118. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House1
SECTO 15097. Subject: Message to the President. For the President from Secretary Haig.
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Thus far the administration has struck the right balance in the delicate and evolving situation in Poland. As you know, we still lack the basic information that would enable us to draw conclusions on what the imposition of martial law in Poland means for the future of the political reform process there. I believe, and there is intelligence information to substantiate my view, that the Soviets were involved in yesterday’s events and that this could be a prelude to a further internal crackdown. Nevertheless, the pressures for reform in Poland remain high and it is simply too soon to judge whether the process of political liberalization has come to an end. It is thus vital, at this stage, to keep all our options open.
3. For this reason, we must avoid two extremes in our policy-making as well as our public posture. On the one hand, we must not incite internal violence which could lead to full-scale civil war and further repression. At the same time, because we don’t know how the Polish authorities intend to proceed, in the period ahead we cannot allow ourselves to acquiesce in internal or external repression in Poland.
4. In these circumstances, we must avoid taking any premature decisions toward Poland on such issues as food aid, trade and debt rescheduling. As a result I have asked that all such actions now underway be held in abeyance for the immediate future. It is important that we preserve our leverage on the Polish Government, making use of it as we can in the weeks ahead to apply pressure against domestic repression and encourage moderation and reform. Some of our allies may decide to adopt a business-as-usual attitude before it is clear precisely what the Polish Government intends to do, but we must continue to exercise leadership on this issue. Thus, I have instructed our NATO Ambassador, Tap Bennett, in the special session of the North Atlantic Council today, to avoid any hasty decisions by the Alliance.
5. I am also making sure that this posture is maintained in the negotiations we are currently conducting in Geneva (INF) and Madrid (CSCE). At Madrid I am asking our Chief Delegate, Max Kampleman, [Page 388] to inform our allies and friends that in view of the uncertain events in Poland we cannot conclude an agreement on confidence-building measures and human rights at this time. (Such an agreement was in any case highly unlikely.) At Geneva, we should continue the INF talks until popular reaction in Poland crystalizes or until the Soviet role is clarified. For now, I am instructing Paul Nitze to inform the Soviets in private that their conduct vis-a-vis Poland could affect the course of those negotiations.
6. These steps are designed to give us maximum flexibility in what is clearly a very fluid situation in Poland. Only through this tactic will you preserve your ability to influence the Polish authorities or Soviet behavior in the days ahead. While avoiding excessive rhetoric, we must continue to express our serious concern about the future of political reform in Poland. Of course, in order for us to preserve all our options, it will be necessary to maintain tight discipline over public statements as well as our own decision-making process, particularly since some of our critics may well attempt to exploit this situation for partisan political purposes.
7. I will be returning from Brussels this afternoon and will be in touch with you upon my arrival.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810010–0084. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent from Haig’s airplane as he traveled from Brussels to Washington.↩