Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2309.

Algiers, June 17, 1981, 1830Z

Department please pass SecDef and USCINCEUR. Tunis also for DepSecDef Carlucci. Subject: Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci Visits Algeria.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary. DepSecDef Carlucci visited Algiers June 16–17 for discussions with the Algerian Government. At both the MOD and MFA, Carlucci briefed senior officials on U.S. defense policy and its regional implications and described U.S. concern over Libyan activities. His MOD interlocutor avoided a substantive response on these issues, but raised instead his hopes for further sales of AMC trucks and his expectation that the end-use assurances the U.S. is awaiting regarding C–130 aircraft will soon be transmitted. Carlucci’s MFA interlocutor indicated Algerian understanding of the need for strategic balance, stressed Algeria’s desire for good relations with the U.S., criticized U.S. sales of arms to Morocco without restrictions, and called for an end to the Western Sahara conflict through negotiations and self-determination. On Libya, he described the threat it poses to the region as overestimated, dismissing such operations as the Gafsa affair² as worthy of a cheap detective novel. Libyan assistance to the Polisario, he said, was fully under Algeria’s control. However, Libya’s arsenal was indeed a matter for concern, as was the possibility of union between Chad and Libya. For this reason, Algeria was collaborating with Nigeria to find a formula for the departure of Libyan troops. We found Carlucci’s visit valuable as a demonstration of U.S. interests in high-level dialogue, as an opportunity for the U.S. to set forth its defense policies, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a cautious expansion of ties and acknowledge certain aspects of the Libyan danger. End summary.

3. Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci visited Algiers June 16–17 to continue the administration’s political and military dialogue with Algeria. In the absence of Foreign Minister Benyahia and MFA Secretary-General Dembri in France and of MOD Secretary-General Belloucif in the U.S., the visit and program were approved at the very last minute, and Carlucci was received by middle-level officials of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in their capacities as Acting Secretaries-General. Although President Bendjedid was purported to be out of town and did not receive Carlucci, and although the GOA was unable to provide any formal hospitality, both of the meetings held were extremely cordial, and Carlucci’s interlocutors apologized repeatedly for the absence of their principals.

4. In a 40-minute meeting with Acting MOD Secretary-General and Director of Logistics Col. Abdelmalek Guenaizia and in a 90-minute meeting with Acting MFA Secretary-General and Director of Western European and North American Affairs Saadeddine Benouniche, Carlucci reviewed U.S. defense policy, emphasizing the commitment of the Reagan administration to strengthening national defense in the face of an erosion of the strategic balance and a change in Soviet military policies and the resulting need for the U.S. to build up its capacity for flexible response through, among other things, cooperation with like-minded governments. Carlucci stressed that the forces and capabilities developed in the process were not meant for intervention in the internal affairs of other states or in purely regional disputes. Specifically, the development of further collaboration with Morocco was taking place in the context of U.S. global strategy, not in response to any regional or local dispute. Carlucci took the occasion of both meetings to describe heightened U.S. concern for Libyan adverturism. Although he indicated he had no formula to propose for dealing with this disturbing phenomenon, he invited Algerian views on the subject.

5. At the MOD, Guenaizia (who was clearly not authorized to address broad issues of foreign or military policy and kept glancing at a major introduced as the new Director of External Relations for reassurance) limited himself to a review of the two pending issues in military sales—AMC trucks and C–130 aircraft. On the truck sale, Guenaizia said the MOD was extremely satisfied with the negotiations and U.S. approval and indicated the first purchase of 1,300 units was likely to be merely a beginning. On C–130 aircraft, Guenaizia said the end-use restrictions being discussed in Washington posed no problems to the GOA, and the assurances the U.S. desired would be forthcoming “very soon”. On broader political and military issues, Guenaizia made no substantive response, although he kept nodding understandingly throughout Carlucci’s presentation. He limited his response on Libya to several nods and a broad smile. (Comment: This is the first time a GOA official has initiated a discussion of the C–130 sale in Algiers. That this should occur so soon after President Bendjedid’s visit to Moscow demonstrates the seriousness with which the GOA is approaching this sale.)

6. At the MFA, Benouniche responded to Carlucci’s remarks with a well organized and well reasoned presentation of Algeria’s view of world and regional issues. Although he broke no new ground except on Libya, the following points of his presentation were noteworthy:

— Algeria is fully aware that the continued independence to which it and other small states aspire requires detente and the absence of superpower confrontation. This in turn requires a strategic balance between the two superpowers which it is not appropriate for Algeria to pass judgement on. (Comment: Nowhere did Benouniche take issue with U.S. efforts to restore military equilibrium vis a vis the Soviet Union; indeed, in an airport discussion with the Charge after Carlucci’s departure, he went so far as to say Algeria understands the reasons for U.S. actions in this field.)

— The genuine non-alignment to which Algeria aspires requires good relations with the U.S., and Algeria is heartened whenever new areas of collaboration are found.

— Algeria understands fully the traditional good relations that exist between the U.S. and Morocco. What it cannot understand is the change in U.S arms sales policy that took place in November 1979 and by which Morocco was furnished weapons specifically for use against the Polisario outside its internationally recognized boundaries.

— Algeria seeks proper decolonization of the Western Sahara through negotiations between the warring parties and through the internationally-sanctioned method of self-determination. To do otherwise sets a bad precedent for Africa by bringing inherited borders into question. Algeria fears the continuation of the conflict for two reasons: (a) under certain circumstances, it could escalate into a wider conflict; (b) it threatens the stability of Morocco, and Algeria is keenly aware of the need for stability there.

