131. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
- Ambassador Vernon C. Walters
- Argentine President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri
- Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez
- Admiral Moya, Chief of Military Household of The Presidency
President Galtieri welcomed Secretary Haig. The Secretary said that he brought President Galtieri a message from President Reagan of our President’s hope for a peaceful solution.2 The Secretary knew that the two Presidents had a good and useful conversation.3 Their problems were different, but he had found a moderate feeling in both capitals (Washington and Buenos Aires).
The Secretary said he knew that Argentina was ready for war if it came. This is equally true of the United Kingdom. For that reason, the situation could very soon become critical. It is important that we work out a solution. Our President is very concerned about the consequences of this conflict for the future. It could affect the entire strategy of the Free World. We had prepared a document.4 It is well thought out and was based on the ideas we developed after our second visit to London. We found the atmosphere there better than on our first visit. He would tell President Galtieri what our proposal would do.
1) It would keep the Argentine flag flying in the Islands.
2) It would expand the Argentine role in the interim period.
3) It would guarantee a conclusion of negotiations by the end of the year.
4) It would guide the process by the principles of decolonization for the normalization of relations between the Islands and the Mainland.
5) It would immediately lift economic sanctions.
[Page 286]6) It would guarantee American help throughout the whole process. In London, we insisted on negotiations that would lead to final sovereignty over the Islands for Buenos Aires.
What he was saying to the President is that neither side would get everything it wanted if we wish to arrive at a successful solution.
As time went on, the military position of the UK would improve; this might not be so, but that was the perception in London. If we let time go by, something could happen in a matter of hours. He was confident that both governments realized that a conflict would be disastrous for both and emotions would be more aroused. We must not permit time to catch up with us. We must make extremely serious efforts to resolve this situation or we will find an unenviable series of developments.
What we must do is provide for Argentina’s immediate and perceived benefits for the sacrifices they have made. These can be visible, but far more important is a final solution for this problem that finally realizes their hopes. There will be a turning away from the status of a non-selfgoverning territory. If we do this, Argentina will have achieved not all it wants but enough to justify its agreement. He must say that we had extracted much of this from London, and we would have to extract more. If he had not thought he could, he would not have bothered to go.
Secretary Haig then said that if President Galtieri thought it useful, he could, at some point, present to the Argentine leadership our feeling of the gravity of the situation and the American proposals on the whole matter. President Galtieri asked if the Secretary was referring to the Junta, and the Secretary confirmed that that was the case; but only if the President thought it useful. President Galtieri did not reply directly to the Secretary’s question as to whether he should see the other members of the Junta.
President Galtieri then said he wished to assure the Secretary that he had full confidence in the U.S. Government, in President Reagan, and in the Secretary himself. But speaking with the frankness that is possible between members of a family, he would tell the Secretary that he is not pleased with the fact that a number of people in the American Embassy were asking for visas to go to Uruguay. After all, it is not the summer season for people to go to the beaches in Uruguay, and this evidence of evacuation by Embassy people caused a bad impression and gave people the feeling that the U.S. might be preparing for a break in diplomatic relations.
Secretary Haig said this was absolutely not the case, and it would stop but, in the same confidence, he would tell the President that we had some intelligence reports [less than 1 line not declassified] that, in case a conflict broke out, some Argentine Services might take steps [Page 287] against certain Americans.5 President Galtieri said that this is nonsense, and he hoped we would not compare the Argentines to the Iranians. Secretary Haig said he feared someone had panicked.
President Galtieri said that there was a British Community here of over 20,000 people who, with the other members of their families, must total some 100,000 people, and they did not feel themselves in any danger.
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez then said that he had a friend in the British Community, a leader thereof, who had told him that he was a wartime comrade of Foreign Secretary Pym in Tobruk and Italy and was flying to London to tell him that the British attitude was crazy.
Secretary Haig said he would stop any further such requests for visas.
President Galtieri said that such reports could spread to the press and create in the Argentine people a psychosis that the U.S. was preparing for a diplomatic break with Argentina.
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez said that it could jeopardize the image of U.S. neutrality and the Secretary’s mission if a perception arose that the U.S. was not neutral.
President Galtieri said that these requests could lead to an awkward situation internally in Argentina. President Galtieri said that we must try to avoid giving newsmen the opportunity to present Argentina in an unfavorable light.
Secretary Haig said that some of the stories that came out while he was flying to the U.S. had not been helpful either.
President Galtieri said that it was essential to tranquilize the press.
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez said that the statement made today by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger was not very encouraging.6
[Page 288]Secretary Haig said that he spoke without authorization. The Argentines know what our President had said. The UK had been furious at our evenhandedness. So had Mrs. Thatcher. The Secretary went on that he must be frank. If open conflict began, U.S. public opinion would push us towards the UK. This was lamentable, and we must avoid it.
President Galtieri said that Secretary Haig must seek a peaceful solution for all of the reasons he had expressed; otherwise, we run the risk of splitting the Americas in two—those north of the Rio Grande and those south of it; some more and some less—but such a split would alter substantially the strategic panorama of the world.
Secretary Haig said that was why we must get to work with the Foreign Minister immediately.
President Galtieri said that he would be in his office and available all day to help them find a solution and overcome any problem that might arise.
Secretary Haig said he wished to assure President Galtieri that no one in the U.S., especially the President, felt they had encountered intransigence in Argentina. On the contrary, they had found good will and serious efforts.
President Galtieri said that the Argentines would give all guarantees covering the way of life and freedom of each individual who chose to remain on the Islands. The Argentines were also prepared to take into account present and future strategic needs of Great Britain as well as her economic interests.
Secretary Haig said he wished to tell them that, despite any other information they might be getting from other sources, he was convinced that economic matters had very little to do with the British position. What bothered them was the question of honor after a long period of humiliation. This was really the driving force behind their attitude.
President Galtieri then wished the Secretary and Foreign Minister Costa Mendez well in their work.7
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Casa Rosada. The original handwritten version of the memorandum by Walters is ibid.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 128.↩
- See Tab A, Document 112.↩
- On April 14, INR prepared an intelligence estimate on the threat to U.S. officials and citizens in Argentina stemming from the “combination” of “the extraordinary deep nationalistic fervor whipped up over the Falklands issue, the latent anti-Americanism that is seldom far from the surface in Argentina, and the perception of a U.S. ‘tilt’ toward the UK. In the context of an Argentine military defeat or any outcome that is perceived domestically as humiliating, these three factors would probably lead many Argentines in and out of government to view the US as responsible. US citizens could then become scapegoats exposed to a dramatically heightened security risk. They might well be subject to random harassment and violence simply for being US citizens, and US officials all the more so.” Although the estimate concluded that it was “unlikely that Argentine intelligence and security units would be ordered to harm US citizens,” individual officials “might indulge in unauthorized actions” and official services “might become less scrupulous in responding to the security needs of US citizens.” (Telegram 100726 to Buenos Aires, April 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840730–0700)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- No memoranda of conversation of Haig’s discussions with Costa Mendez during the morning and afternoon, April 16, have been found. For Haig’s brief summary of the course of the talks, which he sent to Reagan that evening, see Document 137.↩