Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mauritania¹

155115.

Washington, June 5, 1982, 1830Z

SUBJECT

• GIRM Ambassador Meets With Acting Secretary Stoessel.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. Ambassador Ould Daddah’s meeting with Acting Secretary Stoessel covered essentially same ground as his earlier conversations with DAS Wisner² and AF/W Director Bruce.³ Session served to underscore continuing U.S. interest in maintaining good relations with GIRM, particularly as this is the first time Ould Daddah has been received above the level of Under Secretary. End summary.

3. Ould Daddah reiterated standard litany of Mauritanian concerns about U.S. policies in Northwest Africa as follows:

— U.S. tilt toward Morocco is destabilizing, particularly our increased military aid, as it ensures Algeria, Libya and the Soviets will continue their support of Polisario.

— Mauritania recognizes U.S. African policy is shaped by our myriad interests in the region and our world role. Nonetheless, GIRM believes resolution of Saharan problem would benefit everyone. To this end, U.S. should encourage Morocco to seek a negotiated settlement rather than arming itself.

— Mauritania also desires better relations with Morocco, but the Moroccan stand on the Western Sahara makes it difficult.

— The GIRM is constantly criticized about its moderate position in the Sahara and its efforts to improve relations with the U.S. as there is no clear sign the U.S. wants better relations. Only naming a U.S. Ambassador can change this perception and enhance the level of dialogue between our governments.

— The OAU, according to Ould Daddah, is the best hope for a solution.⁴ The U.S. must have patience. An OAU failure would seriously damage efforts toward inter-African cooperation and indirectly complicate U.S. relations with many African nations. Thus, it is essential that we keep OAU process alive.

— President Haidalla is anxious to sustain dialogue between Mauritania and U.S. and suggests sending a special envoy to the U.S. if we would receive him.

4. Stoessel responded stressing importance USG places on good relations with GIRM, noting we have welcomed its moderate stance on regional issues of mutual concern.

— U.S. hopes to ask for agrement for a new Ambassador in the near future as first step in mutual effort to strengthen our relations.

— As GIRM will recall, we earlier proposed visit by General Walters which could still be useful at some point if President Haidalla would agree to receive him. After we have completed these two steps, we can examine the idea of a special Mauritanian envoy to the U.S.

— On Morocco, Stoessel noted long history of close U.S.-Moroccan relations, emphasizing that U.S. can only play an advisory role in Morocco, but not dictate policy.

— Our military agreements with Morocco are designed to enhance our ability to respond to threats in Southwest Asia—a strategic essential in U.S. global security design.

— We agree OAU role has been helpful generally, but positions taken at Addis recently have seriously complicated the process. U.S. hopes next session proves more fruitful, but we remain concerned about negative role Qadhafi, in particular, may play.

— Nonetheless, U.S. strongly desires to continue dialogue with Mauritania on these and other issues as we believe better communication among all parties concerned is key to negotiated settlement.

5. FYI. Ould Daddah’s extensive contacts since his consultations in Mauritania have enabled him to outline GIRM’s position at various levels in Department. Given immediacy of these contacts, plus fact that Secretary will be in Europe for beginning of SSOD session in New York,⁵ Department suggests Foreign Minister Ould Minnih would profit more from Washington visit at another time.⁶ If he asks to see Department officials, however, we will seek to arrange usual meetings. End FYI.

Stoessel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820294–0224. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Melinda Kimble (AF/W); cleared by Bruce, Bishop, and Bremer; approved by Stoessel. Sent for information to Rabat, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Paris, Abidjan, Algiers, and Cairo.
2. In telegram 137047 to Nouakchott, May 19, the Department transmitted a record of the Wisner-Ould Daddah conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820263–0191)
3. In telegram 131971 to Nouakchott, May 14, the Department transmitted a record of the Bruce-Ould Daddah conversation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820255–0546)
4. For the OAU’s role in attempting to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara crisis, see Documents 396, 397, and 400.
5. Reference is to the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament held June 7–July 10.
6. In telegram 2569 from Nouakchott, May 21, Schrager commented: “It is equally noteworthy that Ould Daddah visits come at same time as King Hassan visit to U.S. and are intended, in some way, to offset enhanced U.S.-Moroccan relations sure to come about as result of visit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820267–0478)