Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

61. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 20, 1983

SUBJECT

• Comments on Ed Rowny’s Memo Regarding Dobrynin’s Likely Responses to Our Three Questions on START

You will have seen Ed Rowny’s April 19 memo in which he ventures some predictions as to Dobrynin’s likely answers to your three questions on START (copy attached). As I am leaving today for Europe, I wanted to give you my reaction to Ed’s paper, and offer some suggestions regarding next steps in the informal dialogue in the event you should meet again with Dobrynin on START prior to my return.

Dobrynin’s Likely General Approach

The extent to which Dobrynin parrots the official Soviet line will depend, in part, on the course of the discussion at the next meeting. But I do not believe his replies will be as deliberately disputatious or polemical as Ed Rowny predicts. This is likely if for no other reason than the fact that Dobrynin’s first priority will be to nurture this new channel along to ensure that the real negotiation takes place in Washington rather than Geneva.

Moreover, with the Scowcroft Commission’s recommendations now public,² and with the Administration in need of demonstrating progress in arms control at a time when the INF talks are thoroughly stalemated, the Soviets probably believe the U.S. is on the threshold of making changes in its START position. They will thus see the Shultz-Dobrynin channel as a means of encouraging changes in the direction of the Soviet proposal. As in the past, the Soviets will be reticent in offering specific ideas of their own, and seek to bargain on the basis of proposals advanced by the U.S.

Question 1—Overall Force Levels

On the question of the gap between 850/400 and 1800, I doubt Dobrynin will lay down formal preconditions for Soviet movement as Ed Rowny predicts, since this would risk transforming the back-channel into another sterile, confrontational forum. Dobrynin will cite the well-known Soviet desiderata (the need to limit bombers and missiles in combination; the increased significance for the strategic balance of “forward-based systems” as forces are reduced below the Soviet-proposed 1800 level). But he may hint at Soviet willingness to consider somewhat lower numbers if the U.S. is prepared to be flexible on the questions of separate missile/bomber limits and sublimits on medium/heavy ICBMs. He may pose a counter-question as to whether U.S. concerns about limiting ballistic missiles can be met in other ways, such as through sublimits on MIRVed systems as proposed by the Soviets.

Assuming Dobrynin does take a “problem-solving” approach to this question, you should not state categorically that the U.S. cannot abandon its approach of separate limits on missiles and bombers (as Rowny recommends). Your response last time was just right—“we can talk about structure”—and we should neither open nor close the door any further to the possibility of a single aggregate encompassing ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. In fact, the issue of whether to move to a single aggregate will be on the agenda for an NSC meeting on START prior to the opening of round four.

Question 2—Cruise Missiles

On cruise missiles, Ed’s prediction is closer to the mark, in my view: that Dobrynin will probably indicate willingness to move off the blanket cruise missile prohibition—at least in regard to ALCMs—but argue for inclusion of cruise missile warheads in an overall weapons ceiling (our proposal would directly constrain ballistic missile warheads only; ALCMs would be constrained indirectly through limits on the average number of missiles permitted per aircraft).

If Dobrynin moves away from a cruise missile ban, we should, as Ed Rowny suggests, indicate that ALCM numbers are negotiable, but also argue for the need to treat cruise missile warheads differently from ballistic missile warheads (this is because only a portion of our cruise missiles could actually reach their targets, as a consequence of the Soviets’ extensive air defense network.)

Thus, in your next meeting you should stress that the limits on the numbers of ALCMs per bomber must be higher than the limits on the number of warheads permitted per ballistic missile (pointing to Soviet agreement to this principle in SALT II), and that cruise missiles cannot be lumped together with ballistic missile warheads on the basis of full “freedom-to-mix.” This latter point would leave the door open to an approach under which there would be “one-way” freedom to mix—i.e. an overall limit on ballistic and cruise missile warheads, with a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads—further on down the road.

On SLCMs, we could be slightly more forthcoming than Ed suggests, expressing agreement that SLCMs need to be limited in some fashion, while soliciting Soviet ideas as to workable and verifiable approaches other than a flat ban on these systems.

Question 3—Heavy Missiles/Throw-Weight

Ed correctly predicts that Dobrynin will criticize our 210/110 limits on medium and heavy ICBMs, and what the Soviets consider to be “illegitimate” U.S. demands to restructure Soviet forces. In addition to expressing in vague terms Soviet willingness to reduce heavy missiles, Dobrynin may argue that MIRV sublimits and limits on warheads should satisfy U.S. concerns about ICBM counterforce capabilities. I would agree with Ed’s view that we should sound out Dobrynin on whether Moscow could agree to the principle of reducing heavy and medium missiles by the same proportion as reductions in overall force levels (our current proposal goes well beyond this principle). A more difficult question—one which will need to be addressed at the next NSC meeting on START—is whether we will be prepared to raise our throw-weight objectives by the same proportion as we increase the limits on ballistic missiles.

Other Counter-Questions: Dobrynin may not be content simply to respond to our three questions, but may also pose some questions of his own. For example, he may ask what we are really after in proposing numerical limits on each side’s inventory of non-deployed missiles, and press us to come up with a more “realistic” approach to Backfire (i.e. agree to limit Backfire and other medium-range aircraft in INF). He may also ask why we refuse to consider some of the Soviet CBM proposals.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz³

Washington, April 19, 1983

SUBJECT

• Expected Answers from Dobrynin

I would like to predict the answers I think you will probably get from Ambassador Dobrynin to your three questions on START you asked him on April 14.

