62. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The Acting Secretary, Kenneth W. Dam
- START Negotiator Ambassador Edward Rowny
- Politico-Military Bureau Director Jonathan T. Howe
- Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer
- Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
- Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy
The Ambassador stated he knew how busy the Acting Secretary2 was and thus proposed to proceed directly to the replies to the questions the Secretary had earlier posed on START.
[Page 225]The Ambassador then read the following, translating into English from a Russian text which was later passed to the Acting Secretary:
“Our conversation with the U.S. side on April 14 touched upon questions related to the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks.3
We had already presented our evaluation of the status of the negotiations to the U.S. side earlier and had outlined our approach. The questions raised by the U.S. side in connection with the conversation have been discussed repeatedly and in detail by the U.S.S.R. and U.S. delegations during the three rounds of negotiations in Geneva.
The sum total of the Soviet proposals makes it possible to ensure a truly fair and effective solution to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic arms. We are convinced that it is only by strictly complying with the principle of equality and equal security, which prevents anyone from acquiring unilateral advantage, that the nuclear arms race can be halted and real reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation between our countries can be achieved; in this connection it is necessary that military-strategic parity between them be maintained.
The Soviet Union is in favor of moving ahead based on a continuing process of stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to the lowest possible level.
How far and how fast we can proceed on this path depends upon the United States.
It is well known that the United States has at its disposal numerous forward-based nuclear systems near the Soviet Union; these systems have a very important impact on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the strategic relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. It goes without saying that the U.S. nuclear systems which have been moved up to our borders are of strategic significance for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has no such systems near U.S. territory.
In view of the presence of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems, the Soviet Union needs to have no fewer than 1800 strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems in order to reliably ensure its own security under the present conditions. And this is on the understanding that the U.S. will at least refrain from building up its forward-based nuclear systems.
It cannot be denied that as the sides reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the relative importance and significance of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems would become increasingly greater.
Nonetheless, even in light of this circumstance, which is unfavorable for the U.S.S.R., we have put forward far-reaching proposals which provide for major reductions—by one-fourth—in the sides’ strategic [Page 226] arsenals. If the U.S. is truly prepared to agree, not in word but in deed, on an even more significant reduction of strategic arms, it must also create the necessary conditions for this.
In this connection we would ask the following question: since the U.S. Government is interested in the possibilities for lowering the level of strategic arms we have proposed, is it prepared to seriously consider how the strategic situation will develop in the future and to examine the question of an appropriate solution regarding the U.S. forward-based nuclear systems?
Furthermore, it is important that the levels of strategic arms of the sides reflect the whole complex of these systems, including not only ballistic missiles but heavy bombers as well. Moreover, within the composition of these arms it is precisely strategic arms which must be considered and limited, and not some totally unrelated systems. Is the U.S. side prepared for such solutions? Is it also prepared to withdraw the totally contrived question of the Soviet Backfire medium bomber?
Let us take the question of cruise missiles. Here the Soviet Union is proposing a serious, fundamental solution. But the U.S. takes a different position. The U.S. proposals in this regard permit the deployment of 8,000 to 11,000 long-range cruise missiles on 400 bombers, not to mention the fact that the U.S. approach does not provide for any limitations on long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles. Thus, this involves a buildup in strategic arms, and a large-scale one at that. Is this really consistent with the objectives of the current negotiations?
The Soviet side continues to be convinced that the best solution to the problem of long-range cruise missiles would be to ban these missiles, regardless of basing mode. At the same time, in an effort to create possibilities for progress at the negotiations, we would also be prepared, depending on the course of the discussion of other questions, to consider the possibility of limiting rather than banning air-launched cruise missiles, of course on the understanding that long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles would be prohibited. Of course, the nuclear warheads on deployed cruise missiles would be included in the overall maximum level for nuclear warheads on strategic arms.
Mr. Secretary, you asked what would happen to Soviet ICBMs if the sides reduced their strategic arms. If one takes into account the composition of Soviet strategic forces, it is clear that during reductions to the 1800 level, missiles will also be dismantled. Moreover, we could say that the principal portion of the reductions provided for under the Soviet proposals would involve land-based ICBMs. Each side could determine specifically which missiles or other delivery vehicles would be destroyed, within the framework of the additional limitations provided for in the agreement, of course.
[Page 227]We would like to repeat: progress at the negotiations on these and other questions depends upon the United States.
We expect a positive response from the U.S. side to the questions we have raised.”
On the conclusion of this presentation, the Acting Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his careful answers.
He noted that in answering our first question, the Soviets had posed two questions of their own for us to consider.
In regards the second topic, he welcomed the Soviet willingness to consider the limitation of numbers of ALCMs. With regard to a ban on SLCMs, however, this was a position we could not adopt. We could discuss SLCMs if there were a way to handle the verification problems involved. We would be prepared to discuss Soviet ideas in this regard, but the problems involved would be major.
With regard to overall warhead ceilings, the Acting Secretary went on, cruise missile warheads were very different from those of ballistic missiles. In SALT II these two were approached on an entirely different basis.
In regards the Ambassador’s response to the third question, however, the Acting Secretary stated he did not quite grasp what had been meant in connection with the “composition of forces” and ballistic missiles.
The Ambassador replied that depending on the level ultimately agreed upon, the Soviet Union would have to reduce its land-based missiles given the structure of its forces.
The Acting Secretary asked that with regard to ballistic missiles, was the Ambassador saying that heavy and medium ICBMs would be dismantled?
The Ambassador replied yes, subject to agreement.
The Acting Secretary asked whether Ambassador Rowny had any questions.
Ambassador Rowny stated that he would like to study the Soviet statement.
Ambassador Dobrynin noted that the Secretary had made clear he was discussing only ALCM limits and nothing else. If, however, this would be the only cruise limitation for the whole treaty, why raise additional questions about SLCMs?
The Acting Secretary noted that in discussing ALCM limits, the Ambassador had given the impression these would depend upon a ban on SLCMs.
The Ambassador responded no—ALCM limits would be contingent on agreement on other issues.
[Page 228]The Acting Secretary noted his point had not gone to the question of verifying ALCMs.
The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. was prepared to propose specific figures on ALCMs.
The Acting Secretary stated yes, we would study this and make a comment soon.
The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. would set forth a number today.
The Acting Secretary replied no. He concluded that we would study the Soviet reply carefully.
The meeting ended on this note.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, “Memoranda of Conversation.” Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by McManaway and Dam. The meeting took place in Dam’s office.↩
- Dam served as Acting Secretary of State from April 25—May 7, while Shultz traveled throughout the Middle East in an attempt to broker peace in Lebanon.↩
- See Document 59.↩