116. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez1
In a telephone discussion with Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and Secretary Haig at 11:00 am, April 14, 1982, the following essential points emerged:
1. There will be no submission of Argentine proposals for paragraph 8 until there has been a submission by the UK.2 The basic Argentine thinking would be contained in a memo from the Foreign Minister to the US Secretary of State which involves a concept of decolonization and the creation of a status of international minority provision for compensation of island inhabitants’ property rights, etc. and establishment of arrangements for joint ventures for the exportation of island resources; minerals, fish, oil. However, there would be no formal submission of this unless there is some indication of British flexibility. If you have some statement from London or if the US is authorized by London to make a statement which would indicate clearer flexibility than the Argentines interpreted to have emerged from Mrs. Thatcher’s statement to the Parliament today, we will be willing to submit our comments.
2. The second issue raised by the Foreign Minister involves the consensus of US news reporting over the last 24 hours which suggested US support for British forces.3 Costa Mendez stated that Argentina must have a firm statement that the US is not helping in any way. Secretary Haig emphasized that such a statement would be impossible in light of ongoing agreements of many years standing and especially [Page 251] US obligations on Ascension Island. Secretary Haig stated that he would seek to affirm that there has been no modification to status quo ante and if such were the case, would do all within his power to reverse such policies.
3. Argentine Foreign Minister Costa stated it would be essential to have some guarantee on a limit for the movement of the fleet and that they were already under great pressure from OAS members to invoke the Rio Treaty in this regard. Secretary Haig emphasized that this latter point would be provided for and encompassed in our proposals and there would be no way to place such limits on movement of the fleet until an agreement was arrived at.4 He underlined again that this all highlights the urgency of immediate resumption of discussions. The Foreign Minister then stated that none of these concerns should be considered as personally against President Reagan or the Secretary of State; rather, were the outcome of public perception which needs to be dealt with in Argentina. He then expressed the deep personal gratitude of President Galtieri to President Reagan and Secretary Haig as well as his own. Secretary Haig informed the Minister he would give him an early report to include an assessment of the Rio Treaty situation.
Footnote: It is clear that the Argentines will not accept a visit from the Secretary until some action has been taken on points one and two above.5
Dictated by Secretary Haig April 14, 1982.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret. The summary was dictated by Haig, April 14.↩
- For the text of the agreement, as concluded with the British on April 12, see Tab A, Document 112. For an alternative draft of paragraph 8 of the agreement, see Tab B, Document 112.↩
- See Document 115.↩
- In the left-hand margin next to this sentence a note in an unknown hand reads: “AMH keeping pressure of fleet on Argentina.”↩
- Following this sentence, Goldberg wrote: “AMH phoned FM again at 2:05 on 4/14/82—see transcript.” For the transcript of this conversation, see Document 117.↩