7. On Libya, Benouniche went somewhat further than GOA interlocutors have gone in the past. He began by excluding Libya’s intervention in Chad³ as a special case and went on to minimize the gravity of the Libyan threat in its other manifestations, expressing the view that the destabilizing threat Libya poses to the region has been overestimated. As an example of the absence of danger or serious purpose to be found in Libyan adventures, he cited the Gafsa raid, whose scenario (an armed attack by 40 men on a city of 200,000 some 600 kilometers from the capital in the expectation that this would lead to a wide-scale revolution) he described as worthy of a cheap detective novel.

8. Libya’s role in the Western Sahara conflict, Benouniche affirmed, is not an independent one. While it supports the Polisario, it can go no further. To do so would be to challenge Algeria, and this it cannot do. Morocco may try to exploit Libya’s present unsavory image to obscure these facts, but this is simply a maneuver to relegate Morocco’s own intervention in Mauritania into the background. Algeria does not believe Libya has the capacity to get the upper hand in the Western Sahara issue to change the substance of the problem.

9. Chad, he said, is a different problem. The absence of any state structure had helped give the impression that the Libyan intervention had been a massive, effective operation, but this was not as true as it seemed. In any case, no one in Africa had really found the Libyan intervention at the request of the Lagos Accord, which Algeria continues to support, a really dramatic development.⁴ The announcement of Chadian-Libyan union was an entirely different matter, one on which Algeria had taken a clear position. Unions cannot be achieved in this manner; they must be authentic expressions of the wishes of each country. When they take place in the presence of military forces, this is annexation. Algeria has been working and continues to work with Nigeria to find a solution based on a formula leading to the departure of Libyan troops from Chad. Since, in Algeria’s view, Libya intervened for its own motives, not on behalf of “other parties”, a solution can be found in a regional setting.

10. In give-and-take following Benouniche’s remarks, Carlucci indicated that the Reagan administration indeed has revised U.S. arms transfer policy to make it responsive to overall U.S. interests in the national security field,⁵ but stressed that in Morocco’s case this did not mean a change in policy on the issue of the Western Sahara. The U.S. continues to urge a peaceful solution on its Moroccan friends. While the Moroccan military now appears to have greater confidence in itself and in its role, the Moroccan Government also appears to be more willing to negotiate on the Western Sahara issue. However, it is not appropriate for outside powers like the U.S. to make value judgements on the basis of such impressions. It is to be hoped that the Nairobi summit conference of the OAU will start the parties on the road to a peaceful solution.⁶

11. Carlucci also reiterated U.S. concern over the size and continuing growth of Libya’s arsenal, again indicating he had no formula to propose to deal with this troubling trend. Benouniche responded that indeed Libya’s sizeable arsenal could pose a problem. Algeria had noted U.S. concern over this arsenal as expressed during the visit of General Walters in April, and, when it shared with the U.S. its view that Libya was not a worrisome factor, it limited this evaluation to Libya’s activities, not its arsenal.⁷

12. When a member of Carlucci’s delegation raised the existence of some difficult-to-verify reports that Libya’s support for the Polisario was growing rapidly and might prove an obstacle to a peaceful solution, Benouniche responded that Libya did not have the logistical capability to move in this direction. Only two routes were possible—the existing trans-Algerian route and a theoretical Niger-Mali-Mauritania route. Algeria was firmly in control of the first, while the second was impractical.

13. Comment: The GOA appears to have taken a calculated risk in approving this visit in the full knowledge that top leadership would be absent. It had to balance its desire to avoid giving a negative signal against the danger of leaving its visitors with the impression they were not getting their due. In spite of the absence of GOA principals, however, the visit was valuable as a demonstration of U.S. interest in continued high-level dialogue, as an opportunity for the U.S. to set forth its defense policies and their regional implications, and as an occasion for the GOA to reiterate its desire for a cautious expansion of ties, notably in the military field, and acknowledge for the first time (albeit guardedly) the dangers that Libya presents. It is an interesting coincidence that Algeria nominated its first defense attaché in Washington on the very day of Carlucci’s visit.

14. We are not certain why President Bendjedid did not receive Carlucci. It may be that he did not wish to see him because he is a principal of the Department of Defense and such a meeting would have made too much too soon of Algerian-American military relations. It may, however, simply be that the MFA failed to coordinate preparations for the visit adequately. We had several indications large and small that it had failed to do anything until the very last minute, and a Presidential call may have proven impossible to arrange on that basis.

15. In the absence of ministerial or presidential calls, the Algerian press was extremely restrained in announcing the visit June 16. A small front-page item in “El Moudjahid” simply noted that “in the framework of an orientation trip (tournee d’information) in the Mediterranean region, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci is visiting Algeria from June 16 to 17. During his visit, Mr. Carlucci will have discussions with Algerian officials.” This short item has already caused foreign journalists in Algiers to call us for more details, but we have limited ourselves to saying that Mr. Carlucci is visiting a number of countries in the Mediterranean region for discussions on issues of mutual interest on the bilateral, regional, and world scene. We suspect the Soviet Embassy would gladly give us several cases of vodka for a fuller report.

Ross

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810284–0872. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Moscow, Lagos, Nouakchott, Rabat, and Paris. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis.
2. Reference is to the January 26–27, 1980, commando raid by Libyans and Tunisian rebels on Tunisian Government installations in Gafsa. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, footnote 2, Document 204.
3. Reference is to Libya’s December 1980 invasion and current occupation of northern Chad.
4. Reference is to the August 21, 1979, peace agreement between the warring factions in the Chadian Civil War, which created the Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT), or Transitional Government of National Unity.
5. In telegram 84780 to all diplomatic posts, April 3, the Department informed the posts that “the administration is in the process of revising U.S. conventional arms transfer policy to make it more responsive to the new security challenges we face and more supportive of our military, political and economic interests.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810157–1195)
6. Reference to the Organization of African Unity meeting held in Nairobi in June.
7. See Document 105.