Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense Carlucci¹

I–26286/88

Washington, September 27, 1988

SUBJECT

• Algerian Multi-Mission Aircraft (U)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

ISSUE FOR DECISION

(S) Whether to approve, in principle, the Algerian request for a surveillance/reconnaissance capability for an Algerian C–130 aircraft.

BACKGROUND

(S) Several months ago, the Government of Algeria requested the U.S. provide a surveillance/reconnaissance capability for an Algerian C–130 aircraft. The Algerians intend to use this capability for defense purposes and specifically as a surveillance system for border security and curtailment of smuggling.

(S) In April 1988, a three man U.S. Air Force team traveled to Algeria to receive briefings on the Algerian requirements. At that time, the Algerians indicated their needs in [less than 1 line not declassified] for a Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) system; but, formulation of a specific U.S. proposal awaits a further U.S. policy decision to proceed.

(S) We have very carefully examined the technical, political, and military factors involved in this case and have worked closely with State Department in doing so. The technical information from our U.S. Air Force experts indicates that U.S. equipment that might be provided to satisfy Algerian requirements under this program would be unclassified, off-the-shelf and commercially available, and would be rudimentary compared to the capabilities currently employed by the U.S.

(S) The Air Force further concludes that this program would be a long term one. Following the formulation and agreement on a detailed proposal, and depending on the timing of congressional notification, the contracting, engineering, equipment procurement, and construction would take nearly 4 years. Without U.S. assistance and training, it could take up to seven years to usefully use the system beyond the acquisition of the equipment (TAB A).² The cost to Algeria would be approximately $40 million, not including whatever Algerian support and facilities that would need to be provided (TAB A).

(S) We also asked [less than 1 line not declassified] and CIA to assess the military significance of this [less than 1 line not declassified] SLAR equipment relative to the capabilities of Algeria’s neighbors, as well as the likely political impact on our relationships with Morocco and Tunisia, if we proceed with this project. These analyses conclude that Algerian acquisition of this equipment will give Algeria a capability similar to [less than 1 line not declassified], far more advanced than [less than 1 line not declassified] and somewhat better than [less than 1 line not declassified]. On the political side, Morocco, in particular, would be displeased and Tunisia may request a similar surveillance system, but Algeria would at least temporarily lose interest in discussing security assistance with the U.S. if we did not proceed (TAB B).³

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

RECOMMENDATIONS

(S) We are faced with the difficult choice of balancing our interests in Morocco, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, against those for Algeria, with the wider implications for U.S. influence in the Maghreb. Having considered these questions thoroughly, I recommend that we proceed cautiously with this approach to improving our defense relationship with Algeria under the following conditions:

— Approve this project in principle subject to the completion of a follow-on study by a U.S. Air Force team and development of a specific proposal.

— Inform the Algerians that the new Administration will need to implement this decision to proceed, but that we will recommend that it do so.

— Algeria will need to use its own national funds for this acquisition.

— The U.S. and Algeria will need to agree on security arrangements to protect the hardware, technology, and data from compromise pursuant to the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed on September 7, 1986.⁴

— The U.S. will work to insure that the timing of congressional notification works to our mutual benefit and is consonant with the prevailing political context.

(U) If you agree, I propose to use the talking points⁵ next under incorporating these caveats in my discussions in Algeria on October 1 and 2.⁶ DoD components support this position. State Department is preparing a similar decision memo for Secretary Shultz with the recommendation for approval.⁷

Richard L. Armitage⁸
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers, Subject 1988: Countries, Algeria. Secret. Drafted by Palevitz. At the top right of the memorandum, two stamped notations read: “Office of the Secretary of Defense 88 SEP 27” and “Sec Def Has Seen Sep 29 1988.” Carlucci wrote above the salutation, then struck through, “Bill—Let’s have a brief meeting with Skip et al this PM on this. FC.”
2. Tab A was not attached.
3. Tab B was not attached.
4. Armitage signed the GOSMIA during his September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi. See footnote 2, Document 170.
5. Attached but not printed are the undated talking points, entitled “Algerian Multi-Mission Aircraft.” Acting Secretary of State Whitehead approved the proposal. (Action memorandum from Hare and Holmes to Whitehead, September 27; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis and Exdis Memoranda: Lot 94D433, Nodis Documents September 1988)
6. Telegram 5355 from Algiers, October 3, reported that “on the fringes of dinner” on October 1, after Cheloufi inquired about the status of Algeria’s request for surveillance/reconnaissance capability for its C–130s, “Armitage informed General Cheloufi that the USG had reached a political decision to sell Algeria this capability if the latter wished it.” Cheloufi “expressed his thanks and that of the Ministry of Defense to all those who had worked on this issue, noting that he and his Algerian colleagues were deeply moved.” He also stated that “this step demonstrated the good intentions of the U.S. military towards Algeria.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1988 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 94D552, Algiers 1988 Nodis)
7. Carlucci initialed “Agree.” A stamped notation next to his initials reads: “29 SEP 1988”.
8. Armitage signed “VR/Rich” above this typed signature.