Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

32945.

Washington, February 7, 1981, 1807Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting With Algerian Ambassador, February 6, 1981.

1. Algerian Ambassador Malek met with Secretary Haig February 6 for 50 minutes, primarily for a discussion of Iranian hostage agreements. Also present were DAS Morris Draper, Country Director Carleton Coon (NEA), and Stephanie van Reigersberg, interpreter. After the meeting with the Secretary, discussion of bilateral issues continued in NEA, with desk officer Edmund Hull joining the group (septel).²

2. Secretary opened meeting by outlining in warm terms gratitude of U.S. Government and President Reagan to GOA for its assistance in securing hostage release, as well as for Malek’s personal role. Malek was modest about Algerian role, noting that it was “normal” since Algerian services had been requested by both USG and the Iranians. Algeria had tried to be honest and scrupulous. However, it had been a difficult task, what with changes in the political power struggle in Iran. The Algerians like the Americans had been in a state of suspense until the last moment when the hostages had actually boarded the plane.
From then on things had moved very rapidly, so rapidly that he had not had the opportunity to brief American officials on what had transpired in Tehran during the last crucial three weeks that preceded the release. He said he would be glad to give the Dept a full briefing on that period.

3. Malek noted that the Iranians had in the end made many concessions and that the GOA regarded the final agreement as good from the U.S. point of view. At any rate, the present problem was less one of analyzing the past than one of examining how to implement the agreements from here on out. He cited deadlines and procedures built into the agreements.

4. In response Secretary stressed U.S. awareness of difficulty of job Algerians had taken on, gratitude at outcome, and admiration for Algerian skill, patience, and dedication. He said that history will never record what the consequences of failure of those negotiations would have been, but he said that they would have been “very dramatic” and this provided all the more reason for U.S. gratitude at having the crisis resolved. Secretary noted that inevitably there had been speculation in the U.S. press regarding implementation of the agreements. He assured Ambassador Malek that the Reagan administration intended to meet its obligations, consistent with international law and domestic legal requirements. In the process, he said, the U.S. will be guided by the long term objective of conducting itself in a way that would not force Iran into the arms of the Soviets. He cited reassurances of President Reagan that the U.S. would not proceed in a spirit of revenge. It was normal, however, that a new administration not party to the events leading up to the agreements would wish to study them thoroughly. For that reason, he said, the Department would greatly welcome Algeria’s advice and counsel, including any observations Malek had on the difficult period immediately preceding the conclusion of the agreements. He suggested a review with Malek of the implementation of the agreements, and that three-week period, take place with U.S. officials involved with the issue, including some of our new team, at the Assistant Secretary level.

5. The Secretary then referred to strong public feelings in the United States toward Iran and said that the future conduct of the Iranians would necessarily influence the administration’s ability to implement the agreements in the spirit in which they were reached.

6. Malek noted that agreements for release of hostages should be seen as a valuable basis not only for settling the immediate dispute at hand but also for gradual normalization of relations between U.S. and Iran. In both contexts it was important that terms of agreement be adhered to. Iranians had been very distrustful during negotiations of whether U.S. would live up to commitments. Malek carefully stressed that the Algerians had placed their own credibility on the line in assuring the Iranians that they could trust the U.S.

7. Malek then analyzed specific portions of the hostage agreements. The U.S. commitment not to interfere in Iranian internal affairs was nothing more than what every country agreed to under the UN Charter. The matter of unfreezing Iran’s assets had also been simplified by Algeria’s suggestion that Iran leave certain of its funds frozen here in the U.S. under agreed conditions but that it immediately repay its loans to U.S. banks abroad. If this particular formula had not been agreed, months of additional negotiations between Iran and the U.S. banks would have resulted. Malek said he understood the problem for the U.S. involved in the agreement’s provision to lift attachments and suits against the assets in U.S. banks here, but added that the arrangement governing the appropriate awards out of a renewable dols one billion escrow account was a very reasonable procedure, in his view. He said he understood fully the other issues considered sensitive for Americans: (a) the proviso that no legal claims be introduced by the hostages or their families after the hostages were released; and (b) the question of USG cooperation with Iran’s efforts within the U.S. legal system to identify and locate assets of the Shah.

8. Malek asserted that what it all came down to was that it was time for Iran and America to “turn the page” in their relations. He drew the analogy of Algeria’s protracted conflict with France. Malek assured the Secretary of his willingness, and the willingness of his government, to cooperate in any way toward implementation of the agreements. He also noted that, as the protecting power for Iran, the Algerian Embassy has many problems arising from the large number of Iranian nationals still in the U.S., and expressed the hope that cooperation with the Department would continue on this front too.

9. Referring to “turning the page”, the Secretary said that whether we were able to do that gracefully and effectively will be influenced by the outcome of the situation of the U.S. citizens who are still in difficulty in Iran. He noted also in this connection that there had been earlier telephone threats (perhaps by Iranians) against hostage families; this could complicate matters considerably if continued.

10. Changing the subject, Secretary then referred to a matter that had surfaced virtually at the moment that Algeria’s efforts with the Iranians had been crowned with success. This involved the new administration’s need to resolve at once a longstanding military sales issue with Morocco. The Secretary said he wanted to assure Malek and the Algerian Government that the decisions taken on delivery to Morocco of aircraft and the sale of tanks had occurred when they did because of such factors as production line deadlines. These decisions also reflected U.S. determination to pursue policies which will consistently and reliably support historic friends of the U.S. However, he stressed, neither the decision itself nor the timing were in any way intended as an act or signal of unfriendliness to the Algerian Government. In practical terms the delivery date of the tanks (two and a half to three years) would occur long after we anticipated a settlement of the Sahara question.

11. The Secretary said that the USG “strongly favors a prompt, negotiated settlement” of the Saharan dispute. Conflict will not settle the issue.

12. He then reiterated that it was the policy of the Reagan administration to seek to build on and consolidate promising recent developments in the relationship between the U.S. and Algeria.

13. Malek said that press accounts and the tank decision timing had created a rather curious impression and had raised questions in Algiers. His government, nevertheless, continued as always to hew to a position of not seeking to destabilize Morocco while favoring self-determination for the Western Sahara. He said he saw a useful place for a USG role in the search for a settlement of this dispute, since the U.S. agrees that it cannot be settled by force of arms. Malek expressed the hope that the U.S. can convince Morocco of the need for a peaceful solution. On the broader issue of U.S.-Algerian relations, Malek said Algeria is ready to work for further strengthening. The U.S. is already Algeria’s first trading partner, and Malek hoped that the situation would continue to evolve favorably.

Haig

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Rabat. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 32071 to Algiers, February 7, the Department reported that after their meeting with Haig, Malek and Draper discussed the sale of M–60 tanks to Morocco and the LNG issue. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810058–0084)