Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

1578.

Algiers, April 20, 1981, 1705Z

For the Secretary from General Walters. Subject: Meeting With Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. At 11 this morning (April 20) I saw President Chadli Bendjedid for one hour at his palace. Charge Ross and Lee Martiny were with me. Foreign Minister Benyahia was the only other person present. The President decided to speak in French and dismissed the interpreter.

3. I opened by thanking him for receiving me, stating that Secretary Haig had asked me to come to brief him on the Middle East trip² and to thank him for Algeria’s successful efforts to obtain the release of the American hostages in Iran. I assured him that we intended to live up fully to the terms of the Algiers agreement, supported the territorial integrity of Iran, had no desire to push the Iranians into the Soviet camp, and harbored no spirit of vengefulness toward Iran.

4. I then said that we fully recognized the important role of Algeria in international affairs and that President Reagan very much believed in consultations with others, not just to inform them of our point of view but to listen to theirs and perhaps to change ours in the light of what we learned. A better understanding of one another will help us develop and consolidate those areas where we can cooperate.

5. The purpose of my trip was to brief him on the Secretary’s trip and to discuss bilateral and regional matters.³ It was important that he have a clear idea of our strategic views. I then reviewed the Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh stops.⁴ I told him about the F–15 and AWACS sales to the Saudis despite considerable Israeli opposition, the Secretary’s cooling the Israelis off an intervention in the Zahle fighting, and our understanding of the importance of solving the Palestinian and Jerusalem problems, which were central to peace in that area. When I described the Camp David agreements as not an end in themselves but a first step of a long journey, he smiled understandingly and did not challenge those agreements. I described the concern of many Middle Eastern countries over Qadhafi’s irrational and reckless behavior.

6. Then I said that we fear that the Middle East conflict greatly aided Soviets in mischief making in the area, but that even without the Palestinian problem there was the global problem of Soviet expansionism. There were no Palestinians in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, or Central America, but we still had aggressive Soviet pressure in all these areas. Afghanistan, an Islamic and developing country, had been brutally invaded. We sought no confrontation with the Third World, but we were aware of the realities of Soviet aggression. We intended to redress the military balance, strengthen our friends, consult with others, put our financial house in order, get a handle on inflation, and resume the upward move of American productivity.

7. We were concerned about the conflict in the Western Sahara. Morocco is strategically important to us. We do not desire to see the Straits of Gibraltar in unfriendly hands. We know from the Moroccans that there have been talks between them and the Algerians and that these talks were broken off.⁵ We regret this as we very much favored a peaceful solution of this difficult problem between brother nations. We had constantly made this clear to the Moroccans, who seemed disposed and anxious to talk to the Algerians.

8. When I mentioned Qadhafi’s proposal for a federation between the Sahraoui and Mauritania,⁶ I got the first really sharp reaction of the whole talk from Bendjedid: “No, absolutely not. Out of the question.” I reiterated that we favored a negotiated solution for the Sahara conflict, had offered our support for the integrity and independence of Mauritania, and encouraged direct contacts between the parties to the conflict.

9. We were concerned about Libya now more so than previously. I then again thanked him for receiving me personally and recalled that I had earlier discussed a number of these matters with his Foreign Minister.

10. President Bendjedid then thanked me for coming to see him and said that in the matter of the hostages Algeria had only done its duty and that he was pleased to hear that we supported the territorial integrity of Iran. He hoped that the conflict between Iran and Iraq could be peacefully solved within the next few weeks by the good offices mission of the Islamic Conference. He remarked that he felt my visit and the presentation I had made to him were “positive and encouraging”.

11. On the Middle East he too believed that solution of the problem of the occupied territories and Jerusalem was essential, without such a solution there could be no peace in the area, and a solution would result in lessening of tensions throughout that region. What I told him of our attitude encouraged him. He was sure that Saudi Arabia would never attack Israel.

12. On Namibia Algeria maintained here as elsewhere the right of self-determination and independence for all peoples. It was conflict in certain areas of Africa and the feeling of some countries in the area that they were threatened that made possible the pressure of “people from other countries”. I said that the United States did not threaten any of the newly independent countries. They had brought in many thousands of Cubans, Soviets, East Germans and others: he remarked that they were threatened by South Africa. I said that neither Ethiopia nor Yemen was threatened but they still had tens of thousands of non-Africans or non-Arabs. He smiled ruefully and said, “oh well, Ethiopia is something else”. He had, however, gotten my point.

