We have previously provided to you both the Intelligence Community paper
addressing its estimate of Soviet interest in arms control in 1984; and
a series of memoranda2 sent to you by NSC principals providing their personal
views of the political context and US options. Attached is a short
summary, developed by the NSC staff, of
the Intelligence Community paper and the various memoranda designed to
help you prepare for the NSC
meeting.
While the issue of Soviet arms control intentions in 1984 is an important
consideration, the primary focus of this NSC meeting should be on the issue of the political context
and how it affects US nuclear arms control options and decisions in
1984. The central point for discussion will be an examination of the
validity of the argument expressed in Secretary Weinberger’s memorandum
to you.3
As noted in our previous package to you on this subject, the memoranda
from NSC principals to you argue for a
range of specific initiatives in START, INF and other
areas—many of which require more detailed analysis and discussion before
being seriously considered for implementation. We would recommend once
again that:
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council4
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PAPER: Soviet
Interests in Arms Control Negotiations
Soviet Strategy. The Soviets appear to have
adopted a two-pronged strategy, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing a willingness to
move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a
breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows
flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that
this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of
INF and START, without making themselves
appear so intransigent so as to rally support for NATO’s policies or demonstrate that
they are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations.
Soviets are deeply pessimistic about the prospects for significant US
concessions in START and INF. They are reluctant to do anything
that would enhance the reelection of the Administration, but
apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the
Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on
their doorstep. They appear not to have excluded the possibility of
some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve
their interests.
The Soviets are trying to heighten pressures on the US to alter its
current stance. They are using various channels, including direct
appeals to West European leaders. It appears more likely at present,
however, that they will try to gain credit by expanding upon their
initiatives on non-INF issues in
existing multi-national forums such as MBFR, CDE, and the
CD.
The Soviets will continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of
issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked
improvement in relations or arms control issues before US elections.
They will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that
significant gains for the USSR are
at hand.
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Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks. There have been
several recent indications (the latest being the Dartmouth
Conference trip) that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line
against resuming the Geneva negotiations.
A number of statements have been made that they will not return
unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In the context
of the Dartmouth trip and in talks with German SDP, Soviet
representatives rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some
implying and others asserting outright that neither the INF or START negotiations could resume unless NATO’s new missiles were withdrawn.
They also rejected the “walk-in-the-woods” formula as a solution for
the INF problem. The Soviets have
been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions
in INF.
On the other hand, some Soviets have hinted recently that INF talks could resume this year if
the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployments and to taking UK and French systems into account somewhere in the
arms control negotiations. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has also taken a
more upbeat stance on the prospects of negotiations in discussions
with correspondents. He may be under instructions to keep open a
channel through which Moscow’s hoped-for movement from the US side
might be conveyed.
SECRETARY WEINBERGER’S MEMORANDUM. The
Secretary argues that:
Only 5 months remain prior to the party conventions. Strategic
decisions bearing on East-West relations, especially arms control,
must be made soon if the Administration is to appeal to the
electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent philosophy of arms and
arms control. To do so, it is important that we make an early
judgment as to whether the Soviet government is likely to be more
accommodating between now and the election than it has
previously.
Our strategy since January has been predicated on the assumption that
there is at least a fair chance for an improvement in the US-Soviet
relationship, including an arms control agreement on terms that the
Reagan Administration could defend. Private diplomatic activity,
public pronouncements and our approach to the compliance issue have
all been aimed at coaxing the Soviets along a path of accommodation.
The result has been disappointing.
If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will be
more tractable in the coming months, we should develop now a
strategy that reflects that judgement. The Administration should
stress the continuing validity of its rearmament program and its
approach to arms control. With respect to arms control, the
Administration should elaborate the themes that have guided policy
over the last three years:
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—insistence on sharp reductions;
—the need for full verification;
—the flexibility inherent in our willingness to “trade off” with the
USSR;
—dissatisfaction with past approaches to arms control.
