Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

6885.

Algiers, December 26, 1988, 1658Z

SUBJECT

• President Bendjedid on Libya, Peace Process.

Ref:

• Algiers 6869.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is an action request—see para 10.

3. President Bendjedid engaged me in a few minutes of semi-private conversation in the course of a reception following his inauguration for a third term December 26.

4. President Bendjedid reiterated his congratulations to President-elect Bush on the occasion of his election,³ as well as his best wishes to President Reagan. I replied with warm congratulations on the renewal of his own presidential mandate.

5. President Bendjedid then expressed great satisfaction over our decision to open a dialogue with the PLO,⁴ noting that the Palestinians had taken many steps in our direction and could be prevailed upon to take more in the context of a serious peace process. I assured him that both the outgoing and incoming administrations were deeply committed to continuing the search for peace in the Middle East on a sound and realistic basis. In this regard, I said, it was important that the PLO maintain its rejection of terrorism. He replied that this was precisely what he had advised Yasser Arafat.

6. President Bendjedid then told me he wished to reiterate the words of caution that Foreign Minister Bessaih had shared with me concerning Libya December 24 (reftel). The region did not need the “shock” of another military action against Libya. Consequently, President Bendjedid said, he hoped that President Reagan and, subsequently, President Bush would maintain a “prudent and measured” attitude in this regard. President Bendjedid emphasized that his government and he personally were ready to participate in any bilateral, regional, or international diplomatic effort to convince Libya to act responsibly in any area that troubled us, be it terrorism, CW, or anything else. Already, during the visit of ‘Abd as-Salam Jallud December 25, President Bendjedid confided, he had raised the CW problem.

7. I replied that, indeed, the Libyan CW capability concerned us greatly, and we had just completed briefings on this capability at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Anything Algeria could do bilaterally or in concert with others to get Libya to cease and desist would be welcome, and we hoped that diplomatic efforts would prove effective and sufficient to deal with this threat.

8. President Bendjedid closed our conversation by expressing his confidence that we would continue to take into account the dangers that a military action would present for the stability of the region and that we would consequently persist in seeking a diplomatic solution. He and his government would be at our disposal for any help they could give.

9. Comment: We have clearly caught the attention of the leaders of the region on the Libyan CW issue; it is certainly no coincidence that the highest levels have approached us in both Algeria and Tunisia and that Jallud came to Algeria December 25. If, in the first instance, we wish to deal with this problem through diplomatic means, we should enlist the assistance of Algeria and other friendly parties with influence in Tripoli in the most concrete manner possible. Specifically, we should:

— Describe in as much detail as feasible our demarches in countries providing equipment, precursors, expertise, and labor. Algeria might be prepared to undertake its own demarches in such countries from the perspective of a country that shares borders with Libya. If we judge that such parallel demarches would be useful, we should provide enough facts to make them credible.

— State plainly what we want from Libya. To judge from the briefings that Messrs. Harris and Geiger presented at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Libya already has a significant capability to produce CW and, indeed, to export it. Beyond ceasing production and exports, what should countries like Algeria be asking Libya to do? Should they be asking it to allow round-the-clock verification or dismantle the plant?

— Describe plainly why a one-time inspection would not end the problem. (FYI, in spite of the overwhelming evidence in our briefings, a number of Algerians (and, for that matter, some of our diplomatic colleagues) seem to want to believe that the CW plant is indeed a pharmaceuticals plant and that Qadhafi is sincere in wanting to demonstrate this.)

— Counter the argument, heard from both Algerian and diplomatic interlocutors, that nothing prevents a state from stockpiling CW weapons. (FYI, so far, with a few trusted interlocutors, I have answered this by pointing out that, the questionable purposes of stockpiling aside, we are aware that Libya has exported CW materials to at least one destination. This has caught people’s attention.)

10. Action requested: If the Department wishes to take President Bendjedid up on his offer to pursue the Libyan CW issue, please provide a detailed presentation that specifically requests this and that includes points responsive to those raised in para 9 above for use with the Foreign Minister.⁵

11. Department repeat to Tunis, Cairo, and other interested posts.

Ross

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 6869 from Algiers, December 24, Ross reported that Bessaih had expressed “GOA’s concern over possible U.S. military attack on the Libyan CW factory at Rabta.” He “urged that the U.S. avoid repeating its previous ‘mistake,’ i.e. the April 1986 strike against Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881123–0053) Documentation on Libyan chemical weapons is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
3. Bush was elected President on November 8.
4. On December 14, after the PLO issued a statement which accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and renounced terrorism, Reagan announced that he had “authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialog with PLO representatives.” He also called the PLO’s statement a “serious evolution of Palestinian thinking towards realistic and pragmatic positions on the key issues.” For the text of the “Statement on Diplomatic Talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization,” see Public Papers: Reagan 1988, Book II, p. 1627.
5. No record of a Department response was found.