87. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane) to
President Reagan1
Washington, March 26, 1984
SUBJECT
- NSC Meeting on Nuclear Arms
Control in 1984, Tuesday, March 27
Issue
What are Soviet interests in START and
INF in 1984 and how should the
political context in this election year affect US actions in these
areas?
Facts
On next Tuesday, we have scheduled an NSC meeting to discuss two main items:
(1) Soviet interests in pursuing START
and INF in 1984; and
(2) the political context for US nuclear arms control activity during
1984.
The Intelligence Community has developed a short paper addressing its
estimate of Soviet interest in arms control in 1984. That Intelligence
Community paper is provided at Tab A for your
review. The paper has also been made available to all NSC principals for their study prior to
the NSC meeting.
Due to the sensitivity of the discussion of the political context for US
nuclear arms control in 1984, rather than develop an interagency
discussion paper, we have invited NSC
principals to provide their thoughts directly to you via individual
memoranda prior to the meeting. Those that we have received to this
point are attached at Tab B. We will forward
others as they are received. These memoranda have not
been circulated to other NSC
principals for review.
Discussion
While Soviet intentions in 1984 are an important consideration, the
primary focus of this NSC meeting
should be on the issue of the political context and how it affects US
options and decisions in 1984. The central point for discussion will be
views expressed in Secretary Weinberger’s letter to you.
Secretary Weinberger argues that we should assess whether there is now
any likelihood of Chernenko being more accommodating in
[Page 305]
START and INF before the election. If the answer is no, given the US
political context and Soviet understanding of that context, the
Secretary feels that we should immediately implement a strategy that
permits you to set the terms for the arms control debate and establish
the foundation for defending our last three years of activity in
rearmament and arms control before such actions
could be seen as evidence of the Administration being on the defensive
in a political campaign. The main purpose of Tuesday’s
NSC meeting should be to
examine carefully the validity of this argument.
Having asked Secretary Weinberger to pull together this argument in a
memorandum to you for your reading prior to the NSC meeting, we extended the invitation for other
principals to also offer you their personal views. The memoranda
received do address Secretary Weinberger’s argument to some degree.
Unfortunately, however, most appear to have used the opportunity to
argue for a range of specific initiatives in START, INF and other
areas—many of which require more detailed analysis and discussion before
being seriously considered for implementation. We would recommend that
you read and note the memoranda provided by others prior to the NSC meeting but that:
(1) we maintain the focus of Tuesday’s meeting on the validity of
Secretary Weinberger’s argument; and
(2) that you avoid comment on and not endorse any of the other specific
arms control initiatives proposed in the various memoranda until we can
provide to you additional analyses of these initiatives.
We will return to a consideration of various options in START, INF and other fora at a later time based on the results of
Tuesday’s discussions and with the benefit of additional preparatory
analyses.
Recommendation
| OK |
No |
|
| ________ |
________ |
That you review the Intelligence Community paper (Tab A) and the memoranda from NSC principals to you (Tab B) with special attention being given
to the argument made by Secretary Weinberger.2 |
| ________ |
________ |
That we maintain the primary focus of Tuesday’s NSC on a discussion of the
validity of the argument offered by Secretary Weinberger drawing
upon the Intelligence
[Page 306]
paper and the other memoranda to support that discussion.3 |
| ________ |
________ |
That at Tuesday’s NSC meeting
you avoid extensive discussion or endorsement of any of the
range of specific arms control initiatives cited in the various
memoranda to you at Tab B.4 |
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency5
Washington, March 23, 1984
Summary6
The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms
control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while
simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other
security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet
relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other
areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to
stand firm on the central issues of INF and START,
without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support
for NATO’s policies or to
demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for
poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US
flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the
maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms
control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary
of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at
hand for the USSR, especially on
their fundamental concerns in START and INF. [portion marking not declassified]
The Soviet Calculus
1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet
policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need to keep
the
[Page 307]
deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet
political position in Europe—including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment—and calculations
regarding the US election campaign. [portion
marking not declassified]
2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US that would
end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have
made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance
the reelection prospects of the present Administration by enabling
it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At
the same time, they apparently believe that if they appear
unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for
poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at
a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear
not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at
this time if convinced it would serve their interests. [portion marking not declassified]
3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a
significant US concession on START and INF, and
probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms
control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made
West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the
East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and
belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic
pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased
concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet
stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a
position more acceptable to Moscow. [portion
marking not declassified]
4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through
direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has
maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the
consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches
at this level, as well as public commentary, they have sought to
demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to
restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US
missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well
as their “gains” from detente. Moscow might further try to court
West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider
multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French
into direct discussion of INF and
their own forces’ role. It appears more likely at present, however,
that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their
initiatives on non-INF issues in
existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the
CDE. [portion
marking not declassified]
5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the
villain’s role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-basing countries—
[Page 308]
particularly the Social Democrats in
West Germany—to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has
maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and
covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may
hope that the existence of deployed missiles—along with announced
basing sites—will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the
dispirited and divided movement. Moscow’s efforts in this area
probably will be tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the
charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must
face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct
their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures.
Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for
them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion.
[portion marking not declassified]
Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks
6. Following Chernenko’s accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition
of Moscow’s demand that the INF
missiles be withdrawn had suggested that the Soviets might be
hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have
been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain
its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number
of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return
to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from
Europe. In talks [less than 4 lines not
declassified] the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging
the negotiations, some implying and others asserting outright that
neither negotiation could resume unless NATO’s new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn
from Western Europe. [portion marking not
declassified]
7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a
solution to INF the
“walk-in-the-woods” formula. By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods
formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door
on two potential avenues which some Soviets had speculated as
recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks. [portion marking not declassified]
8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF
talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the
INF deployment schedule and
taking the UK and French systems
into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most
recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a
representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who
said that INF talks could be
resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first
secretary and presumed KGB officer at the Soviet embassy, who
apparently has been used to float trial balloons in the past, also
has suggested that the USSR would
be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He [less than 2 lines not declassified]
[Page 309]
9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat stance on the
prospects for strategic arms negotiations in discussions with
correspondents than the general line would indicate. His statements
clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely
interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the
Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably
reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow’s
hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed. [portion marking not declassified]
10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they eventually must
moderate their position if they are to limit NATO
INF deployments and US strategic
systems through resumed INF and
START negotiations. However,
while the Soviets hope to use negotiations to limit US strategic
programs, their R & D programs provide them with the capability
to compete with or without arms control agreements. Strategic
offensive systems currently in development and flight-testing
provide the Soviets with the basis for improving their strategic
capabilities under SALT II Treaty
limits or those of their START
proposals, as well as in the absence of any arms control
constraints. There is room under SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed
SLBM systems (the SS–N–20 and
SS–NX–23), the ALCM-equipped Bear
H and Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS–X–24 ICBM.
Further, the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS–X–25 is a “modernized” SS–13 is
intended to permit deployment of this system as well. While the
Soviets at START have thus far
insisted that long-range SLCMS and
GLCMS be banned, they are [less than 1 line not declassified]
well-positioned to deploy them in the absence of a ban on them. [portion marking not declassified]
11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that would
eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban testing and deployment of all
space-based weapons. In addition, they have announced a moratorium
on testing ASAT weapons in space,
as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their immediate aim
probably is to preclude the development and deployment of the US
direct-ascent ASAT interceptor,
while their longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating
its technological capabilities into systems such as space-based
lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic missile defense. [portion marking not declassified]
Prospects for Progress on Other Issues
12. Chernenko seemed
to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues
usually regarded as secondary—particularly the banning of chemical
weapons and the demilitarization of space—could prepare the way for
a “dramatic breakthrough” in US-Soviet relations
[Page 310]
despite the impasse in START and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass
the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears
intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms control
and reduced international tensions despite the USSR’s continued refusal to return to
Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on
a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a
reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions. [portion marking not declassified]
13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals
and public positions:
—US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear
weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
—resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty,
suspended by the US;
—an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
—US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
—an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said conditions
for an accord are “beginning to ripen.”
