Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

1952.

Algiers, May 4, 1983, 1515Z

SUBJECT

• Growing Algerian Activism in Middle East Peace Process.

Ref:

• Algiers 1937 (notal).²

1. Confidential Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian involvement in the Middle East peace process has entered a more activist phase. Although now willing to engage its good offices—as demonstrated in recent trip of Presidential Emissary Lakhdar Brahimi and message of President Bendjedid to President Reagan³—rather than sit passively on the sidelines, the GOA remains wary of treading on PLO prerogatives. Algerian influence at present derives in large part from a strict policy of noninterference in internal Palestinian affairs and its concomitant success in keeping lines of communication open with more radical Middle East players—within the PLO as well as among Arab states—while increasing its cooperation with moderates, notably Arafat and Saudi Arabia. The GOA remains convinced that the Reagan initiative contains flaws, but—always keeping within the general parameters prescribed by Arafat and the PLO mainstream—is ready to assist more actively in the search for a compromise solution. End summary.

3. The evolution of Algerian Middle East policy has been long and tortuous, but has picked up speed in recent months. Although the GOA had gradually distanced itself from the Steadfastness Front over a number of years, the final break was consummated only in the fall of 1982. Algeria not only resisted Libyan and Syrian pressures for further front activities, but also signed on publicly with the Arab mainstream at the Fez Summit. GOA representatives then played a positive and active role in the follow-up visits of the Fez Contact Group to UNSC capitals.⁴ Previously President Bendjedid had characterized the Reagan initiative as insufficient, but nonetheless a step forward containing positive elements. Most recently, Bendjedid engaged Algerian diplomacy in an effort to find an alternative formulation for self-determination which might help in breaking the Jordan-PLO impasse. To that end he dispatched adviser Lakhdar Brahimi on a special mission to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan and then wrote personally to President Reagan.

4. Among other signs of a more activist Algerian Middle East policy, one of the most striking is the regular series of consultations between Arafat and Bendjedid. This personal relationship appears to have grown steadily in the wake of the PLO evacuation of Beirut—where the GOA placed the totality of its resources at PLO disposal—and to have intensified during the PNC meeting when Algeria provided a no-strings-attached refuge for Arafat in his time of need. Much publicity has also been given to the GOA’s 10-million-dollar contribution to the PLO during the battle of Beirut and to the military training provided in Algeria for Palestinian fighters.

5. At the same time, however, Algeria has done its best to keep open lines of communication with other PLO factions, especially those of Hawatmeh and Habbash. They are routinely received at the highest levels and were given no reason to complain of GOA meddling or favoritism during the PNC. Algeria also maintains good contacts with the radical Arab states of its former Steadfastness Front alliance. For example, both Arafat and King Hassan asked Bendjedid to intervene with Assad on the subject of an Arab summit. Finally, building on Bendjedid’s November 1982 meeting with King Fahd and his more recent meetings with his Moroccan and Tunisian neighbors, the GOA has increased its cooperation and coordination with moderate Arabs. Lakhdar Brahimi’s April 23 meeting with King Hussein seems to have added Jordan to that list.

6. The net result is a substantial Algerian capacity to play the role of honest broker in the Middle East. The GOA is proud of its peacemaking initiatives elsewhere, as in the release of U.S. hostages in Iran and ongoing efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq war. It would be tempted by the possibility of playing a meaningful role in the Middle East in what it sees as the most important of all conflicts. In that context, the GOA feeler on a self-determination formulation represents a cautious toe in the water; Brahimi’s positive remarks to King Hussein and Bendjedid’s letter to Reagan offer the prospect of significantly greater activism.

7. It is difficult to predict how far Algeria will be prepared to pursue its new role. Its most comfortable position is that of go-between or broker on behalf of the PLO. The GOA firmly believes in the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and has said consistently that it could accept any solution in the Middle East which would be acceptable to the PLO. Thus, support for PLO-sponsored initiatives entails only limited political exposure for the GOA. Beyond that, however, Algeria remains chary of any maneuvering which might hint at usurpation of Palestinian prerogatives.

8. Nonetheless, the GOA is now more receptive to active participation in consultations among its Arab partners and could prove to be a useful link between moderate and radical elements. Lakhdar Brahimi told the Ambassador that Algeria would work discreetly to improve Syria-PLO, Jordan-PLO, and Syria-Jordan relations—all in coordination with the Saudis. Brahimi also welcomed regular consultations with U.S. on the peace process.

9. Overall, the evolution in Algerian Middle East policy is positive from our perspective. The GOA has shown itself already to be a valuable ally for Arafat, helping to free him to some extent from Syrian pressures. Growing coordination with Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan should improve prospects for the moderate Arab camp. Algeria’s ability to talk with all parties—including the U.S.—provides a useful channel and potential influence heretofore unavailable. Although the GOA is likely to be very cautious in its approach, its emerging activism should be carefully evaluated as a new factor in the Middle East equation.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830251–0912. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Rabat, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 1937 from Algiers, May 3, the Embassy reported that Presidential Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi believed that “while recognizing positive elements of President Reagan’s plan, U.S. needed to endorse Palestinian self-determination in order for Arafat make the leap.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830249–0345)
3. Telegram Tosec 40208/121121, May 3, summarized Bendjedid’s message to Reagan: “Yaker came in to express Algerian President Bendjedid’s belief that it is time for the U.S. to take a ‘bold initiative’ and make a statement acknowledging the fundamental importance of the Palestinian problem and the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. He did not refer to the Moroccan initiative.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830247–0959)
4. See footnote 3, Document 119.