108. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger 1
SUBJECT
- UK Request for Additional JP–5 Fuel at Ascension
ISSUE FOR DECISION
How to respond to British request for fuel support at Ascension.
ESSENTIAL FACTORS
The British are estimating their fuel (JP–5) consumption rate at 660,000 to 800,000 gallons per week to support air operations at Ascension. Based on our computations, we agree with HMG that we can spare 900,000 gallons of fuel (just over one week’s supply) that are currently in storage on the island. Even with access to this fuel, however, the UK would run out on approximately April 19–20 unless they either adjusted their consumption rate or received additional supplies.
DOD, working with Defense Fuel Supply Center and the Military Sealift Command, states that they can get a tanker to Ascension by April 23 or 24. To accomplish this they have pulled a tanker out of a Caribbean exercise and are sending it directly to Ascension without consolidating its load or taking on additional cargo fuel. It will carry approximately 2.4 million gallons of JP–5. There are no other tankers in the area that could provide JP–5 before then.
Aviation fuel resupply is critically needed by the UK to ensure a steady flow of logistical support via cargo aircraft to Ascension where support is to be staged for delivery to the UK forces off the Falklands. The five logistical support ships and possibly some of the amphibious ships with the task force would shuttle supplies between Ascension and the Falklands. HMG also plans to use Nimrods (which consume JP–5) based at Ascension for communications support and in an anti-submarine role to prevent Argentine interdiction of their supply line. (Nimrods could cover all but the last 600 miles of the route.)
Alternative sources of the required fuel are hard to pinpoint. The MSC ships are the only tankers that carry JP–5, a special military fuel, [Page 229] other than Navy oilers. The closest US Navy oilers are supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. They could not arrive in time.
The only other possibility would be to fly cargo fuel to Ascension or attempt to use commercial tankers. The relatively small quantities that could be delivered and limited storage and handling facilities at Wideawake Airfield make the former approach unrealistic. In the latter case, the time required to find a ship, load and sail it to Ascension would exceed the MSC delivery date.
In short, time and distance factors preclude a more favorable response on our part. I spoke with Dave Jones this morning. He is aware of the situation and has directed his staff to make whatever adjustments as necessary to get the tanker underway. He said he would get back to me later today.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you advise HMG:2
• That we are making every effort to get the tanker to Ascension as soon as possible, perhaps by April 24 or 25 with approximately 2.4 million gallons of JP–5. You may want to explain that there are no other tankers in the area that could provide JP–5 before then.
• We realize that this will create a shortfall of several hundred thousand gallons of fuel before the resupply of JP–5 arrives. Hopefully HMG can adjust its operations to compensate. We have pulled our tanker away from a major exercise and sailed it directly to Ascension without consolidating the load. This is simply the best we can do.
• We are investigating additional resupply capability and will advise as soon as possible when the next load of fuel can be delivered. We realize that a second load will be required in about two weeks.
• RADM Watson, our JCS Deputy Director for Planning and Resources, has asked that Air Commodore Dick contact him to work out the details of further JP–5 resupply at Ascension. His number is 695-2934.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Austin; cleared by Haass. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Eagleburger saw it on April 13.↩
- In the left-hand margin next to the following three bulleted points, Burt wrote: “Larry: I informed D. Thomas of this today. Rick.” Under this annotation, Eagleburger wrote: “Good.” In an April 16 memorandum to Eagleburger, Burt reported that the Ascension base commander had been authorized to “draw on his war reserve stock to meet the UK requirements” until the MSC tanker arrived on April 24 or 25. “This means that the RAF will be able to operate without any reduction in tempo.” (Memorandum from Burt to Eagleburger, April 16; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 10–19 1982)↩