Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

298742.

Washington, September 24, 1987, 1842Z

SUBJECT

• Acting Secretary Whitehead’s Meeting With Algerian MOD Secretary General Cheloufi—September 21.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is a memorandum of conversation between Acting Secretary Whitehead and General Mustapha Cheloufi, Secretary General of the Algerian Defense Ministry. Cheloufi was visiting the U.S. at the invitation of ASD Armitage, following the latter’s visit to Algeria in September of 1986.² The conversation with the Acting Secretary took place at the Department of State on September 21 from 5–6 p.m. Also present at the meeting were NEA DAS Ussery, DOD DAS Gnehm, D staffer Bernicat, Embassy Algiers DATT Di Leonardo and Algeria Desk Officer Fitzpatrick (notetaker).

3. Summary: Acting Secretary Whitehead September 21 told General Cheloufi President Bendjedid’s 1985 visit to the U.S. had ushered in a new era of good relations between the U.S. and Algeria, and that ties continued to improve. He pointed out, however, that the U.S. had serious concerns about easing of Algerian-Libyan relations and about Algerian relations with Abu Nidal. Cheloufi told the Acting Secretary the Algerians were well aware of Qadhafi’s nature, but said the U.S. must trust the GOA in its effort to stablize the region. He also assured the Acting Secretary the GOA did not support terrorist activities and took note of U.S. concern about Abu Nidal. On the Western Sahara, Cheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in resolving the conflict. End summary.

4. Libya

— Isolating Qadhafi. The Acting Secretary stressed that Qadhafi must remain isolated from the international community, and the U.S. was therefore concerned that events such as Qadhafi’s July visit to Algiers³ and other bilateral efforts might encourage him and lend him credibility. Cheloufi said the Algerians understood the need to isolate Qadhafi but that separating him from Africa was not the answer. Cheloufi said the GOA’s relations with Qadhafi were not easy, and he agreed Qadhafi was unstable and unpredictable. Algeria’s geographical position, however, obligated the GOA to pursue regional stability by dealing with him.

— The Moroccan Experience: Pointing to the Moroccan experience with the Oujda Accord,⁴ Cheloufi said the GOA recognized the need to be wary of Qadhafi. Cheloufi deemed the Oujda Accord an “unholy alliance”, likening it to a hypothetical alliance between such disparate states as Albania and Chile, and claimed King Hassan’s goal had been to isolate Algeria. Qadhafi, who had harassed the Moroccans for years to enter into a union, demonstrated his instability when, 15 days before the accord was reached, said he would never negotiate with King Hassan. This had occurred when President Bendjedid had attempted to bring Qadhafi, King Hassan and President Bourghiba together in Algiers.

— Algerians Seeking Libyan Guarantees: Cheloufi said Algeria had few alternatives. The GOA had to try to settle the problem or find a means to neutralize Qadhafi. The GOA could not sign a unity agreement without guarantees. Should the GOA sign such an agreement, it would make certain Qadhafi adhered to it.

— Qadhafi Pushing for Union: Qadhafi, Cheloufi said, strongly desired union with Algeria. The GOA had told Qadhafi it wanted time to consider such a move. Algeria would enter into such an agreement only with the free and democratic consent of both the Algerian and the Libyan peoples, and the Algerian people for their part could well reject such a union. The GOA believed Qadhafi might become more dangerous without an outlet. Though the GOA was very concered about Qadhafi, it wanted to calm him down rather than oppose him outright.

— Chad. Cheloufi said the GOA continued to pressure Qadhafi to allow the Chadians solve their own problems, but given the conflicting Libyan and Chadian claims on the Aozou Strip,⁵ the GOA believed the matter must be resolved through international arbitration.

— Tunisia. The GOA was also concerned about the situation in Tunisia, and had warned Qadhafi to refrain from actions against that country. The GOA had also urged Libya to meet Tunisian conditions regarding reparations for Tunisian workers expelled from Libya in 1985. Algeria had good, neighborly relations with Tunisia, and could not accept foreign intervention in Tunisian affairs.