13. On Libya he said he had seen Qadhafi the day before. One should not take seriously all of his rhetoric and impulsive statements. I repeated that I was more concerned by the immense quantities of arms he has brought into Libya and stored in huge depots. Most countries tried to have several pilots or drivers per plane or tank. Libya was the only country which had several planes per pilot and several tanks per driver. As a soldier, I know that he would understand that we were concerned as to the ultimate users of all of this equipment. Qadhafi had already moved on Chad and his neighbors. President Bendjedid said that he was working with Nigeria and other members of the OAU to solve this problem and was confident that they could do it. He indicated the Lagos mini-summit on Chad had been rescheduled to the near future with the agreement of all the parties and asked that “outsiders” give Africa a chance to solve this problem for itself.⁷

14. I remarked that Qadhafi had tried to federate or unite with almost all of his neighbors including Algeria. The President laughed and said that with Algeria it would never work. Union was like a marriage, you had to have agreement from both sides. I added that both sides have to be “consenting adults”. He laughed and repeated “consenting adults” with emphasis on the last word.

15. On Morocco and the Western Saharan conflict he said that Algeria sought no quarrel with Morocco. It did not want to see the overthrow of the monarchy, which it considered a factor for stability in the area, since no one could tell what sort of regime would follow. Algeria was not directly concerned in the conflict between the Sahraoui people and Morocco. He would not hide the fact that Algeria had helped the Polisario as it had helped all movements of national liberation. Algeria had often shown its desire for a peaceful solution and was disposed to help, but he made no direct offer to resume negotiations. I decided not to press this point as I was sure he had my message. I said that, if he really wanted to help, he must find some way to get the negotiations started again in a way that would not cause the Moroccans to lose face. After all, every man killed in this conflict is a brother and a fellow Moslem. He agreed, saying that they were all Arabs whether descended from those here before the Arab conquest or not. The Algerians regarded them all as brothers.

16. I took the initiative of closing the conversation by saying I had detained him long enough. He then thanked the President and Secretary for sending me. He felt my visit would encourage cooperation in a number of areas of common interest. He expressed great interest in the President’s recovery⁸ and said that he looked forward to seeing him at the Mexico meeting⁹ or perhaps later in the U.S.

17. Comment. The conversation was much warmer and more cordial than that with Foreign Minister Benyahia the previous day.¹⁰ President Bendjedid was smooth, relaxed, and assured without being cocky. His manner was extremely friendly throughout. Several times he nodded understandingly as I made a point. I was struck by his lack of criticism of the Camp David Agreements. At no time did he consult the Foreign Minister, who took no part in the conversation. He clearly regarded Qadhafi as a troublesome child who will some day grow up, but he implicitly recognized that the Libyan leader’s antics were disturbing. When I spoke of our concern about whence the crews might eventually come for Qadhafi’s vast numbers of tanks and planes, it was clear that he understood what I was telling him.

18. He seems a man sure of himself, an Algerian nationalist not entirely caught in an ideological straightjacket. He has some flexibility. It will be interesting to see if he does anything to resume talks with the Moroccans to support his affirmation of his desire for a settlement with them.

19. I am considerably encouraged by the talk’s atmosphere even though I cannot point to any concrete positive development.

20. Department repeat as desired.

Ross

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810186–0883. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. In telegram 96383 to Rabat and Algiers, April 15, the Department transmitted Haig’s talking points for Walters’s meeting with Bendjedid. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810179–0764)
3. Haig visited Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and Riyadh April 4–8 to discuss the Middle East peace process. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
4. Earlier in April, Walters met with Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, and Saudi leaders to explain the U.S. position on the Middle East peace talks. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
5. Reference is to the ongoing discussions between Algeria and Morocco over the former’s support for the Polisario guerillas in Western Sahara.
6. In telegram 1811 from Nouakchott, April 22, the Embassy reported on Qadhafi’s “unexpected” visit to Mauritania, during which he publicly made the federation proposal. The Government of Mauritania assured the Embassy that it “did not agree with Qadhafi’s public statement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810189–0944)
7. In telegram 4340 from Lagos, April 10, the Embassy reported that the planned Lagos mini-summit on Chad had been postponed, apparently because Nigerians were unable to persuade Qadhafi and Adhijo to attend. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810171–0519) Documentation on the OAU’s mediation efforts is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
8. Reference is to the abortive March 30 assassination attempt on President Reagan.
9. Reference is to the North-South Summit, or the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development, scheduled to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in October. Documentation on the summit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance.
10. A record of the April 19 discussion with Benyahia, which Walters described as “polite” and “actually less confrontational than I had expected,” is in telegram 1559 from Algiers, April 19; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810185–0989.