Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

63. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 29, 1983

SUBJECT

• My Meeting with Dobrynin—April 28, 1983

Ambassador Dobrynin came in April 28² to pass on Moscow’s answers to the various questions on START-related issues which the Secretary posed in their April 14 meeting.³ Ed Rowny was present. The following is a preliminary report.

In response to our first question concerning Soviet flexibility in their proposed ceiling of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, Dobrynin stated the 1800 figure was the minimum possible to meet Soviet security requirements and was itself contingent on no increase in U.S. Forward-Based Systems (This apparently means traditional FBS such as aircraft carriers and those nuclear delivery systems based outside the U.S. within range of the Soviet Union such as our proposed Pershing II and GLCM deployments). In this regard, he posed two questions—whether, to the extent we want them to go below 1800, were we prepared to “resolve” this FBS question and whether we were ready to drop our insistence on including the Soviet Backfire as a strategic bomber.

In answering our second question about their willingness to drop their call for a ban on cruise missiles, Dobrynin noted that although a complete ban on all long-range cruise missiles was still the best solution, the Soviet Union was nonetheless prepared to discuss limitations on Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). The Soviets would continue to insist, however, on prohibiting Sea-Launched and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs and GLCMs). ALCM warheads, moreover, would have to be counted along with those of ballistic missiles into any overall warhead ceiling.

Our third question dealt with how many Soviet heavy and medium ICBMs might be reduced under the Soviets’ own START proposal. Dobrynin’s answer was equivocal, stating the “basic part” of Soviet reductions would consist of ICBMs. The specific missiles and systems to be dismantled “could be determined by each side in the framework of additional limitations foreseen in the agreement.”

In sum, the Soviet response was mixed. On the 1800 missile and bomber ceiling, we received a negative answer, one in which Dobrynin reiterated familiar, tough Soviet positions on FBS and Backfire. On heavy/medium ICBM reductions, the Soviet response was ambiguous, suggestive of some eventual reductions, but offering us no specific numbers. On ALCMs, however, Dobrynin’s response did represent a modest and specific move beyond their current position in Geneva toward us. Although the Soviet willingness to drop their insistence on a complete ban on ALCMs and to discuss limitations along the lines we have proposed essentially gets us back to only a SALT II position, it is a step they have not taken previously during the past year of negotiations in Geneva. This suggests they wish to continue this dialogue.

We will be assessing Dobrynin’s statement over the coming days and will be making further recommendations on how we might best proceed in this discussion.

Attachment

Non-Paper Prepared in the Soviet Foreign Ministry⁴

Undated

In the discussion of April 14 with the American side, several questions were touched upon, connected with the negotiations about the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

Our estimates of the situation in the negotiations has already been conveyed to the American side and our approach has been underlined. The questions put by the American side in connection with the (April 14) discussion have been discussed in detail by the Delegations of the Soviet Union and the USA in the course of three rounds of negotiations in Geneva.

Taken together the Soviet proposals present the possibility of guaranteeing a genuinely just and effective solution to the problems of limiting strategic arms. We are convinced that with the strict observance of the principles of equality and equal security, which excludes the acquisition of any one-sided advantage, we could limit the race in nuclear arms, achieving a real lowering of the levels of nuclear forces between our countries in accordance with requisite support of parity between them in strategic arms.

The Soviet Union is for moving ahead on the basis of an uninterrupted process of step-by-step lowering of the nuclear levels between the Soviet Union and the USA to the very lowest possible level.

How far and how fast it is possible to move along this path depends on the United States.

It is well known that the United States has near the Soviet Union many nuclear means forward based, which have a fundamental influence on the quantitative and qualitative sides of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The American nuclear means close to our borders unquestionably have strategic significance for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not have analogous means close to American territory.

Taking into consideration the presence of nuclear means forward based, it is necessary for the security of the Soviet Union in the existing circumstances to have no less than 1800 strategic nuclear means and this is with the understanding that the US at least would not increase its nuclear means forward based.

It is impossible to deny that as the sides reduce ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the relative weight and significance of means forward based will increase. Nonetheless, even in the light of the aforementioned, unfavorable conditions, the Soviet Union presented far-reaching proposals, which envisage a major, by one quarter, reduction of the strategic arsenals of the sides. If the United States is genuinely ready not only in words but in deed to reach agreement about still more significant reductions of strategic arms, they must guarantee for that the necessary conditions.

In that connection we ask: to the extent that the United States is interested in the possibility of lowering the level of strategic arms presented to us, is it with all seriousness prepared to look at the development of this strategic situation and analyze the question about the corresponding question of American nuclear means forward based?

Further, it is important that the levels of strategic arms of the sides reflect the totality of all means, including not only ballistic missiles but also heavy bombers. Included in this composition of arms must be considered and limited namely strategic arms, and not such means which have no relationship to them. Is the American side, prepared for such solutions? Is it prepared to remove the entirely made up question about the Soviet medium bomber “Backfire”?

Let us take up the question of cruise missiles. Here the Soviet Union is proposing a serious fundamental solution. But hear the position of the United States is different. The proposals of the United States in this area permit the deployment of 400 bombers with from 8 to 11,000 cruise missiles of long range, not even talking about the absence in the American approach of any limit on sea based and land based cruise missiles of long range. Thus, there would be an increase in strategic arms of massive proportions. Does this really agree with the goals of these negotiations?

The Soviet side is convinced that the best solution of this question of air-launched cruise missiles of long range would be a ban of (such) missiles of all types of basing. However, trying to guarantee the possibilities for forward movement in the negotiations, we would be prepared depending upon the course of discussions of other questions to consider the possibility of limiting, and not banning air-launched cruise missiles with the understanding, naturally, that sea and ground based cruise missiles would be banned. It is understood that nuclear warheads on cruise missiles would be included in the general list of nuclear warheads of strategic arms.

You, Mr. Secretary, asked about what would happen with Soviet ICBMs in reduction by both sides of strategic arms. If one takes into account the composition of Soviet strategic forces, then it is clear in reductions to the level of 1800 and that there would take place dismantling of ballistic missiles. More than that, we could say that the basic part of reductions, foreseen by Soviet proposals, would consist of ICBMs. Concretely, which missiles or other systems would be destroyed could be determined by each side, of course, in the framework of additional limitations, foreseen in the agreement.

We would like to repeat: movement forward in the negotiations, including on the above mentioned questions, depends on the United States.

We expect from the American side a positive answer to the questions we have presented.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (04/22/1983—04/29/1983). Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 62.
3. See Document 59.
4. No classification marking. Typewritten notes at the top of the paper read: “Non-Paper Delivered by Dobrynin April 28 on START” and “Rough Translation by Mark Palmer.”