane postponement and anything you might have with respect to dates for a visit in the future.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850428–1038)
4. In telegram 5660 from Rabat, June 19, Kirby reported that he had informed Filali that “unfortunately National Security Affairs Advisor McFarlane will be unable to visit Morocco next weekend as previously suggested. I said that while President Reagan and Mr. McFarlane believe in the value of continuing the high-level dialogue with Morocco Mr. McFarlane currently has too many things on his plate, including the TWA hijacking, to permit him to undertake such a visit at this time.” Kirby continued: “Filali was clearly disappointed and said that the King would be, as well.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850433–0549) Documentation on the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism.