Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

130.

Algiers, January 8, 1986, 1654Z

Dept pass as desired. Subject: Condemnation of Terrorism: Algerian View.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: MFA SecGen Hamdani heard our demarche on Abu Nidal January 6,² including request to intercede with Syria on cutting its ties with that group. I urged that GOA make its opposition to terrorism well known publicly. Hamdani, after much circuitous and unhelpful argumentation, indicated that GOA does not want to undermine its ability to serve as an interlocutor with wide-ranging groups in the Middle East and, for this reason, will continue to take a reserved public position on terrorism. GOA, at same time, is likely to continue behind-the-scenes support for USG efforts to combat terrorism. End summary.

3. I had a long and, on the surface, not very satisfactory discussion on January 6 with MFA SecGen Hamdani of the issue of terrorism and the need for all states to condemn it forthrightly. Drawing on Dept guidance, I urged that Algeria make its opposition to terrorism well known by condemning publicly such acts as those at the Rome and Vienna airports that were most certainly carried out by the Abu Nidal group with Libyan support. I also gave him our background paper on Abu Nidal³ and urged that GOA intercede with Syria to stop that country’s remaining support for Abu Nidal.

4. Hamdani, who was accompanied by Europe-North America Director Ghoualmi and Deputy Director Souibes, took the line that this issue is confused by the lack of a clear and widely accepted definition of what is terrorism and what is national liberation. He said that Algeria certainly sees the attacks in Rome and Vienna as damaging to the Palestinian cause and noted that the GOA had let the press handle this issue through analysis and propagation of the PLO and Arab League condemnations of the attacks. Continuing in a “personal vein,” Hamdani said that what really matters for governments is to analyze who is behind the many Abu Nidal terrorist operations which, he said with Ghoualmi’s vigorous backing, were consistently damaging to the Palestinian cause. After much indirect accusation, Hamdani eventually got to suggestion that Mossad is “manipulating” Abu Nidal through intermediaries as part of a broad Israeli policy of disrupting the peace process.
I dismissed this canard, saying that it was quote pure fantasy, even absurd unquote. Referring to Hamdani our secret background paper on Abu Nidal, I said there is no question that Abu Nidal sets his own agenda and carries out his actions with Libyan support. In these terms, I said that it is most important for responsible states to make absolutely clear that these kinds of actions are unacceptable.

5. Hamdani and Ghoualmi then shifted gears, going back to the first issue of the need to condemn terrorism publicly. With extensive references to the FLN’s policy and practice in its war for independence which limited itself to direct attacks on the enemy, Hamdani maintained that Algeria does not want to condemn publicly actions such as those at Rome and Vienna because this hides the fact that terrorism comes from the failure to solve underlying problems. What we should be doing, he said, is treating the cause of an illness, not its manifestations. He granted, nonetheless, that Arab states must focus on the issue of terrorism and stop its damaging effects on all of us. They went on to point out, however, that Algeria also has an important resource among all Middle Eastern countries that it must carefully guard—its credibility. This credibility gives the GOA entree in many camps and makes it an invaluable interlocutor. If the GOA is seen to take sides on certain issues, it will take itself out of that intermediary role and thus lose its usefulness. Hamdani acknowledged that GOA had not condemned in public terrorist attacks such as those in Rome and Vienna (although he insisted on taking credit for the Algerian media’s carrying of PLO and Arab League condemnations), but he noted also that Algeria had also not criticized the U.S. diversion of the Egyptian airliner carrying the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro hijacking,⁴ even though Algerian public opinion had clamored for such a condemnation.

6. Comment: I returned to our position on the need to publicly comdemn terrorism and isolate its backers, making sure Hamdani understood the importance we attach to the issue in our relations with all states. I don’t think I left them in any doubt about that. I sense, however, that the GOA feels that it can be more helpful in the fight against genuine terrorist acts like the Rome and Vienna airport incidents (acts of the sort, they emphasized, the FLN never engaged in during a bitter struggle against the French for Algeria’s independence) by working quietly behind the scenes. Indeed, the GOA is giving us important cooperation in identifying and neutralizing terrorist operatives, and we have every indication that cooperation will continue.

7. Subsequent to this meeting, Foreign Ministry issued official statement in “threats to Libya” (see septel).⁵ While statement did not specify the U.S. by name, it was a relatively severe criticism of pressure on Libya. GOA undoubtedly felt obliged to make some public defense of an Arab brother, but Hamdani would at the same time take credit with us for not having named the U.S., as such an Algerian statement a decade ago most certainly would have done and in even more virulent terms.

Johnstone

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860038–0924. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. In the wake of the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports (documentation scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989), the United States sent a démarche to Damascus, which was sent for information to multiple posts, stating that “there is compelling evidence that Abu Nidal’s organization was involved. He is a dangerous and ruthless terrorist, committed to violence and destruction.” The démarche continued: “Abu Nidal cannot operate in a vacuum, however; he is dependent on others to provide sanctuary, facilities, and financial support. Recent evidence indicates that Abu Nidal has obtained increased support from Libya. The only certain way to curtail the bloody activities that Abu Nidal has made his vocation in life is to cut off the support system that keeps his organization alive. Those who provide Abu Nidal assistance must share in the responsibility for his actions, and must likewise be subject to universal opprobrium.” (Telegram 265 to Damascus, January 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860003–0712)
3. Not found.
4. After the hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship surrendered to Egyptian authorities on October 9, 1985, they boarded an Egyptian passenger plane bound for Tunisia rather than face trial in Egypt. U.S. fighter jets intercepted the plane and forced it to land at the NATO airbase in Sigonella, Italy. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Terrorism, Part 2, June 1985–January 1989.
5. In telegram 132 from Algiers, January 8, the Embassy transmitted the text of the Algerian statement which read, in part, that the threats against Libya, “which constitute in themselves a serious violation of the standards of international conduct, are unacceptable. Their implementation (carrying out) would generate a grave situation in the region, would place in danger peace and international security and would undermine the efforts of the international community to establish a just and definitive peace in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Algeria, concerned about the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as the preservation of the gains of the brotherly Libyan people, would not allow in any case that they be violated.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860017–0597)