Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 6, 1983

I am sending on to you Ed Rowny’s memo on “Continuing Current Discussions in Geneva.” Rowny recommends that the informal Shultz-Dobrynin channel be shifted to an informal Rowny-Karpov channel in Geneva and that, in any event, the Shultz-Dobrynin channel on START ought not to operate unless Rowny is present. Rowny also outlines the specific changes in our START position that he would like to discuss with Karpov outside the formal Geneva negotiations.

Larry is opposed to Rowny’s ideas on procedure.

I recommend that you arrange for a complete review of our START position and negotiating procedures as soon as you have time. Rowny’s recommendations can be considered in the context of that review.

Kenneth W. Dam²

Attachment

Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz³

Geneva, May 3, 1983

SUBJECT

• Continuing Current Discussions in Geneva

As we approach the opening of the next round of START (June 8), we need to consider how to make the transition from informal discussions with Dobrynin to the talks in Geneva. At the same time, we should recognize that the report of the Scowcroft Commission presents us with an opportunity to streamline the US position in a way which furthers serious negotiation toward an agreement.

Once the talks resume the focus of negotiation should shift to Geneva. The informal exchanges we have begun with Dobrynin should be continued through private, one-on-one discussions between me and my Soviet counterpart, Viktor Karpov. We should use these discussions to propose a number of changes in the US position in return for changes in the Soviet position which would bring us closer to an agreement. If, for some reason, discussions with Dobrynin need to be continued in Washington, I should be brought back from Geneva to participate.

I recommend that I be instructed to put a deal to Karpov along the following lines: The US would indicate its willingness to raise the 850 ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles to a number more acceptable to the Soviets. We would also agree to drop some other provisions to which the Soviets have strongly objected, specifically the division of the negotiation into phases, the 2500 ICBM RV subceiling, and the 210/110 subceilings. In return, the US would require that the Soviets accept a separate ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile RVs and a direct ceiling of 2.5 million kg of ballistic missile throw-weight. We would indicate our willingness to consider equal and verifiable limits on cruise missiles which would allow us to accomplish current plans at lower levels than those theoretically possible under the current US position. We would insist that the Soviets drop efforts to aggregate launchers of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and to drop efforts to aggregate cruise missile warheads with ballistic missile warheads.

We will need to inform Dobrynin that I will be instructed to continue these informal discussions with Karpov in Geneva. This approach would require that a set of instructions be provided me separately from the basic Round IV instructions which are drafted by the interagency group.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.”
2. Dam signed the memorandum “KWD” above his typed signature.
3. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Dam. Copied to Burt and Howe.