He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of
continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction
sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons
verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there
would be effective control of the “whole process of destruction—from
beginning to end.” [3 lines not
declassified]
14. [1 paragraph (11 lines) not
declassified]
15. Chernenko’s claim
that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of
a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets
might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at
the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting,
however, that it is up to the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may
well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on
fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before
agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be
looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider
major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:
—a freeze on further INF
deployments, particularly Pershing IIs;
—an agreement to take into account UK and French systems; or
—an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems
the Soviets consider most threatening—SLCMs, ALCMs,
MX, or the D–5 SLBM.
The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold
progress in START dependent upon
US concessions in INF. For now, it
appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations
unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed,
[Page 311]
but this line is doubtless intended in
part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a
definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to
specific US initiatives. [portion marking not
declassified]
16. Chernenko also
suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on “norms” to
govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement
to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening
nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet
negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at
preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown.7
Chernenko, however,
raised this possibility separately from those issues which he
suggested could lead to a “breakthrough” in relations, perhaps to
signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable
significance. [portion marking not
declassified]
17. Chernenko made no
reference on 2 March to the MBFR
talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early
breakthrough. [5 lines not declassified] This
view probably has been strengthened by Western press reports of
differences between the US and West Germany over the Allied
position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening
their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would
be unlikely to accept Western proposals on verification to the
extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks. [portion marking not declassified]
18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in
Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an
agreement on the non-use of force as a step toward improving the
climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal,
and although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than
the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of
US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them
on more substantive issues. [portion marking not
declassified]
19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where
they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant
lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be
the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an
agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of
nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean,
and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these
proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major
strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore
[Page 312]
appear largely rhetorical,
rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of
repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance
in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider
the more innocuous among them could be part of a package to improve
bilateral relations. [portion marking not
declassified]
Uncertainties and Soviet Political
Dynamics
20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control policy
rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions in this
area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about half a
dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the Defense
Council’s executive secretariat, the General Staff—through its Main
Operations Directorate—coordinates the flow of information to the
Defense Council decisionmakers. This arrangement assures the
military a highly influential role in the arms control policy-making
process. Information and policy proposals are channeled through the
General Staff from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the
Military Industrial Commission, and specific Central Committee
staffs, notably the International Department and International
Information Department. Individuals from the Academy of Sciences and
probably the personal secretariats of Politburo members can also
inform Soviet leaders on arms control issues, but do not have access
to the details of military plans and programs. [portion marking not declassified]
21. [1 paragraph (15 lines) not
declassified]
22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on
arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe,
however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in
Chernenko’s
speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov’s death.8[portion marking not declassified]
23. We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo
on US–Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his
colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes
in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear.
They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in
Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet
retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture. [portion marking not declassified]
24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the Soviet
leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures
that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are
convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on
significant arms control issues. [portion marking
not declassified]
[Page 313]
Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger
to President Reagan9
Washington, March 23, 1984
SUBJECT
In the last eleven months of his Administration, President Carter
abruptly changed his policy towards the Soviet Union, withdrawing
the SALT II Treaty from Senate
consideration, instituting sanctions in response to the invasion of
Afghanistan and proposing 5% real growth in defense spending. But
the change came too late to regain the confidence of the American
people: the voters in large numbers ignored the new policy by voting
against the old. Indeed, Carter’s shift seemed to vindicate the
criticism that led up to it: by abandoning his established policies
and appearing to embrace new and contradictory ones, Carter himself
seemed to acknowledge that he had been weak in the face of Soviet
strength. Candidate Reagan’s steadiness of purpose stood in sharp
and winning contrast.
There now remain fewer than five months until the party conventions
and only eight before the election. Strategic decisions bearing on
our conduct of East-West relations, especially arms control
negotiations with the Soviets, must be made soon if President Reagan
is to appeal to the electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent
philosophy of arms and arms control.
Between now and November it must be a central element of
Administration strategy to convey in a consistent manner a sense of
the President’s approach to East-West relations—an approach based on
the strength of our re-armament coupled with a continuing search for
militarily significant, balanced and verifiable arms reduction
agreements that diminish the threat to our security and that of our
allies.
