86. Editorial Note
On March 5, 1984, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “I attended a quite unsatisfactory meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group talking about START. Because OSD is out to sabotage any movement on START, the meeting was carried on at a high level of abstraction. Indeed, it is not too clear why McFarlane held the meeting at all except to try to get some additional work done so that a decision could be taken by the President to produce some movement in our START position in the direction of implementing the tradeoff ideas that were first surfaced last October. The basic problem is that OSD is extremely suspicious that something may be going on that they don’t know about, and I found it interesting that Richard Perle said absolutely nothing during the meeting today. Apparently he believes that if he does not take part in the discussion, he will not be bound by any decisions that the President takes.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary [Page 303] Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)
On March 17, Dam dictated a personal note about a March 16 meeting: “Today was a busy day, even hectic, although there is not too much to report in terms of accomplishments. For example, I spent an hour and a half at a Senior Arms Control Policy Group talking about START, but essentially nothing happened, because Richard Perle disrupted any substantive conversation by repeatedly coming back to the point that we should be extremely careful about making any new move at this time, because it would be a move toward SALT II, and it would embarrass the President during an election year if he were to be put in the position of the Soviets responding with an attractive offer which would leave the President in the position of either accepting a SALT II-like agreement or refusing to accept an attractive Soviet offer because it was too much like SALT II. Clearly Perle is out to prevent any movement on START and is even prepared to try to manipulate the analytical agenda to achieve that result.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)
On March 22, Dam dictated a personal note describing: “a meeting of the Strategic Arms Control Policy Group this afternoon which was devoted to Richard Perle’s exposition as to why we should hunker down and defend our record on arms control rather than undertaking any new initiatives this year. Apparently the outcome was that Perle’s memorandum, which he merely summarized and did not show us, will be sent to the President under Cap Weinberger’s signature. Bud McFarlane has been implying to us that this is merely an exercise to allow Perle a chance to sound off. I am somewhat worried that he is implying to the Defense Department that the analytical exercise that we are going though is merely designed to keep State busy. It is not clear where McFarlane is on this issue, and I suspect that the President hasn’t decided either.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984) For Perle’s memorandum, see Tab B1, Document 87.