138. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White House1
For the Vice President Immediate.
Your September 28 meeting with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi will be a critical one for the future of our relations in North Africa. The meeting will provide the first opportunity for an in-depth high-level exchange with Algeria after the Moroccan-Libyan Treaty of Union. This message outlines Algerian concerns and views as perceived here.
The Algerians see the Oujda Treaty2 as directed against them. It confirms their belief that the King has abandoned the search for a [Page 309] compromise solution of the Western Sahara conflict and intends to pursue, with Libyan financial help, a military solution.
Thus far, Algeria has reacted with relative restraint. It considers the Oujda Treaty an unnatural union which is unlikely to last, but wonders how the King plans to use it in the Western Sahara context.
Algerians, like others, find it hard to believe that with our extremely close relations with the King he would have taken such a radical step without our foreknowledge and at least tactic consent. I have tried at the highest levels to reassure them that we had no advance notice from Hassan and that our policy toward North Africa and Qadhafi in particular has not changed.
Our public statements and Guedira’s reception have gained us credibility in Algiers. However, the situation is complicated because Algeria believes France and perhaps King Fahd were aware that Oudja was in the works. This has reawakened Algerian suspicions of French double-dealing. (The French handling of their deal with Qadhafi on Chad has also had an unsettling effect.) The Algerians say they have no plans to resume high-level secret contacts with the King. Given his search for a military solution, typified by a further extension of the berm near the Algerian border, the Algerians say they have nothing to discuss.
Algeria is aware of the fact that we wish to maintain our traditional close relations with Morocco. They themselves probably are in favor. What they will be concerned about is a deliberate polarization of the region by the King with the object of associating the United States with a Moroccan-Libyan anti-Algerian alliance. Your personal relationship with Bendjedid and Ibrahimi provides an opportunity to clear the air. They would like to believe we were not somehow involved in the Oujda Treaty but they find it hard to do so.
Ibrahimi will be prepared to brief you on Algerian efforts on behalf of Buckley and the other two Americans held hostage in Lebanon. Hopefully he will have seen Kuwaitis in New York before he comes to Washington.
With all of your other responsibilities at the present time, your willingness to see Ibrahimi is deeply appreciated.
Warm regards and all best wishes.
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (06/15/1984–12/22/1984). Secret. Sent via Privacy Channels. Also sent Immediate for the Vice President. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Reference is to the August 13 agreement between King Hassan of Morocco and Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, which established a “union of states” between the two nations. For additional information about the treaty, see Document 37.↩