Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2752.

Algiers, August 5, 1981, 0950Z

Pass NEA, S/AL, AF, ARA. Subject: Ambassador Walters Meets With President Bendjedid.

1. (Secret Entire text.)

2. Scarcely had I returned from meeting with Defense Secretary General Belloucif on the morning of my arrival in Algiers² than word came that President Bendjedid would see me at once (in great contrast to the cliff hanger on my last visit in April). I went to Presidential palace with Charge Ross and my executive assistant Nancy Lewis. There was a guard of honor in the courtyard.

3. President Bendjedid greeted me warmly. I told him that the concern I had expressed regarding Libya on my first visit was still present and, in order to let him know that it was well founded, I wanted to show him some photography I felt he would find interesting. As I showed him the pictures, he looked very interested but handled them as though they were pornographic in nature. He thanked me for the confidence that we had indicated by showing him this photography.

4. President Bendjedid said he had talked sternly to Qaddafi at Nairobi³ and the Colonel had promised to be good, as he was very anxious to have the 1982 OAU meeting in Tripoli. Bendjedid said he had told Qaddafi that Algeria would not tolerate any Libyan destabilization of Tunisia, Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta. He did not mention Mauritania. Bendjedid took credit for a good part of Qaddafi’s improved behavior since Nairobi.

5. He then spoke of Morocco, saying that King Hassan’s offer of a plebiscite in the Western Sahara had been well received but that his last press conference was discouraging. He hoped that Hassan was talking for home consumption only. He denied any desire to weaken Hassan, saying Algeria wanted peace and good relations with Morocco but that the Western Sahara was the only fly in the ointment. Algeria wanted to work with the Moroccans on economic projects, such as a natural gas pipeline to Morocco and beyond to Spain and Europe. He expressed belief that opposition parties were trying to paint King Hassan into a corner and denying him freedom of maneuver. He recognized that the Istiglal and other opposition groups were more intransigent on the Western Sahara than the King was.

6. I told the President that we were concerned with the situation in Central America and did not want to see clouds on our developing relations with Algeria. He said, “Belloucif has told you the story.” Here again, I got the impression that the sale of ten tanks to Nicaragua was a one-time shot. I detailed our post-Somoza aid to Nicaragua and said that the Sandinistas seemed to want to close the door on their relations with us.

7. I then told Bendjedid that we hoped to have a decision on the C–130’s soon and were considering the Algerians’ other requests to buy military equipment in order to diversify their sources of supply. We would notify them as soon as we reached a decision.⁴

8. He spoke of his visit to China some years ago and, in answer to my question, said he had always seen Mao and Chou En Lai either alone or with only one or two people present.

9. President Bendjedid said it was his feeling that the Ethiopians were ready to talk to the Somalis but the latter did not know what they wanted. After asking for Algerian help in arranging talks, they had added so many new conditions that talks had broken off. He was personally convinced, and the Ethiopians had told him so, that they were looking for a secure way out of dependence on Soviets and Cubans.

10. I told Bendjedid of my visit to Foreign Minister Benyahia in the hospital near Paris, where he was recovering from injuries sustained in a plane crash. He was most appreciative that I had gone. He praised Defense Secretary General Belloucif, saying he was a man who understood the world—“both sides, like you”—a sly reference to the fact that Belloucif and I both speak Russian.

11. Bendjedid said that during his visit to the Soviet Union, Brezhnev had not brought up Afghanistan, but Bendjedid, as a Moslem leader, had. He felt Brezhnev was looking for a way out of the Afghan morass that would not cause him to lose face before the world.

12. I told him I was delighted that the Algerian Government had given agrément for the new U.S. Ambassador. As I left, he spoke of his desire for better relations with us and asked me to convey to President Reagan his warm regards and his hope that they could talk in Cancun.⁵

13. Comment: My reception on this visit to Algiers has been incomparably warmer and the Algerians much more forthcoming than during my previous visit in April. I saw the President and the Defense Secretary General within five hours of my arrival. President Bendjedid was much more relaxed and cordial than on my previous call. The Defense Secretary General was downright friendly. Since I was last here, Bendjedid has removed Yahiaoui and others who opposed his moderate policies, and I believe that an Algerian Government decision has been made to take a certain distance from the Soviet Union and to move toward a more truly non-aligned position. Both Bendjedid and Belloucif were almost sheepish about the tanks and hopeful we would see their action in perspective. The fact that I visited Foreign Minister Benyahia in France did no harm.

Ross

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D81364–0411. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. A record of the Walters-Belloucif conversation is in telegram 2757 from Algiers, August 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810364–0618)
3. See footnote 6, Document 107.
4. In telegram 217122 to Algiers, August 15, the Department informed the Embassy that it “has approved, subject to our legal requirement for congressional consultations, a commercial sale of C–130 aircraft to Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810381–1215)
5. See footnote 9, Document 105.