44. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Hayward) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

921345/Bravo 005. Subj: Argentina Situation. Adm Hayward sends.

1. (S/NF) Adm Hayward was received by Adm Anaya, CINCARGNAV and naval member ruling Junta, at 0825L this am in ARGNAV Hdqtrs Bldg here in Buenos Aires.

2. (S/NF) Adm Anaya explained situation as follows:

A. At 10 pm local last evening (1 Apr) 70 Argentine Marines (referred to as commandos) landed south of Port Stanley, Malvinas Islands (Falklands).

B. At 4 am this morning the govt radio station on the Island was secured.

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C. At 6 am a battalion of Marines landed by amphibious means near Port Stanley (a batt normally is about 350). NavAtt estimates with LST Cabo San Antonio and available LVTP–7 amphibious vehicles Arg Marine force ashore could total max of 300.

3. (S/NF) No additional info was provided on action in Malvinas by Adm Anaya. Adm expressed apologies that this action came during my visit. He attempted to link Arg action with their role in countering the perceived threat of “Soviets” in the region, refering to their count of an estimated 60 Soviet fishing trawlers in the vicinity of these Islands.

4. (S/NF) I informed Adm Anaya that remainder of my visit was cancelled and that plans were initiated to leave for Rio de Janeiro this afternoon.2

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Noforn. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State, Department of Defense, DIA, and CNO Admin.
  2. In telegram 1950 from Buenos Aires, April 3, the Embassy reported that [text not declassified] had met with Anaya’s personal aide, Captain Ricardo Nolte, on April 2. Nolte indicated that Anaya was “surprised” by Hayward’s “brusque” reaction to the Malvinas operation when Anaya and Hayward met that morning, which “did not accord at all” with the Argentine Navy’s expectation of how the United States would receive the news of the operation. According to Nolte, “the navy believed that while we would disapprove, our reaction would be more softly stated owing to growing GOAUS coincidence of interests and US pragmatism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0027)