60. Editorial Note
In an address from the East Room of the White House on the morning of April 19, 1983 President Ronald Reagan endorsed the recently submitted report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces and summarized its recommendations: “First, the Commission urges us to continue the strategic modernization program which I announced in October of 1981. It reaffirms that the need remains for improvements in the command, control, and communications of our strategic forces, and continuation of our bomber, submarine, and cruise missile program. Second, the Commission urges modernization of our ICBM forces. We should immediately proceed to develop and produce the Peacekeeper missile and deploy 100 in existing Minuteman silos near Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. At the same time, the Commission recommends that we begin engineering the design for a small, single-warhead missile. If strategic and technical considerations warrant, this missile could be ready for deployment in the early 1990’s. Incidentally, this modernization program will save about $1.5 billion in 1984 and even more than that in each of the next 2 years. Third, the Commission recommends major research efforts in strategic defense and a thorough research program of hardening, making our land-based missile systems more secure. This modernization effort is the final component of our comprehensive, strategic program. It will mean a safer, more secure America. And it will provide clear evidence to the Soviet Union that it is in their best interest to negotiate with us in good faith and with seriousness of purpose. That adds up to an important [Page 218] incentive for both arms control and deterrence, for peace and security now and far into the future. Finally, the Commission underscores the need for ambitious arms control negotiations, negotiations that would lead to agreements that are balanced, promote stability in time of crisis, and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. These are precisely the objectives of our arms control proposals now on the table in Geneva. These are—well, I want to reemphasize that we’re in Geneva seeking equitable, reliable agreements that would bring real reductions.” (“Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,” Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 555–557)
In a letter of April 29, 1983, Senator William Cohen, Senator Samuel Nunn, and Senator Charles Percy wrote President Reagan expressing support for the report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, in particular “the Commission’s recommendations to work vigorously toward development and deployment of systems which are collectively more survivable and individually less valuable as targets for a would-be attacker” and the “emphasis on a new direction in arms control as an essential component in its recommended program.” They went on to say: “The present debate in the United States provides an opportunity to develop a widely supported, long-term framework for arms control and weapons modernization—a policy that would put the United States in a position to move forward resolutely on strategic force improvements, while giving the Soviet Union strong incentives to bargain earnestly in ongoing arms reduction negotiations.” As such, the Senators urged Reagan to commit to three initiatives: “A reformulation of the U.S. START position to incorporate the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission”; “A proposal in the appropriate arms control context that the Soviet Union and United States should adhere to the principle of a guaranteed mutual build-down of nuclear forces in which each country would eliminate from its operational inventory two nuclear warheads for each one newly deployed. This agreement would ultimately be linked to warhead ceilings established in the relevant negotiations, and would be subject to mutually agreed procedures and verification”; and “An immediate start on research and development of a new, small, single-warhead ICBM, with an assurance that the program will retain a high priority despite probable constraints in the overall defense budget.” (Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, Nunn-Cohen Proposal (1))