This Administration has rightly rejected Soviet proposals that would
codify their monopoly of intermediate missiles, freeze U.S. forces
in urgent need of modernization, and permit the continued growth of
[Page 314]
Soviet strategic
forces. And while we must continue to probe the attitude of the new
Soviet leader toward arms control (and his ability to shape Soviet
policies), we must not abandon the properly demanding standard for
agreement that has distinguished the approach of this administration
from that of its predecessors. Above all, we must not permit the
merit of our security policy to be tested by whether we achieve an
arms control agreement or bring the Soviets back to the bargaining
table. For try as we might, the Soviet leaders may well seek to deny
President Reagan a fair agreement, precisely so that his “failure”
to achieve one will damage his re-election prospects and bring into
office a Democratic administration, ready to agree to terms more
favorable to the Soviets and certain to slow the rebuilding of our
defenses.
After all, it is only this President’s strategic modernization
program that promises to restore America’s strategic strength and
dissuade the Soviet leadership from the attempt to reach decisive
superiority. Opposition to that program has become a central theme
of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. And opposition to much of our
modernization program and arms reduction philosophy, together with
support for SALT II, the freeze
and other arms control measures rejected by the President, has
already become a campaign theme of the Democratic Party and its
leading candidates. While an agreement manifestly tilted in the
Soviets’ favor might lure them from their current intransigence, it
is most likely that Moscow will do nothing that might help re-elect
a President who has mounted the most effective challenge to Soviet
power in more than a decade: “Better to wait—and hope—for Mondale or
Hart.”
The Soviets are tough bargainers, even in adversity. If they sense
that the Administration is negotiating with one eye on the ballot
box (and there will be plenty of commentators to suggest that we
are) they will be tougher still. They have shown no sign of letting
up on the demand that we remove (or at least halt) INF deployment in Europe as a
precondition for a return to the START/INF talks. (In
recent days they have repeated this demand to Senators Cohen and Biden, to Brent Scowcroft and
the Dartmouth group, and to SPD leader Vogel). Even if they were to
return to Geneva, or agree to a summit, it would be risky in the
extreme to take such a tactical move as a softening of their basic
unyielding position. An acrimonious summit, or an October breakdown
of renewed talks might well figure in a Soviet strategy to undermine
the President’s re-election. (Even Khomeini, who had every reason to
believe he had Carter over a barrel, preferred to hold the hostages
until Inauguration Day).
It is important for the Administration to make an early judgment as
to whether the Soviet government under Chernenko is likely to be
[Page 315]
more accommodating
between now and the election than it has been since President Reagan
took office. Our strategy since January has been predicated on the
assumption that there is at least a fair chance for an improvement
in the U.S.–Soviet relationship, including an arms control agreement
on terms that the Reagan Administration could defend. Private
diplomatic activity, public pronouncements and our approach to the
compliance issue have all been aimed at coaxing the Soviets along a
path of accommodation. The result has been disappointing. And while
we must explore any genuinely promising opening, we must not drift
toward November in the hope that a late break-through will obviate
the need for a re-assertion of this Administration’s record and
philosophy.10
If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will
become more tractable in coming months, we should develop now a strategy reflecting that judgement.
And, far from using a muffled voice on the need for firmness and
perseverance in dealing with the Soviet Union, the President should
stress the continuing validity of his rearmament program and his
approach to arms control. With respect to arms reductions, we should
elaborate the themes that have guided our policy for the last three
years: insistence on sharp reductions, the need for full
verification (especially in light of Soviet non-compliance with
existing agreements), the flexibility inherent in our willingness to
“build down” and to “trade off” our advantages against theirs, and
dissatisfaction with the past approach to arms control in which
agreements like SALT I and II
actually led to a startling increase in nuclear weapons. We also
should be more assertive (although moderate, almost clinical in
tone) on the issue of Soviet violations and their walk-out from the
Geneva talks.
The Administration’s handling of two important issues illustrates the
dilemma of the policy choice the President now faces. Until now the
Administration has deliberately down-played the Soviet walk-out from
Geneva and the Soviet record on compliance. In both cases we have,
for the last four months, taken pains to encourage the Soviets to
return to the negotiating process by withholding criticism of their
actions. “Not justified” is about the strongest comment we have made
on the Soviet withdrawal from the Geneva talks. And a dispassionate
sotto voce bill of particulars has been
the extent of our comment on the Soviet record of noncompliance,
with the single exception of our wholly justified, two-year long
attack on “yellow rain.”
