Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

36414.

Washington, February 6, 1988, 0125Z

SUBJECT

• Letter to Bendjedid From Vice President Bush.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Please deliver following letter from the Vice President to President Bendjedid. No/no signed original will follow.

3. Begin text

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me great pleasure once again to take up our secret dialogue on issues affecting international peace and stability. In this regard, I very much appreciated your December letter.² The following, Mr. President, are some reflections on events that have occurred since then.

As you know, Mr. President, last December the United States and the Soviet Union moved a step closer to safeguarding international peace by agreeing to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.³ President Reagan was gratified by your solid expression of support for this step. We look forward to Algeria’s continued support as we move closer to a second summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.⁴ The INF Treaty, I believe, will make a vital contribution to greater stability. As we prepare for subsequent meetings later this year in Moscow, it is our intention to build on this treaty to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union on the further reduction of nuclear weapons. To this end, U.S. negotiators in Geneva have been instructed, along with their Soviet counterparts, to accelerate resolution of outstanding issues to clear the way for a treaty on strategic offensive arms.⁵ With goodwill and determination on both sides, these efforts can and will bear fruit.

Our continuing consultations on global issues have taken on even greater significance in light of Algeria’s election to the UN Security Council. Algerian diplomacy is justly renowned for its efficiency and effectiveness, and it has given your country important influence in the developed and developing world. We welcome Algeria’s presence on the Security Council, and look forward to working closely with you.

In this connection, I would like to touch briefly on a key issue now facing the Security Council. Clearly the Gulf war is a major concern. The Gulf area, and the Middle East as a whole, is very important to me. I made two trips to the region in 1986, including my visit in April of that year to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.⁶ There, I sensed the need for the United States to engage the Arab world, not only to protect American security and economic interests, but to help our friends. As we pursue the objective of stability in that region, the Amman summit’s call in November for action by the international community to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 598 must not go unheeded.⁷ We must continue to press for urgent adoption of a follow-on, enforcement resolution by the Security Council. While some progress has been made, the Soviet Union continues to counsel delay in the imposition of an arms embargo against Iran as the non-complying party, and to insist that the council discuss its impractical proposal for a UN naval force. The latter focuses only on one aspect of the war—attacks on shipping—rather than on the urgent need to implement Resolution 598 as a comprehensive whole. As Iran prepares for a new offensive which brings the new threat of widening the war to neutral Gulf states, the need for an enforcement resolution to help bring Iran to the negotiating table has become even more urgent. Algeria will play a key role with the Security Council in the period just ahead. We look forward to working closely with Algeria in the coming weeks as we work for the earliest possible adoption of an embargo on the transfer of arms to Iran as the party which has refused to negotiate the implementation of Resolution 598 in good faith. Algeria can help by urging the Soviet Union to end its delaying tactics, and by making clear to China its concern over continuing Chinese arms sales to Iran.

The Gulf war, however, is not the only conflict that threatens stability in the Middle East. The tragic events we have witnessed in recent weeks in the West Bank and Gaza⁸ highlight the critical need for progress toward a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Movement toward this objective will be possible only if all concerned eschew inflammatory rhetoric in favor of pragmatic, realistic positions. Ambassador Sahnoun has passed along your interest in seeing the U.S. help move this process forward.⁹ I can assure you, Mr. President, the U.S. is now intensively engaged in working for a resolution to this conflict. We share your deep concern that reason and moderation must prevail if progress toward peace is to be achieved. On my second trip to the Middle East in 1986, I visited Israel, Jordan and Egypt. I negotiated six points of agreement which showed clearly the desire for movement toward peace that existed in those three countries.¹⁰ Now, the tensions in the West Bank and Gaza have made it clear to everyone that the status quo cannot endure. Time is not on the side of peace. Efforts to achieve progress must be reinvigorated. We were able to take advantage of President Mubarak’s presence here to engage in lengthy discussions on how we might move forward in the peace process.¹¹ President Mubarak, as you know, has recently proposed some ideas which contain a number of positive elements. We were able to exchange views in some detail and to share with him some of our latest thoughts. We remain committed to do all we can to promote peace and we will pursue this goal energetically.

