Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

3475.

Nouakchott, July 25, 1983, 1232Z

SUBJECT

• Qadhafi’s Mauritania Visit.

Ref:

• Nouakchott 3437 (Notal).²

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: In his 45 hour visit to Mauritania, Libya’s Colonel Qadhafi found officials wary and a populace relatively indifferent. Qadhafi minded his manners. Important issues addressed—Chad, Western Sahara, and the Middle East—apparently prompted no startling revelations. In all Mauritanian officials made it quite clear that they were not susceptible to the Libyan leader’s grand schemes for Africa, Islam, or the Arab world. End summary.

3. Mounting a hasty but credible reception to accommodate Col. Mummar el Qadhafi’s auto-invitation to visit Mauritania, Chief of State Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla welcomed the Libyan leader to Nouakchott for a forty-five hour visit beginning July 22. Trailer trucks transported several thousand inhabitants of Nouakchott’s tent-and-shack suburbs to ringside seats on the airport road. French and Arab editions of Chaab carried a photo of Haidalla and Qadhafi in a fraternal embrace. Qadhafi boarded one of the four aircraft which transported his entourage at 9 a.m. on July 24.

4. Authentically Arab: In apparent contrast to his disastrous public relations effort in April, 1981,³ when he chastised Mauritanians for their defective claims to membership in the Arab-Islamic world, Qadhafi this time round celebrated the authenticity of Arab culture and Islamic values in this “most western bastion of the Pan-Arab nation”. Haidalla, whom he had earlier asked to step aside in favor of more zealous Pan-Arab nationalists, was described as “a true guide to the revolution”. During a hastily arranged meeting with leaders of Mauritania’s structure for the education of the masses, a year-old political consciousness-raising effort, Qadhafi drew some flattering parallels between the SEM and his own successes since coming to power in September 1969.

5. Matters of substance: Apart from two dinners and a breakfast (offered in a tent 20 miles into the desert), visits to two small Libyan-supported projects, and meetings with Mauritania’s sizeable contingent of Libyan secondary school teachers, Qadhafi’s schedule consisted primarily of two hour long meetings, one with Haidalla and Prime Minister Taya, and another with Foreign Ministry officials on both sides. At the latter, according to one report, Qadhafi stoutly contradicted reports of Libyan troops’ presence in Chad, and urged Mauritania to play a more active but unspecified role in the “anti-Zionist” camp. Haidalla and Qadhafi reportedly discussed Western Sahara options in their private talk; little more is known except for a GIRM official’s comment that Haidalla sought new assurances that a settlement should not prejudice Mauritania’s sovereignty or the Sahara’s right to self-determination.

6. Comment: In a nice touch, the front page of the July 23 Chaab managed to juxtapose Haidalla welcoming Qadhafi with a picture of Foreign Minister Ould Minnih receiving Ambassador Peck. The airport scene projected another message: Several French military aircraft parked alongside the runway, prompting rumors they were carrying supplies to Chad. Mauritanian officials noted with relief and astonishment that Qadhafi and his party of 200 brought their own food—even lambs for the traditional meschoui; Nouakchott’s food markets are notoriously short on basic supplies this time of year, and news of Qadhafi’s impending arrival had prompted a mini-run on what delicacies were available. For the rest Nouakchott’s attention remained steadfastly fixed during Qadhafi’s stay on Mauritania’s first-ever soccer tournament in their new stadium. From what we can see at this point, in substance and in form, Qadhafi’s return to Mauritania was a modest affair; we will assess the significance of the visit in septel.⁴

Brynn

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830421–1051. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 3437 from Nouakchott, July 21, the Embassy reported: “In meeting this morning, Foreign Minister Minnih noted that Qadhafi had asked leave to visit Mauritania following his trip to Rabat; GIRM had replied Mauritania’s friends were always welcome. GIRM officials were visibly relieved when Qadhafi’s entourage headed east from Rabat.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830415–0655)
3. Reference is to Qadhafi’s “unexpected” April 21, 1981, visit to Mauritania. In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April 22, 1981, the Embassy reported that Qadhafi publicly declared that Mauritania had accepted “in principle, to join Steadfastness Front” which opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process as well as “the possibility of Mauritania-Libya merger.” The GIRM informed the Embassy, however, that Mauritania had not agreed to any of Qadhafi’s claims. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810189–0944)
4. In telegram 3555 from Nouakchott, July 28, the Embassy reported: “According to GIRM and foreign observers, Col. Qadhafi left Mauritania not a happy man. His departure, however, may have raised Haidalla’s spirits. Qadhafi found no audience for federation schemes, and Chief of State Haidalla took umbrage at his demeaning assessment of Mauritania and its efforts to mobilize its own resources.” The Embassy continued: “Qadhafi was heard urging his aide-de-camp to hasten their departure from ‘this miserable country.’ It was not a productive visit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830430–0191)