[Page 316]
It is now time to ask whether this policy of restraint, which has
been met by an unrelenting Soviet attack on the President and his
policies, will achieve its intended effect of eliciting an
improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If we conclude that it
is unlikely to move the Soviets to constructive negotiations, then
it is fair to ask whether we are wise to forfeit a more assertive
argument centered on the facts and merits of these two issues.
These are not only issues on which the Soviets are vulnerable; they
are also issues the American people can understand.
Every poll conducted on the subject confirms that the American people
believe that the Soviets will, if given an opportunity, cheat on
their international obligations. The fact of their record of
violating SALT II, the ABM Treaty and other agreements could
be profitably amplified to support the President and diminish the
weight of the Mondale/Hart appeal for new “quick fix” agreements
even less verifiable than the present ones—the freeze, the threshold
test-ban, ASAT, and the like.
The same holds true of the Soviet walk-out. With the Democratic
National Committee running television spots that portray Ronald
Reagan as the first President since John Kennedy who is not
presiding over a nuclear arms negotiation, surely we can begin to
drive home the point that the Soviets have broken off the Geneva
talks because we would not accept a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles. However conscious we in
Washington may be of the Soviet walk-out and their compliance
record, they’ll forget it in Kansas if we continue to be inaudible
on the subject.
It may be argued that we can go on with our current strategy,
watching and waiting, adopting neither an approach that is
appropriate to Soviet recalcitrance and stalling through November,
nor one that assumes a breakthrough before the election. The trouble
with this view is that time is passing—days and weeks are going by
in which we are not mounting a defense of the President’s three-year
record in the conduct of East-West arms control—with all the
ammunition at our disposal. As we approach the national conventions
there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that vigorous
explanation of our policies mounted in the aftermath of the
Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus
unpersuasive.
A more assertive defense of our record and philosophy need not—indeed
should not—sound strident, hostile, or pessimistic. Nor would it
rule out a continuing private effort, through the President’s
correspondence with Chernenko or the Shultz-Dobrynin channel, to probe
for signs of Soviet flexibility. We have a good story to tell, an
admirable record to explain and defend, and we should get on with
it.
In the nearly 15 years since the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, the Soviets have
added some 7,950 medium and long-range
[Page 317]
nuclear missile warheads to their arsenal—an
increase of 515%. Fully 3,850 of these warheads,
an increase of almost 65%, have been added since the SALT II agreement was signed in
1979. And despite the permissive terms of the agreements
between us, the Soviets have resorted to circumvention and violation
to sustain a fifteen year strategic build-up of unprecedented
proportions.
This dismal history would be reason enough for a new President to try
a different approach. And Candidate Reagan’s criticism of SALT II, echoed by the Senate
Committee on Armed Services which declared it contrary to our
national security interests, set the stage for this Administration’s
effort to obtain sharp reductions, better verification and, in
general, agreements that, while more difficult to negotiate, would
yield results of military significance.
The “zero option” was one such proposal. And while it was
unacceptable to the Soviets, its embrace by the President turned a
tide of opinion that had been running against us and helped to
sustain a successful U.S. INF
deployment. Above all it was a concrete expression of our desire for
an agreement that offered the reality, and not merely the
appearance, of a significant and understandable reduction in nuclear
arms.
Similarly, our proposal for START,
which departed in fundamental ways from SALT II, was—and remains—a sound expression of the arms
control objectives that this Administration has put forward as an
alternative to the cosmetic results of its predecessors. The 10
major changes that we have subsequently made to the 1982 START proposal, including the “build
down” and the offer to balance U.S. against Soviet advantages in the
reductions process, has positioned us well to argue that we have
been fair, flexible and responsible. We have negotiated on a broad
front, adjusting the elements of our position to encourage the give
and take of negotiation. At the same time, and it is this that
distinguishes the President from his critics, we have properly
refused to travel the path of the Soviet approach—an approach that
would allow a 45% increase in ballistic missile warheads and that is
structured along the lines of SALT
II.
