Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

5400.

Tunis, July 19, 1983, 1400Z

SUBJECT

• Prime Minister Mzali Visits Tripoli.

Ref:

• Tunis 5244.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Prime Minister Mzali left Tunis July 19 for Tripoli to attend a session of the Tunisian-Libyan High Commission. Although as late as July 15 Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi told the Ambassador that no final decision had been made that Mzali would go, it has been increasingly apparent that the Libyans would take great offense if he failed to show. The Tunisian Ministers of Economy and Plans have been in Tripoli since July 17 to prepare the High Commission meeting.

3. The High Commission has existed for some years, but it had been dormant until it was revived by Qadhafi’s visit to Tunisia in February 1982. Although the communique issued at the conclusion of that meeting specified that the High Commission would meet every six months, presided by Mzali and his Libyan counterpart, no formal meeting of the High Commission has taken place until now because there has been no progress on the two issues of primary concern to the Tunisians: the enrollment of Tunisian workers into Libyan backed “liberation movements”, and the continental shelf.

4. It is not clear why Mzali has now agreed to go to Tripoli. We are told that Libyan pressures have been intense, and it may be that Mzali concluded that his continued refusal to go to Libya would have provoked an unnecessary crisis with the Libyans. That one Mzali advisor was hoping he would not go, and the Foreign Minister’s statement to the Ambassador July 15 that no final decision had been taken,³ indicate that there may have been a debate on the issue within the government, which Bourguiba would have had to resolve.

5. One thing is certain, Mzali’s visit does not mean that the Tunisian view of Libya has changed. From Bourguiba on down, the Tunisian Government regards Qadhafi’s Libya as a continuing security threat. Mzali can be frank and tough when he wants to be, and his meeting with Qadhafi may well be acrimonious. With regard to Chad, the PLO, and relations with Algeria, Mzali can be counted on to speak his mind, while concentrating on the problems of Tunisians in Libyan Camyu and the continental shelf. If Qadhafi is prepared to make concessions, particularly on the shelf issue, relations could improve. If not, as seems more likely, Mzali’s visit risks aggravating already strained relations and threatening the rather threadbare “normalization” which began in February 1982.⁴

Cutler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830409–1130. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Paris, Rabat, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 5244 from Tunis, July 11, the Embassy reported an impending visit by Mzali to Tripoli in order to attend the Tunisian-Libyan High Commission meeting. The Embassy’s source said that “Libyan pressure for a Mzali visit has been intense. In exchange, the Tunisians want tangible progress on several fronts, including the treatment of Tunisian workers in Libya and the continental shelf.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830392–0836)
3. No record of Mzali’s statement has been found.
4. In telegram 5476 from Tunis, July 21, the Embassy reported: “Prime Minister Mzali appears to have emerged unscathed, at least publicly, from his recent visit to Tripoli for the first meeting of the Tunisian-Libyan Joint Commission. Progress on the difficult political issues which divide Tunisia and Libya appears to have been minimal. While agreement was reached on certain economic and commercial questions, we can expect that Tunisia will watch closely to see whether or not Libya intends to follow through on its commitments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830415–0832)