Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

3110.

Washington, January 6, 1989, 0021Z

SUBJECT

• Algerian Ambassador’s Démarche on Shootdown of Libyan MIGs.

Ref:

• State 1420.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun told NEA DAS Burleigh the GOA was deeply concerned that the January 4 downing of Libyan MIGs would exacerbate regional tensions already high because of U.S. charges about Libya’s chemical warfare facility. Sahnoun asked if the action against the Libyan MIGs were part of a larger operation or an accident. Burleigh assured Sahnoun the MIGs incident had nothing to do with U.S. concern about the Libyan CW capability. Indeed, Burleigh said, the U.S. viewed the MIGs shootdown a discrete incident that was now closed. Sahnoun welcomed any further information that could assist GOA in playing “moderating” role with Libya.³

3. Burleigh outlined information known about the MIGs downing incident at the time (just before Jan. 4 1100 EST Pentagon press conference—see State 1420.) Sahnoun did not press for further details, indicating he would await the Pentagon press conference that day for further information and asked to be kept abreast of details as they became known. He said, however, the incident could set back Algeria’s efforts to “contain” Libya through diplomatic means and provide justification for Libya to use “other methods” to achieve its goals.

4. Sahnoun then turned specifically to U.S. effort to halt Libya’s chemical warfare production capability, stressing GOA had expressed its concern on this issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers at highest levels. He queried whether the U.S. had considered Libya’s alleged offer to allow teams to inspect the Rabta facility, which Libya maintained was a pharmaceutical plant only.⁴

5. Burleigh pointed out the inconsistencies in the alleged Libyan offer, conveyed by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti December 24. In the offer, Libya had agreed to attend the Paris Chemical Warfare Conference and to abide by any inspection/verification decisions the conference might make on CW facilities.⁵ However, the CW Conference will not address specific inspecton/verificaton issues. Moreover, Libya denies the Rabta facility is a CW production facility. Therefore, it remains unclear whether Libya means to imply that Rabta facility would be covered under any decisions the Paris CW Conference might take—even though it claims Rabta is only a pharmaceuticals production facility. Burleigh again stressed, however, the purpose of the Paris Conference was not to single out any particular country, nor to develop specific inspection/verification regimes. At any rate, inspection of such facilities could not be a one time event by non-experts.

6. When Sahnoun stressed Libya lacked the technical capability to produce chemical weapons without assistance from developing countries, Burleigh agreed. He pointed to U.S. efforts to cut off such supplies through a major diplomatic effort which provided detailed information to a number of countries, including those whose firms were believed to be involved. Burleigh countered Sahnoun’s suggestion that friendly states such as the FRG had disputed USG information regarding the nature of the Rabta facility. He said that privately these countries had not questioned the U.S. assessment. The FRG, for example, remained actively engaged in investigating the involvement of several FRG firms in the Libyan CW effort and planned to try to tighten related export controls. Burleigh pointed out that even publicly the FRG had not questioned the U.S. assessment of the nature of the Rabta plant.

7. Sahnoun said GOA planned to pursue its effort to “contain” Libya, and therefore remained concerned about increased tensions in the region. He asked to be kept abreast of developments on recent events as they became known. Burleigh undertook to do so as appropriate.⁶

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890011–0641. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Casey, Sharon Wiener (NEA/AFN), and Timothy Savage (EUR/CE); approved by Burleigh. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Tunis, Paris, Cairo, Bonn, Riyadh, and Rome.
2. In telegram 1420 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, January 4, the Department reported that at 5 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, “two Libyan MIG–23’s were shot down by F–14 aircraft from the USS Kennedy” in international airspace. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890007–0161) The telegram is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
3. See footnote 2, Document 184.
4. No record of the Libyan offer of inspections was found.
5. The Paris conference on chemical weapons took place January 7–11.
6. In telegram 177 from Algiers, January 10, the Embassy indicated that Ross had “made follow-up demarche on shootdown of Libyan aircraft and Libyan CW issue on January 9 to MFA SecGen Hamdani. On the latter, Hamdani said the GOA objected, not to the U.S. concern about Qadhafi’s CW capability, but to the style of the ‘excessive’ U.S. campaign to eliminate that capability. He asserted that it was the responsibility of the international community, and not just the U.S., to control CW use and proliferation—on a world-wide basis, and not just in Libya’s case. On the Libyan aircraft shootdown, Hamdani argued that the U.S. planes had been too quick to fire; Ambassador reviewed the U.S. pilots’ efforts to avoid contact with the Libyan aircraft.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890022–0721)