For some weeks a number of experts drawn from the departments have
been exploring new “frameworks” that might be put to the Soviets in
the hope of advancing towards a resumption of negotiations and
possible agreement. Adoption of a new “framework” or “structure”
that parallels SALT II would
almost certainly entail abandonment of this Administration’s attempt
to break out of the SALT II mold.
And since it is only prudent to assume that any such framework we
might table would form the basis for further negotiation, it is
likely that, in due course, we would find ourselves negotiating
largely within the SALT II
structure. Were this to happen, we could face the election with
something like the SALT II Treaty
on the table in Geneva.
[Page 318]
Given the history of the conduct of the negotiations thus far, the
Soviet walk-out, the broad Congressional support that our current
position has attracted (particularly the build down feature) and the
flexibility inherent in the President’s willingness to trade off
U.S. for Soviet reductions, it is fair to ask whether a new
“framework” at this stage would serve our interest. It would
certainly create confusion. It would almost certainly run counter to
the underlying logic of the position we have taken from the
beginning. And it would diminish the clarity of the President’s
position as we enter a period in which the defense of that position
will be crucial to our domestic politics.
The Soviets have recently adopted a strategy of pressing for
concessions on arms control issues other than START or INF. Most of these—chemical weapons, anti-satellite
weapons and nuclear testing—entail multilateral negotiations, under
United Nations auspices, where serious negotiation is difficult and
the opportunity for propaganda is great. Moreover, all are
complicated by extreme, if not insurmountable, verification
problems. And taken together, this new Soviet agenda seems aimed at
obscuring their Geneva walkout.
The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption
about likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an
appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a U.S. strategy on
unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the President’s record and
philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets desire,
should form the keystone of our public policy. We should move
quickly to put such a policy in place, and to develop a broad
strategy for its implementation.
With all of the above being said, it is still desirable, I believe,
to try to secure Soviet agreement at least to consider some or all
of the following:
(a) Renegotiation of the TTBT with
effective verification;
(b) A ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site
inspection for purpose of verification;
(c) Notification to the other side of all
ballistic missile tests;
(d) Agreement not to encrypt test
parameters;
(e) Notification of all major military
exercises.
Some or all of the above, even though it is not “arms reduction,”
might help us hold the Aspin-Dicks types who voted for MX last year “if we would be more forthcoming on arms
reduction,” and could help us with the public opinion of the world,
and would not hurt us if the Soviets agreed. It might put them on
the defensive—or they might agree to talk with us. Either result
would be good.
I’d be glad to develop further details if you wish.
[Page 319]
Attachment
Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (Adelman) to President Reagan11
Washington, March 23, 1984
SUBJECT
- Arms Control Possibilities in 1984
We cannot be sure of Soviet intentions or of what the Soviets might
do. But the odds are against serious negotiations, much less any
breakthrough, in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations this year. The
Soviets will likely (1) wait out our elections, (2) work vigorously
against our strategic modernization programs, and (3) increase the
heat on us in multilateral arms control areas like nuclear testing,
chemical weapons, antisatellite weapons, and MBFR.
While the Soviets stonewall on START and INF,
political pressures will still quicken over the coming months for
progress in nuclear arms control. Political advertisements already
portray the Reagan Administration as the only Administration since
World War II without a significant arms control achievement. This
concern could well affect our strategic modernization programs,
especially the MX.
We can and should make moves that will demonstrate our interest in
arms control, without prejudicing our substantive positions and
without asking the Soviets to “eat crow”. Five possible initiatives
come immediately to mind, with INF
heading the list.
1. Although the INF negotiations are
probably “dead” for now, INF offers
opportunities for unilateral initiatives and fewer risks than new
steps in START. In particular, we
could offer to halt US INF deployments in Europe at the end of 1985,
which would give us 236 warheads, if the
Soviets by that time had reduced
their SS–20s to a comparable level in Europe. (We would have to
adjust the mix and location of PIIs and GLCMs in Europe. We would retain a right to match
Soviet deployments outside of Europe, but could clarify our
intention not to exercise that right by deployments in Asia.)
This would be consistent with our basic INF position, ease some Allied concerns, and show our
readiness to work for nuclear arms control. At the same time, it
would not depend on the Soviets returning to these talks. It merely
requires performance—reductions—on their
[Page 320]
part. In the unlikely event that they wanted
to negotiate, we would welcome it. Whatever the Soviets did would
not detract from the benefits of such an initiative.