We should also be more assertive on the issues of Soviet violations
and the Soviet walk-out from Geneva. These are not only issues on
which the Soviets are vulnerable; they are also issues the American
people can understand.
Time is passing, time in which we are not mounting a defense of the
Administration’s three-year record. As we approach the national
conventions there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that
vigorous explanations of our policies mounted in the aftermath of
the Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus
unpersuasive. We have a good story to tell, an admirable record to
explain and defend, and we should get on with it.
Adoption of a new “framework” or “structure” that parallels SALT II would almost certainly entail
abandonment of this Administration’s attempt to break out of the
SALT II mold. We could face
the election with something that looks like SALT II on the table. We must not
abandon the demanding standard for agreement that distinguishes this
Administration from its predecessors.
We should try to secure Soviet agreement on some of the
following:
—renegotiation of the TTBT with effective verification;
—ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site inspection;
—notification of all ballistic missile tests;
—agreement not to encrypt; and
—notification of all major military exercises.
The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption
about the likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an
appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a US strategy on
unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the Administration’s
record and philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets
desire, should form the keystone of our public policy.
AMBASSADOR ADELMAN’S MEMORANDUM. Amb Adelman argues:
The odds are against serious negotiations, much less any
breakthrough, in INF and START. The Soviets will likely (1)
wait out our elections, (2) work to block our modernization program,
and (3) increase the heat on us in multi-lateral negotiations.
We can and should make moves. Five possible moves come to mind:
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1. As unilateral initiative, offer to halt US INF deployments at the end of 1985
(236 warheads) if the Soviets reduce their SS–20s in Europe to a
comparable level.
2. Have the Vice President table a draft treaty banning chemical
weapons next month in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
3. Table an initiative on outer space in the CD.
4. Seek a US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation.
5. Move NATO towards a posture of
greater conventional deterrence and less of a reliance on nuclear
weapons. After laying the proper groundwork, declare a policy
objective of no early first use of nuclear weapons.
AMBASSADOR ROWNY’S MEMORANDUM. Amb Rowny
argues:
The Soviets have been adamant on not coming back to INF but have not shut the door on
START. On balance, they will
see it in their interest to come back in START by June. It is certainly in our interest to get
them back if we do it in a way that does not jeopardise a good
agreement. The Administration should be perceived as willing to go
the extra mile, but not making concessions to get them back to the
table.
The best way to get them back is to let them know that they stand to
gain through our offer of trade-offs made on October 4, 1983. We
should communicate this message via Shultz-Dobrynin discussions
followed by private Rowny/Karpov meetings.
In doing so, we should seek a goal for this year of the initialing of
a Vladivostok-type aide memoire this fall on a set of guidelines
which codifies progress to date and lays out what still needs to be
done. We should avoid: a SALT II
framework, use of a special envoy, talk of a START/INF merger, and attempting to get an interim agreement
this year. While pursuing this goal, the Administration should
explain in a factual but measured way the virtues of our START proposal and not wait for the
Democrats to put us on the defensive.
AMBASSADOR NITZE’S MEMORANDUM. Amb Nitze
argues:
If we do nothing over the next five months, we will appear frozen and
immobile in the INF/START field. It is better that an
initiative be in INF than START. INF is of central importance to the Europeans, the
focus of Soviet recalcitrance, and must be gotten out of the way for
progress in START. The initiative
should make no substantive concession, nor adversely prejudice the
final outcome of negotiations. It should not appear to be rewarding
the Soviets for their behavior. And, since it is risky to conduct
serious negotiations in an election year, the initiative should be
in the form of spelling out in more specific terms past policy
formulated in such a way that it could be advanced unilaterally. One
such possible US initiative would be for the US to indicate a
readiness to halt deployments at the end of 1985 (236 warheads) if
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the Soviets agreed to
reduce their LRINF missile force
in Europe to an equal level and make collateral reductions in
Asia.
