89. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Points to be Made at Today’s NSC Meeting on Arms Control
Today’s meeting will be highly charged philosophically. While Cap’s position (which is not supported by the Joint Chiefs) is subtle, it masks a proposal to “hardline it” by not exploring even internally in our own government more flexible positions on START or INF. It would place emphasis on condemning the Soviets for their violations and their walkout in Geneva. I would not argue for ignoring those problems, but it is a matter of emphasis. If we do that and nothing else, we risk having you cast in the image of being inflexible and responsible for the breakdown. Frankly, I think Cap understands this but his advisors would assure that background briefings would carry a much tougher line if you give them any encouragement.
To set the course at today’s meeting, I recommend that you listen to the alternative approaches but at the end of the meeting, you intervene with some very explicit guidance for our conduct in the weeks and months ahead. It would include several points:
How you see Soviet Strategy Towards Arms Control this year.
• They want to avoid the onus for having walked out of Geneva.
• They will do this by diverting attention from START and INF to other arms control issues (MBFR, Chemical and ASAT).
• They are unlikely to give us anything which would appear to be progress on START and INF.
What this is designed to do.
• Make us appear as footdragging while they are peacemakers.
[Page 331]• Create pressure on us through the Congress (with the collateral benefit of defeating MX) and private citizens/businessmen.
What are your policies?
• You want a good agreement but are not concerned with how long it takes.
• You do not intend to make unilateral concessions to get them back to the table.
• You believe we must have a full credible agenda on arms control.
• It should focus on MBFR, Chemical, Confidence Building, notification of all ballistic missile tests, agreement not to encrypt and CDE.
• But we cannot let them off the hook on START and INF. We must keep the pressure on.
• To do that, we need solid flexible positions on both START and INF.
• You do not intend to fall into the trap of SALT II but we also cannot ignore those things which were good simply because they were also part of SALT II.
• For example, having a launcher limit isn’t wrong so long as it is matched by warhead and throw-weight limits.
• In short, we need a position which takes part of their approach and melds it with ours so that they have a figleaf for coming off their position.
Next Steps
• I want a letter drafted to Chernenko. It must be substantive and positive by laying out the agenda I have touched upon above plus stressing the obligation to resume START and INF talks.
• We should offer to have Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze engage in private talks if the Russians wish. We should make clear that we are prepared to be flexible.
• To assure that we are ready to do business we must accelerate our efforts in several areas.
—I want a draft chemical treaty on my desk before I leave for China.
—I want the Senior Arms Control Group to accelerate their efforts to present options for new START and INF positions to me within two weeks.
• Against the chance that the Russians remain intransigent, I will consider a speech within two months time at which I will lay out the record of our efforts for all to see.
• In the area of public affairs, I want the Secretary of State—and he alone—to be my spokesman on arms control. Leaks and gratuitous backgrounders must cease now.
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–104, NSC00104. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.↩