126. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State1
From Under Secretary Eagleburger/Polto 2007. Dept rpt as desired. Subject: U/S Eagleburger’s Meetings in Algiers: Session With Foreign Minister. Ref: Algiers 1630.2
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Reftel reported on U/S first session in Algiers. This message reports on second, more restricted meeting.
3. FonMin Ibrahimi, accompanied by MFA SYG Azzout and Political Affairs Director Kerroum received U/S Eagleburger, accompanied by Ambassador Newlin and AFN Director Sebastian for about 45 minutes late morning April 11. Meeting was cordial throughout. FonMin discussed Algerian-Moroccan relations, OAU and Saharan settlement perspectives as well as US-Algerian bilateral ties. Following developed.
A. Algerian-Moroccan relations, OAU, and Saharan settlement perspectives. In response to Under Secretary Eagleburger’s question, FonMin described President Chadli Bendjedid’s conversation with King Hassan in late February during their border meeting.3 Ibrahimi said that Chadli had opened by telling Hassan that he was not authorized to speak for the Polisario but, as President of Algeria, was prepared to transmit to Polisario any proposal King might wish to make. He invited King’s comments. Hassan responded, “Nairobi does not please me much.” Hassan said that if a referendum eventuates there will be a winner and a loser. This would leave scars on the Algero-Moroccan relationship. Hashen asked why the Saharans who had chosen the Polisario and those who had chosen Morocco should not talk to each other. Ibrahimi said Chadli responded that in his view, only way to bridge so polarized a position is through the emergence of a Saharan state. King responded that Moroccan man in the street would find Saharan state difficult to accept. Chadli replied that Moroccan public opinion was what King had made it. King could change it. He (Chadli) wished to say to King in front of FonMin Boucetta as representative [Page 284] of Istiqlal that Algeria considered King Hassan, not Moroccan political parties, its only valid interlocutor in Morocco.
According to Ibrahimi, Chadli then said that as President of Algeria he wished to be helpful to Morocco. Algeria considered Moroccan monarchy factor of stability in Morocco and its region and thought what Moroccan people needed now was not more war but more bread. King’s eventual agreement to a Saharan state could be made more palatable to Moroccan public opinion, if Moroccans saw direct benefit to themselves in such an outcome. Algeria would be prepared to assist in making this possible by helping to provide a suitable political and economic cover. The King said he was interested only in the flag and the postage stamps. However, he would consider Algeria’s proposals. Chadli then said that, politically, a Saharan state together with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, could be fitted into a greater Maghrebi ensemble. Initially, a Maghreb summit might be convened in which the leaders of these countries might participate. This should please the Moroccan people. Economically, Algeria would contribute the iron ore of Ngara Djebilet. This ore needed to be exported via the Atlantic. This would require a port which Moroccan labor could build on Morocco’s Atlantic coast with direct benefit to the Moroccan economy. Also, “when Algerian gas crosses Moroccan territory” Moroccan households and industry could burn Algerian fuel. The Moroccan and Algerian people could thus have something in common. In the same line of thought, Saharan phosphates might be exploited jointly between Saharans and Moroccans. The King, Ibrahimi said, asked for time to think it over.
Ibrahimi then told Eagleburger that Chadli had also gone to Tunisia to explore this idea.4 Algeria and Tunisia had signed a border agreement and a treaty of friendship. The latter should prove reassuring to the Tunisians after Gafsa. Tunisia’s investigation of that incident had shown that there had been no Algerian involvement whatsoever. Algeria had also negotiated border demarcation agreements with all of her other African neighbors, Libya excepted. The GOA hoped to be able to complete the process by signing with Mali and Mauritania before the end of the month. Algiers considered that the border with Morocco had been demarcated and agreed since the King of Morocco had signed the relevant accord in ’72. That left only Libya and the Libyan [garble] was expected in Algiers today (Apr 11) to begin negotiations of a frontier accord. Algeria had thus set up a “Maghrebi dynamic”. It had been pleasantly surprised to see the scope of the favorable reactions its initiative had elicited throughout the region. Libya was confronted by a choice of either integration (into the Maghreb) or isolation. Algeria hoped Tripoli would chose integration. In Algeria’s view the construction of a greater Maghreb and a more solid region should be seen in [Page 285] Washington as a favorable development. The U.S. could help to bring it about. Its assistance (unspecified) would be welcome.