While these answers may not be what he gives you, I think some “guesstimates” will help you respond in a way which will help move the process forward without sacrificing our basic objectives.

If Dobrynin responds in ways other than the ways I predict, you may be able to channel your responses along the lines I have indicated. If the Soviets propose new ways of doing things which will accomplish our objectives we should be ready to explore them.

Our basic objective should be to get the Soviets to engage in a dialogue which will break the current logjam. If there is sufficient time for further turn-arounds of questions before June 1 you should attempt to arrange it.

At any event, I recommend you seek Soviet commitment to a further dialogue by Karpov/Rowny in Geneva along the lines we have begun in this back-channel. The US and Soviet governments should agree to instruct the START negotiators to produce by the end of Round IV (early August) a set of “Vladivostok-type guidelines” which could serve as the basis for a Shultz/Gromyko mini-summit. The ideal place and time for this would be in New York at the UNGA meeting in late September. We have no time to lose if we are to reach a meeting of minds on a set of guidelines which might result in an agreement before the election process goes into higher gear.

Throughout your dialogue with Dobrynin you should stress that everything you discuss with him is of an exploratory nature.

Question 1: Would the Soviet 1800 figure come down if the US number went up?

Dobrynin will probably reply that Moscow continues to reject the US differentiation between missiles and bombers. He will argue that the problem is not whether the US and Soviet figures can converge but whether the US will abandon its approach of trying to separate fast-flying and slow-flying systems into separate categories. The USSR believes all weapons systems are converging in capabilities and can participate in a first-strike.

Accordingly, he will probably avoid a specific reply as to whether the Soviets would consider reducing their 1800 number. Instead, he will likely say that the US should meet three conditions before the Soviets could consider flexibility:

(1) Aggregate ballistic missiles and heavy bombers into a single figure.

(2) Refrain from deploying GLCMs and PII’s in Europe.

(3) Agree to equal totals of all nuclear weapons, that is, ballistic missile warheads, bomber weapons and long-range cruise missiles.

I recommend that you answer that the US is willing to adjust its 850 deployed ballistic missile aggregate upwards to meet the concerns the Soviets have expressed about reducing to this level, provided the Soviets recognize some of the concerns the US has expressed. Specifically, the US cannot abandon its approach of separating ballistic missiles and bombers. This is a fundamental principle for the US. We believe that both sides will benefit from improving crisis stability. This can be best approached by imposing specific and separate limits (without freedom to mix) on fast-flying destabilizing systems and on slow-flying systems, which can only be used in a retaliatory role.

The US rejects any linkage of progress in START to deployments in INF. These are separate negotiations which should proceed on their own merits.

Aggregating ballistic missile warheads and cruise missiles is simply another way of lumping fast-flying destabilizing weapons systems with bomber armament. The US cannot abandon this basic principle.

Nevertheless, to repeat for emphasis, the US is willing to raise its 850 number if the USSR agrees to consider deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers separately.

Question 2: Is the USSR ready to negotiate with us seriously on ALCMs?

Dobrynin will probably reply that the USSR is prepared to reconsider its proposal that all long-range cruise missiles be banned. However, his offer will be made on the condition that cruise missiles be included in an equal level of total weapons on both sides.

Recommend that you answer that cruise missiles cannot be aggregated for the same reasons that ballistic missiles and bombers cannot be aggregated. Ballistic missiles with their inherent capabilities as first-strike weapons simply should not be equated with slow-flying retaliatory weapons such as bomber armaments. Current Soviet testing of advanced long-range ALCMs indicates either that they desire to deploy them or that they will use them for negotiating leverage. The US is offering the USSR a way of constraining ALCMs by placing limits on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. This is consistent with the approach which the USSR has previously accepted. The numbers are negotiable.

Dobrynin may reply that since US programs call for a buy of 4000 ALCMs, the total number of weapons under the US proposal would not be reduced to 5000 but could actually increase to 9000 or more.

Recommend you not get drawn into this line of argumentation but stick to the US approach of separating destabilizing ballistic missile weapons from bomber armament. You could reiterate that numbers are negotiable.

Dobrynin may insist that all cruise missiles, including SLCMs, be limited.

Recommend that you reply that the US will entertain any serious Soviet proposals. As for SLCMs, we would want to know how the Soviets would propose to verify SLCM deployments.

Question 3: How would the USSR reduce medium and heavy missiles to alleviate the concern of the US that these Soviet missiles threaten US deterrent forces?

Dobrynin will probably reply that the 210/110 collateral constraints are unacceptable to the USSR. He may say that the Soviets accept the principle that reductions in weapons systems would require reductions in heavy missiles as well. He may add that the Soviets object to being dictated to as to how their reductions would have to take place.

Recommend you tell him the US does not intend to place overly severe restrictions on Soviet force structuring. But if the Soviets will accept the principle of reducing their medium and heavy missiles in proportion to the overall level of reductions, this would be a step in the right direction. In this case, or if the Soviets have any other serious proposal for significantly reducing the threat to US ICBMs, the US would be prepared to drop its collateral constraints.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM, 1979–1989 The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, April 16–30 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.
2. See Document 60.
3. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent through Dam, who did not initial the memorandum. Copied to Burt.