Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

481.

Algiers, February 1, 1981, 1525Z

CINCEUR for POLAD. Subject: GOA Protests Sale of M–60 Tanks to Morocco. Refs: A) State 18634 Notal;² B) Algiers 424 Notal;³ C) Algiers 435 Notal.⁴

1. (S) Summary: The GOA has made a low-key oral protest over our decision to begin consultations with Congress on the sale of 108 M–60 tanks to Morocco. Public and private criticism of the substance and timing of this decision has begun to mount. End summary.

2. (C) At the end of a meeting held at my request January 31 to discuss the Algerian-American LNG negotiations (septel),⁵ MFA Director of Western European and North American Affairs Saadeddine Benouniche asked me to stay behind after EconCouns Smith’s departure. He then made the following presentation.

3. (S) The GOA has taken note of our explanation of our decision on the M–60 tanks as being grounded in our traditional relations of friendship with Morocco. It is disturbed that our explanation mentions neither the clauses of the 1960 Moroccan-American Arms Accord⁶ that restrict the use of arms sold to Morocco for the defense of Morocco’s internationally recognized territory nor the language used to justify President Carter’s November 1979 decision to sell OV–10 aircraft and other equipment to Morocco—i.e., that this sale was meant to promote negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara dispute.⁷ Indeed, our reference to the non-suitability of these tanks for use in the Western Sahara implies that we have placed no formal restriction on their use there. In the absence of a clear reference in our explanation to either the restrictions of the 1960 Arms Accord or the justification of the 1979 arms sale decision, the GOA believes the sale of M–60 tanks is contrary to the spirit of the resolutions and recommendations of the various international organizations that have pronounced themselves on the Western Sahara issue. Such a sale would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, work against the exercise of self determination in the Western Sahara and contravene the OAU’s call on external parties not to prejudice the negotiating process it has defined.

4. (S) On the basis of the above analysis, Benouniche said, he had been asked officially to present a protest over our decision. I told him I had taken note of the analysis and of the protest he had presented and would transmit them to the Department.

5. (S) Comment: Following the return of President Bendjedid and Foreign Minister Benyahia from the Islamic Summit January 29⁸ and publication of wire services reports of our decision in the leading government-owned Algiers daily “El Moudjahid” January 31, both official and unofficial criticism has begun to mount. Benouniche was acting under instructions, and, although both the level and the form of the protest were low-key, civilian and military leaders in the GOA are clearly disturbed. Captain Mahfoud, the Deputy Director of External Relations at the Ministry of National Defense, began a previously scheduled meeting with the DATT February 1 with strong criticism of our decision (septel in DAO channels).⁹ The Director of Higher Air School at Tafaraoui, Major Hamid Abdelli, voiced similar criticism of the substance and timing of our decision to our Vice-Consul in Oran January 31.¹⁰

6. (U) The first press editorial on our decision has also appeared, and it is predictably critical but surprisingly laconic. The government-owned Algiers daily “Ash-Sha’b” wrote in a February 1 front-page editorial: “The decision . . . could have passed as a simple, ordinary news item . . . had it not been for the speed with which it was taken and the inopportune circumstances in which it occurred. It had been expected that the requests of the Rabat regime would receive a sympathetic hearing within the new administration, especially after its candid announcement of its hostility to national liberation movements. . . . But the speed with which the Secretary of State rushed to take this decision . . . raises a number of questions about the hidden motives behind this race with time and about whether the new administration may not have had grave reports about the situation in Morocco requiring it to deliver arms on an urgent basis. . . .” End comment.

7. (S) We will continue to report Algerian reaction on this issue and would welcome further guidance from the Department as it becomes available.

Ross

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Madrid, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USCINCEUR. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 18634 to Algiers, January 23, the Department reported that the United States would inform the Algerian Chargé “of our decision to sell Morocco 108 M–60 tanks. At the same time, we will inform him that the title to the first two OV–10 aircraft approved for sale to Morocco by President Carter in 1979 is being conveyed to the GOM as previously scheduled.” The Department suggested that the Embassy inform the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “at your discretion,” of the decision, “noting that, in keeping with the close relationship between our two countries, we wanted to bring the Algerians up to date on the status of our military relationship with Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810035–0632) For Carter’s decision to provide OV–10s and arms to Morocco, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Document 49.
3. In telegram 424 from Algiers, January 27, the Embassy reported that Benouniche called in Ross “to request clarification of the Department’s January 23 notification of recent USG decisions on arms to Morocco.” The Embassy explained that based on telegram 18634 (see footnote 2, above) it had chosen not to inform the MFA about the decisions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810040–0211)
4. In telegram 435 from Algiers, January 28, the Embassy warned that the impending deliveries of arms to Morocco “is, unless we can give the GOA convincing background elements rapidly or take some of the edge off with a rapid gesture towards Algeria, going to have a chilling effect on bilateral relations as they have emerged from the GOA’s role in the hostage negotiations.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810041–0428)
5. Not found.
6. Reference is to the 1960 agreement by which the United States agreed to sell arms to Morocco with the stipulation that the arms only be used for Moroccan self-defense.
7. See footnote 2 above.
8. Reference is to the third summit of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation held in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, January 26–29.
9. Not found.
10. Not found.