The United States also shares an interest in seeing peace and stability in the North Africa. I noted particularly the thoughts about this issue which you outlined in your December letter. The U.S. has closely followed recent developments in the region, including the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Egypt and between Tunisia and Libya, as well as your visits to those latter two countries. Our long-standing policy is supportive of regional arrangements that contribute to the stability of the area. In this, I believe, we share a strong, common goal. Our views diverge, however, on the effectiveness of regional arrangements that include Libya and exclude Morocco. I hope that careful consideration is being given to how Libya’s inclusion in the Tripartite Accord could potentially improve Qadhafi’s internal, domestic standing and thereby increase his capacity for aggressive activities abroad, including in Chad and promotion of terrorism. My views on Colonel Qadhafi have not changed. His international behavior continues to be unacceptable to all Americans. It is also a shame what he is doing to his own country—controlling his people with terror, and squandering his country’s ample resources on frivolous and misguided foreign adventures.

The U.S. has also followed with close attention the government transition in Tunisia.¹² At the time of the succession in November, we expressed our esteem for the friendship that has characterized U.S.-Tunisian relations over the years, and reaffirmed U.S. support for Tunisia under its new leadership. We will continue our efforts to enhance and refine our bilateral cooperation with the Tunisian Government. The U.S. has also taken positive note of the series of diplomatic exchanges between Algeria and Morocco. Dialogue and diplomacy of this sort can facilitate the kind of communication necessary to developing understandings that are acceptable to both your nations on issues of common interest, such as the Western Sahara.

The United States values its relationships with both Algeria and Morocco. Conflict in the Maghreb is not in our common interest; it prevents and impedes economic progress in the region. The U.S. therefore supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. In this regard, we are following closely the efforts of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. I understand that the UN technical team that visited the area last November has now presented its findings to the Secretary General. The U.S. will continue to support his initiative, and calls on all with influence over the situation to encourage restraint and cooperation as his efforts proceed.

Mr. President, I am gratified at the progress our two countries continue to make as we build our relations in a variety of fields. In this regard, I very much appreciated the invitation of Mr. Rabah Bitat, President of the Popular Assembly, for a congressional delegation to visit your country. I am sharing his letter with my congressional colleague, James Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives. In the economic area, the U.S. looks forward to the meeting of the joint U.S.-Algerian Economic Commission this spring,¹³ as we pursue joint endeavors to solidify commercial cooperation. We have already made significant progress in the agricultural area, and anticipate that this has laid the groundwork for further economic cooperation in other fields. In this connection, I believe such cooperation can be helpful as Algeria pursues its plans for restructuring its economic sector.

Mr. President, I hope that our bilateral relations will continue to grow in many areas, and that we will progress toward our shared goal of a peaceful, stable Maghreb. Our exchange of letters provides a valued opportunity for facilitating understanding on important questions. I look forward to receiving your thoughts as we progress through 1988. In the meantime, Mr. President, please accept my sincere good wishes for continued progress and prosperity for yourself and the Algerian nation now and throughout the new year.

Sincerely, George Bush

End text.

Armacost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881021–0206. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Kathleen Fitzpatrick; cleared by Casey, Laurence Pope (NEA/NGA), Eastham (P), Stephen Young (EUR/SOV), Richard Mueller (S/S), Michael Minton (S/S–O), Gerald Feirestein (NEA/EGY), Paul Wilcox (NEA), Joann Alba (S/S–S), Gregg, Perito (NSC), Kirby, and Wayne Miele (H); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.
2. In telegram 7604 from Algiers, December 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of Bendjedid’s letter, which read in part: “You know—as I have discussed with you in detail—that Maghreb unity represents a cardinal objective for my country and people. Without it the Maghreb will never be able to have an optimal mobilization of its resources at the service of its development.” To accomplish this, Bendjedid continued, “This meant normalization of relations between Tunisia and Libya—that is happening now—and it meant that Libya would have its place in this treaty.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871021–0206)
3. Reference to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington on December 8, 1987. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1988.
4. Reference is to the summit scheduled to be held in May and June in Moscow. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 155–164.
5. Reference is to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I.
6. Documentation on Bush’s visit to Saudi Arabia is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
7. See footnote 3, Document 171.
8. Reference is to the Palestinian uprisings against Israeli forces, or the First Intifada, that began in December 1987. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
9. No record of Sahnoun’s communication was found.
10. Documentation on Bush’s 1986 trip to the Middle East is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
11. Mubarak made a state visit to the United States January 26–29. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
12. Reference is to Ben Ali’s removal of Bourguiba and assumption of the Tunisian presidency. See Document 355.
13. The U.S.-Algerian Joint Economic Commission was originally scheduled for April, then postponed until May, and ultimately postponed until 1989.