U/S Eagleburger wondered how FonMin Ibrahimi saw the Saharan issue play itself out in OAU context? Ibrahimi replied that for first time in its history, 1982 had seen two failures to convene an OAU summit. A third attempt is now being readied. Algeria hoped it would succeed. Algeria wanted the OAU to survive, believing that regional organizations had value and that the OAU is best placed to deal with African problems. He hoped the U.S. agreed. The U/S assured him that we do agree. The Under Secretary then asked about Qadhafi’s reaction to these developments. Ibrahimi smiling said that the first adjective that came to mind was “unpredictable”. No one knew what Qadhafi would do. Algiers was counting on the strength of the pro-Maghrebi current now running in area to convince Qadhafi to go along. In reply to further questions, Ibrahimi said he could not say how various problems which had plagued the OAU would play themselves out. This was up to contact Group of 12, “mandated” to organize Addis summit. As Ibrahimi understood it, Chad would be represented by Habre and there would be no rpt no preparatory ministerial. The summit would be convened directly. All chiefs of state would attend and they would discuss everything. (Comment: He did not go beyond this formulation. End comment)
Under Secretary Eagleburger expressed appreciation. He said that to extent U.S. could be helpful it would be. U.S. wished to contribute to efforts now in course to strengthen the Maghreb and explore ways in which to end the Saharan conflict. Moroccans know this. Tunisians are currently somewhat concerned with respect to Qadhafi’s intentions towards them. We are trying to assist there as well. Ibrahimi interjected that it is important to contain the Saharan conflict “so close to our frontiers, those of Morocco and Mauritania.” We must try to do so without humiliating the Moroccan monarchy, he said. Algeria had had ample opportunities to intervene in Morocco after the Skhirat attempt on King Hassan,5 but had not done so. Algeria now hopes to return to the posture prevalent during the decade of cooperation which marked relations between Algeria and Morocco from 1965 to 1975. “The U.S. can help us” settle the Saharan problem, Ibrahimi said. Eagleburger noted that Ibrahimi had included Mauritania in proposed greater Maghreb. Ibrahimi said that Mauritania was widely seen as Achilles heel of Maghreb “the place it can be sundered”. It had to be included. Algeria was doing what it could to help the Mauritanian Govt which it saw as nationalist regime. Libyans, Iraqi Baath, Moroccans had all tried destabilize Mauritania at some point. Algeria had told Libyans that it believes in the non-exportability of national “facts” and does [Page 286] not approve of Libyan interference in the affairs of its neighbors. This remains the Algerian view. This is not merely a matter of principle but a position on which Algiers has acted. In fact, Ibrahimi said in closing this part of the conversation, Algeria, which is not blessed with unlimited resources, has expended $200 million last year in aid to other African states “without a quid pro quo”.
B. Eagleburger invited Ibrahimi to discuss his view of our bilateral relations. Ibrahimi responded that GOA saw them as on the whole satisfactory. Algeria would like to see them expand further. “There is a lot more we could do.” Two areas come to mind: agro-business and cultural/educational exchanges. Algeria coe [could be?] a long-term customer. It will have to import important quantities of grain for the foreseeable future. Such imports might usefully be put on a solid organized basis. The cultural area is also often neglected. The GOA wants to train Algerians of tomorrow to be at home in Arabic, French and English. The U.S. could send English teachers to Algeria. We should be working on this. Algeria, of course, needed to sell its gas. This too is an undertaking over time.
C. At FonMin Ibrahimi’s request U/S also summarized U.S. views on Middle East developments and the Williamsburg Summit as presented at first meeting (reftel). Ibrahimi expressed appreciation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830226–0322, D830224–0138, D830224–0719. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- In telegram 1630 from Algiers, April 13, the Embassy transmitted a summary of Eagleburger’s discussions in Algiers on the Middle East, the NAM meeting in New Delhi, and global negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830204–0977)↩
- See Document 19.↩
- See Document 20.↩
- Reference is to the attempted assassination of King Hassan on July 10, 1971, at his palace in Skhirat in southern Morocco.↩