Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

109. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT

• Falkland Dispute: Calling in Dobrynin

You asked for our recommendation on whether and how you should raise the Falklands with Dobrynin,² and for talking points if you decide to do so.

On balance, we believe that you should. There is a danger that the Soviets will take such a demarche as an invitation to meddle even further, and the “threat” we have available to warn them off is not very impressive. Nevertheless, we think the danger can be easily deflected, and a warning could help. More importantly, even if it does not, it will be extremely important to be able to cite a diplomatic warning to the Soviets in the event that the crisis drags on and they and/or the Cubans become increasingly involved.

At the same time, the questions of “whether” and “how” are related, because only a “threat” to relations overall has a chance of being plausible and effective. Moreover, in every meeting with the Soviets you should reiterate our main message that we are working for peaceful solutions while they are the troublemakers, and the Falklands fits the case. Hence, you should cast your remarks broadly, as a warning against involvement which would break the back of an already overburdened geopolitical agenda and our hopes for future progress embodied in the President’s invitation to Brezhnev to meet at the SSOD. (In our judgment, this is also the proper glancing way to reaffirm that invitation in diplomatic channels.)

Accordingly, the attached talking points³ are intended to help you sound both angry and statesmanlike. They begin with a statement of our objectives in the Falklands dispute which you may wish to supplement; proceed to complain strongly about increasingly malicious Soviet media treatment; and then set the problem within the overall relationship. A contingency point in case Dobrynin seeks a role for the USSR in the crisis is added.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Scanlan and Bosworth. Sent through Eagleburger.
2. See footnote 4, Document 94.
3. Not printed.
4. Below this paragraph, Bremer wrote on April 14 a notation that reads: “The Secretary has asked Mr. Eagleburger to do this.” See Document 135.