Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

233. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

11001.

Rabat, December 11, 1984, 1228Z

Dept for Secretary Shultz. Dept please pass to White House for National Security Advisor McFarlane and Admiral Murphy. Dept please pass to Department of Defense for Secretary Weinberger. Subj: Audience With King Hassan—Message for the President.

1. (Secret-Nodis)—Entire text

2. Summary: During an audience in Fes on December 10, King Hassan dictated a message to President Reagan, urging that the United States provide larger amounts of material assistance to Morocco. The King’s warning that the United States is getting more from Morocco than it receives in return undoubtedly reflects the growing domestic and international pressures which he is under. End summary.

3. In the course of a 90 minute audience December 10 at the Royal Palace in Fes (full reports of which I am sending by septels),² the King, acknowledging my renewed expression of concern over Morocco’s relations with Libya, asked me to convey “textually” the following “question” to “my friend” the President and his senior advisors, which he insisted that Pol Off take down verbatim.

4. Begin text: “America knows it can do what it wants in Morocco. Morocco has given you the access and transit agreement, an active military exercise program, unrestricted ship visits, permission to expand your Voice of America station, and a host of other programs. I must ask, what have you done for Morocco in exchange? I value the close relations I have with the leaders of the United States, and appreciate the many signs of friendship I receive, but I am disappointed to note that the friendship is rarely backed up with corresponding substance. What is America going to do? You will have to make a choice.” End text.

5. In parting I asked Hassan why he had chosen this moment to convey such a message rather than during the visits to Morocco last year of the Vice President³ and the Secretary of State.⁴ He responded, “I did, but, perhaps I was too oblique. Now with Addis and New York this is the moment of truth.” The King reiterated his desire for continued close ties, reminding me he had given his word that the “union” with Libya would not in any way affect the U.S. relationship.

6. Hassan also observed somewhat ominously that, while he was still unhappy with the Soviet Union and its equivocal stance on the Western Sahara, he had received indications from the Soviet leadership that it will soon change its policy on the Western Sahara.⁵

7. Comment: In my 20 years of acquaintance, I have never seen the King more tense or impatient than at the December 10 audience. At several points during the conversation, I interrupted to set the record straight with regard to substantial American assistance to Morocco. In this connection, I noted that we have done more for Morocco in the intelligence field than any other country, but Hassan put this aside as “a case apart” and instance of “apples and oranges”. He had clearly rehearsed the message he wished to deliver and was in no mood to be dissuaded or side-tracked. As we have reported, he is under increasing pressure at home following recent diplomatic defeats and increased conflict in the Sahara (Rabat 10923).⁶ Under such stress, Hassan is prone to react as the tribal, Bedouin, Berber and Francophile chieftain which he is. While the Soviet Union is clearly maneuvering to gain ground here (Rabat 10634)⁷ Hassan—isolated and lacking other options—is in my view using the Soviet threat as a bargaining chip to gain leverage with us. Despite his message above, which reflects the King’s current mood, I believe that Hassan remains committed to continued close ties with the United States. Hassan is, however, passing through his most difficult period in recent years, and we will need to be alert both to our own interests and to the possibility of unpredictable reaction to pressure. I will be formulating recommendations on how to respond to Hassan for discussion during consultations in Washington on December 18.

Reed

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840014–0312. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 11043 from Rabat, December 11, Reed reported that Hassan considered French-Moroccan relations “excellent.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840792–0013) In telegram 11047 from Rabat, December 11, Reed reported that Hassan had provided “a brief description of the current border situation with Algeria during a December 10 audience in Fes, down-playing the risk of direct military conflict but indicating readiness to fight if attacked.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840792–0056)
3. See Document 26.
4. See Document 221.
5. See Document 232
6. In telegram 10923 from Rabat, the Embassy reported: “a series of diplomatic defeats in the OAU and UN, as well as stepped up military activity by the Polisario and Algeria over the past two months, have confronted Morocco with perhaps its most difficult foreign policy challenge in recent years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840781–0228)
7. See footnote 2, Document 232.