— Caution Urged. The Acting Secretary responded by urging the GOA to be very wary of Qadhafi. Mr. Whitehead explained that he himself had talked with King Hassan just after he had signed the Oujda Accord. King Hassan had assured Mr. Whitehead the U.S. should not worry because he the King could control Qadhafi through the treaty. King Hassan, however, was not able to control Qadhafi and ended up embarrassed. Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the GOA would not make the same mistake.

5. Abu Nidal

— U.S. Concerns. Mr. Whitehead raised US concerns about Algerian relations with Abu Nidal. He told Cheloufi the U.S. believed Abu Nidal was responsible for a large proportion of terrorists acts around the world, many against U.S. citizens. The U.S. found Abu Nidal totally undesirable and was worried he might find refuge in Algeria.⁶ Cheloufi said he had been concerned about criticism of the GOA for Abu Nidal’s presence at the PNC this spring. The GOA had a moral commitment to hold an open PNC in order to foster a unified Palestinian approach. The GOA, therefore, had accepted everyone who wanted to participate. Cheloufi said the GOA was absolutely against terrorist activities. The Abu Nidal group had promised to refrain from terrorist acts, and there had been no acts attributable to Abu Nidal since the PNC, Cheloufi said.
Mr. Whitehead said he hoped the GOA no longer would welcome Abu Nidal. He stressed Abu Nidal remained number one on the U.S. most-wanted list, and said U.S. intelligence services knew Abu Nidal continued to plan terrorist acts, even though he may not have been directly involved in recent incidents. Mr. Whitehead urged the GOA to keep its distance from Abu Nidal, because relations with the US could be harmed if Algeria associated with him.
Cheloufi said he had taken good note of the Acting Secretary’s concerns in this regard and would delve into the matter further on his return to Algiers.

6. Western Sahara
Cheloufi urged the U.S. to play a role in helping to resolve the Western Sahara dispute, and to use its influence to get King Hassan to accept the “universally accepted principle of self-determination.” He said Bendjedid had shown Algeria’s good will and that there was not much more the GOA could do. The GOA, moreover, did not oppose King Hassan and had no bilateral problems with Morocco other than the Western Sahara, which would continue to prevent Algeria from normalizing relations.

7. U.S.-Algerian Bilateral Relations

— Improving Ties. The Acting Secretary expressed satisfaction at improving U.S.-Algerian bilateral ties, particularly since President Bendjedid’s 1985 U.S. visit. He asked Cheloufi to extend U.S. good wishes to President Bendjedid. Cheloufi said President Bendjedid asked him to reaffirm good relations with the US and to highlight the GOA’s desire to look sincerely for further areas of cooperation.

— Invitation to Visit. Mr. Whitehead said he had a special affection for Algeria, because he was at Mers el Kebir with the U.S. Navy in 1944. Cheloufi invited him to come again to Algeria to see how things had changed. Ambassador Sahnoun noted Mr. Whitehead had an outstanding invitation. Mr. Whitehead said he would enjoy such a visit.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870789–0420. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Ussery, Casey, Gnehm, Carolyn Huggins (S/S–O), and Michael Klosson (S/S); approved by Whitehead. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Rabat, Paris, and Nouakchott.
2. A record of Armitage’s September 5–7, 1986, meetings with Cheloufi and senior members of the Algerian military, during which they signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GOSMIA), is in telegram 4521 from Algiers, September 8, 1986. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860680–0680)
3. See footnote 2, Document 168.
4. See footnote 2, Document 138.
5. Documentation on the dispute between Libya and Chad over the Aozou Strip is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
6. In telegram 118885 to Algiers, April 20, the Department stated: “As post is aware, a variety of sources have reported that both Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna) and Abu Abbas (Muhammad al-Abbas) are (or have been) in Algiers for the current Palestine National Congress and the preparatory meetings which had led up to the PNC.” The Department instructed the Embassy “to register our deep concern” and that “we are dismayed by reports that your government has allowed such notorious terrorists to enter Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870304–0541)