2. A second initiative will be our tabling a draft
treaty to ban chemical weapons next month in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This could most effectively be done
by the Vice President, to give high visibility to the beginning of
negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.
3. Our tabling an initiative on outer space in
the CD would also be viewed as a positive, welcome step. We could
propose a multilateral agreement prohibiting any attack on
satellites, together with some related confidence building measures.
Such undertakings would not adversely affect
any US space programs, including our anti-satellite weapons program
and your Space Defense Initiative. The interagency process could
shortly complete its work on such an outer space agreement.
4. We could seek a US-Soviet understanding on
non-proliferation. The US and the Soviet Union have a
common interest here and have, for many years, cooperated in efforts
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We have initiated regular
and more extensive bilaterals with them in your Administration. They
agreed to the last meeting in February despite their breaking off
INF and START.
As part of a further initiative, we could formalize this process and
might obtain some substantive movement as well. Thus, we could seek
a bilateral understanding that would reflect already agreed
principles and policy objectives and bring the Soviets a few steps
closer to your comprehensive safeguards initiative.
5. We could take steps now to try to move toward a posture of greater
conventional deterrence in NATO,
to reduce over time the role and our dependence on nuclear weapons.
This long-term goal could perhaps be furthered by planning, with our
NATO Allies, to structure our
conventional and nuclear forces in order to eliminate the need for
using nuclear weapons at the outset of a European conflict. We
could, after laying the groundwork, declare a policy objective of no early first
use of nuclear weapons, if that would help move the NATO Allies toward this approach.
This topic could be broached at the anniversary meeting of NATO this May in Washington.
[Page 321]
Attachment
Paper Prepared by the Chairman of the Delegation
to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny)13
START NEGOTIATOR’S IDEAS ON HOW TO “MAKE
PROGRESS”
Question: Will the Soviets return to START before fall?
—Difficult to predict; but they will do what is in their
interest.
—Soviets have been adamant on not coming back to INF but have not shut the door on
START.
—On balance they will see it in their interest to come back in START by June.
—Because they want to influence our defense programs which they
cannot do as easily if they are refusing to negotiate.
—Because they believe they can move toward a better deal from a
Candidate Reagan than from a reelected President Reagan with a
four-year mandate.
—They may be interested in nailing down some progress and the
outlines of an agreement this year.
—Soviet walk-out of INF and refusal
to resume START undercuts their
propaganda campaign.
—Soviet reluctance to return to START may be a tactic to extract concessions.
Question: Is it in our interest to get them
back to the table?
—Yes, if we do it in a way which does not jeopardize a good
agreement.
—But the President must be perceived as being firm, consistent, and
not making concessions to get them back.
—Moreover, the President must show that he is committed to arms
control, is serious, and was willing to go the extra mile rather
than sitting back and waiting.
Question: How best to bring the Soviets
back?
—We let them know that they stand to gain through the President’s
offer of October 4, 1983 for trade-offs of our bombers and ALCMs for their ballistic missile
capacity.14
[Page 322]
—We offered to explore trade-offs in Geneva but they showed no
interest, probably to influence us in INF.
—We should describe in more detail that our current position lends
itself to trade-offs, to relaxation of the 5000 ballistic warhead
limit (to 6000–7000), and to further reasonable compromises.
Question: How do we do it?
—Shultz should initiate broad discussions with Dobrynin to be followed by
private Rowny/Karpov meetings on details.
—If the Soviets don’t accept Rowny/Karpov meetings; then Rowny could
follow up with Dobrynin.
Question: What are the pitfalls?
—Avoid a SALT II framework which
creates impression we are reversing our opposition to SALT II and that we have wasted two
years.
—Avoid being over-eager and showing our bottom-line at the outset;
only if they move in response to our moves should we move.
—Avoid a special envoy from outside the Administration; it could look
like election-year gimmickry, not serious negotiations.
—Avoid talk of a START/INF merger. A formal merger is not in
our interest and Soviets have said they don’t want one.
