155. Letter From Vice President Bush to Algerian President Bendjedid1
I was pleased to have received your distinguished Ambassador, Mohamed Sahnoun, on December 12 and to hear from him the oral message which you sent outlining your concerns about the situation in North Africa.2
During my discussion with Ambassador Sahnoun, it was immediately clear that we share a common perception about the malevolent designs of Colonel Qadhafi. My government’s unyielding view is that Qadhafi is not to be trusted in any context. Over the course of time, he deliberately has pursued a path at variance with the accepted norms of international behavior. Like you, we believe that his regime poses an unremitting danger to Libya’s neighbors and, through the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy, to the international community at large.
Like you, we perceive a Libyan role in the recent Egypt Air hijacking,3 as well as in numerous other instances of terrorism. For example, we have well-documented evidence of Libyan plots to carry out terrorist acts against American government installations in Khartoum. As I suggested when I last met with Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi,4 [Page 341] there is both purpose and scope for close cooperation on these issues. I hope we can pursue this mutual concern.
On other issues of immediate concern which you raised about Qadhafi, our information and assessment are generally very close to yours. There is mounting evidence that Qadhafi contemplates further military moves in Chad. While we are uncertain as to his immediate intentions, we credit reports of a significant buildup of Libyan forces in the northern part of that country. Even if he does not engage in further adventurism to the south, continuing Libyan occupation in the north, to include the Aozou strip, is unacceptable. My government strongly supports the legitimate government of President Habre, and I applaud your decision to meet with him in Algiers.
Even more dangerous to area stability are Qadhafi’s attempts to establish hegemony in Sudan. Success would pose a grave threat throughout the region. Qadhafi’s plotting and publicized, cynical offer to “buy” Sudanese obeisance fits a pattern of attempts to exploit the economic and financial difficulties which beset many of his neighbors.
Military tensions between Egypt and Libya have abated momentarily, but the threat of conflict remains so long as Qadhafi persists in his relentless determination to destabilize the Government of President Mubarak. I am particularly heartened to know that you continue to consult with the Egyptian government on matters of such concern. We are also in close and continuing contact on this matter. Of particular concern are reports that the Soviets have agreed to major new arms deliveries to Libya, possibly to include SA–5 missiles. Introduction of these would seriously threaten Mediterranean and North African security.
Tunisian leaders are clear in their assessment that Qadhafi represents a continuing and very serious threat to the stability of their country. Your strong, clear and undiminished support for President Bourguiba’s government is a vital contribution to our mutual objective of helping assure the security of Tunisia.
Regarding your assessment of the situation in Mauritania, we do not have independent information of plotting against the Taya government. Quite frankly, we believe it unlikely that King Hassan would seek to undermine President Taya who has shown himself to be quite favorably disposed toward Morocco. To me, it is more plausible that Qadhafi might seek to take advantage of Mauritania’s economic weakness to pressure that government towards joining the Arab-African Union. Again, we have no information to confirm this. We would not welcome expansion of that union. I invite your continued thoughts on this most important matter.
Mr. President, I deeply appreciate your having informed my government of your decision to meet with Colonel Qadhafi. I well understand that this is a difficult decision for you and that you have sought [Page 342] to establish conditions aimed at eliciting better behavior from Qadhafi. I share your skepticism about Qadhafi’s sincerity, even should he make such commitments. In the same spirit of friendship and candor with which you sent your message, I express my hope that you will use this meeting both publicly and in private to convey the strongest possible message of disapproval to Qadhafi concerning his international behavior. You know even better than we that Qadhafi will try to exploit this meeting to gain international respectability and to advance his regional goals. That would indeed be unhelpful in dealing with this dangerous and erratic dictator.
If it would be of value to you, my government is prepared to send an official to Algeria to provide you personally with a more detailed review of our information about Qadhafi’s activities. This could be arranged prior to your meeting with Qadhafi, which I understand will not take place until at least very late this month.
Please accept my highest regards and warmest wishes. I wish you and the people of your great country a prosperous and happy 1986.
Sincerely,
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19796, Folder 19796–005, Algeria—1985. No classification marking.↩
- Telegram 382284 to Algiers, December 16, contains a record of the Bush-Sahnoun meeting as well as Benjedid’s oral message. Bendjedid had instructed Sahnoun to “deliver a message directly to the Vice President.” The message read in part: “Bendjedid ‘very concerned’ about situation in area, particularly Qadhafi’s moves and possibly ‘hidden’ motives. These might be related to his intention to do something in Chad.” Bendjedid also “turned to the situation in Mauritania where Qadhafi trying to buy adherence to his Arab-African union with Morocco” given that “Mauritania is desperately poor and pressure is on” and that “Bendjedid wants to draw USG attention to developments, call for vigilance. GOA is concerned about perceived temptation for Moroccans to exploit situation by encouraging Mauritanian entry into union—which would complicate situation for Algeria.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D025, Algiers #1, Nodis 1985, Nodis Sept 30 thru Dec 17)↩
- On November 23, three members of the Adu Nidal Organization hijacked Egypt Air flight 648 shortly after the plane left Athens. The plane was diverted to Malta. The hijackers shot and killed two female passengers—one American and one Israeli—and wounded three others. Two days later, Egyptian commandos stormed the plane, killing 54 passengers, two crew members, and one hijacker. (Judith Miller, “From Takeoff to Raid: The 24 Hours of Flight 648,” New York Times, November 26, 1985, p. A1)↩
- See Document 154.↩
- Bush wrote: “Warmest Personal Greetings to you and your family” under his signature.↩