—Soviets need a face-saving solution in INF which will allow them to climb down from their
opposition to any US INF deployments. We should not design such a face-saver
for them but US START initiative
should leave open such a possibility along lines of Soviet
“solutions” on FBS in SALT I and II.
Question: If they do come back, what is our
goal this year?
—Stress mutual benefits of a “break-through” this year on basis of
trade-offs.
—Avoid an interim agreement this year because it would be
unverifiable, could become permanent like the 1972 Interim
Agreement, would need Congressional approval, and would use up
leverage.
—Suggest to them the best solution would be initialing a
Vladi-vostok-type aide memoire this fall on a set of guidelines
which codifies progress to date and lays out what still needs to be
done.
—Be prepared to permit them force structuring flexibility by allowing
more than 5000 warheads and offering further limits on ALCMs.
—But we must get reductions in warheads (not
only launchers) and avoid weapons aggregation (no mixing between
ballistic missile warheads and bomber missile weapons).
Question: What should we do in the
meantime?
—President should in factual but measured way explain virtues of
START proposal and his
personal commitment to arms control, not
[Page 323]
wait until Democratic candidate puts him on
defensive. He can convince public we have a good offer because we
were flexible and met many of the Soviets’ main concerns. He should
stress we have reached the stage where we can now engage in
trade-offs to mutual advantage.
A draft of what I think the Vladivostok guidelines could look like
and negotiating tactics to get Soviets back to the table was
submitted by me to Bud
McFarlane on March 16. A copy is attached.15
Attachment
Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation
to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations (Nitze) to
President Reagan17
Washington, March 23, 1984
SUBJECT
- Thoughts on an Arms Control Initiative
The following thoughts come to my mind with respect to an arms
control initiative in the INF/START field.
An initiative should make no substantive concessions to the Soviet
side; it should not in any way adversely prejudice the final outcome
of the negotiations. It should, however, demonstrate that the United
States is not frozen into immobility in the INF/START field. I
believe the reactions in Europe, the Congress and U.S. public
opinion would all be negative if there were any indication that we
were rewarding the Soviets for having broken off the negotiations.
Neither do I believe it would improve our relations with the Soviet
Union; they would look upon it as weakness on our part. It is,
however, probable that over the next five months we will appear
frozen and immobile if we do nothing.
I believe we can develop an initiative which would help our friends
in Europe (the Dutch, in particular, could use and would appreciate
such an initiative). Such a move could also help our friends on the
Hill
[Page 324]
who are having
difficulty resisting pressure from their constituents for a
demonstration of U.S. movement on arms control.
I believe it is better that such an initiative be in the field of
INF than in the field of START. INF is of central importance to the Europeans, is the
focus of Soviet recalcitrance, and must be gotten out of the way
before, if progress is to be made in START.
At the present time the pressure for an initiative is not strong
either in Europe or in the Congress. I believe it would be much
better to move prior to such pressure building up either here or
abroad. An initiative taken later may well be viewed as being the
result of the pressure and thereby induce further pressure rather
than result in mitigating it. Furthermore, it should not be reactive
to anything done by the Soviets. It should be an initiative taken by
the President in pursuit of U.S. objectives.
If it were decided to take an initiative along these lines it would
be prudent discreetly to sound out some of our allies and some of
our friends on the Hill in advance.
As a general principle it appears to me to be risky to conduct
serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in an election year. The
Soviets will consider that U.S. public opinion pressure is uniquely
subject to exploitation by them at such a time. Our allies will
suspect that the U.S. initiative is motivated as much by the
electoral considerations as by the long-term interest of the West.
Skeptics on the Hill and in the media will be looking for any
opportunity to be critical on these grounds. It therefore seems to
me that an initiative should be in the form of spelling out in more
specific terms past policy lines and should be formulated in such a
way that it could be advanced unilaterally and not necessarily
require actual negotiation.
I have given to Bud
McFarlane a memorandum18 on a specific INF initiative which could, in my opinion, satisfy the
criteria I have outlined.
In conclusion it seems to me to be unlikely that the Soviets will in
fact agree to any proposal which fits within and makes more precise
existing U.S. INF policy. The
Soviets have demonstrated to us, however, that nonsubstantive moves
can give an impression of flexibility and mobility.
