Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

57. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 18, 1983

SUBJECT

• The Two-Phased U.S. START Proposal

NSDD–78² instructed the START IG to examine new START developments. One issue remains unresolved and will go to the NSC shortly for decision: whether or not to retain the two-phased structure of the U.S. START proposal.

As you know, last May the President decided on a two-phased approach for our START position whereby the U.S. is seeking direct limits on deployed ballistic missiles and ballistic missile warheads in a first phase of the negotiations. In the second phase we will seek direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels, i.e., 1.9 million kilograms (mkg). Throw-weight is to be limited by indirect constraints in the first phase: a ceiling of 210 heavy and medium ICBMs, of which no more than 110 can be heavy ICBMs. These constraints are designed to reduce Soviet throw-weight from its current level of 5.1 mkg down to below 2.5 mkg. The second phase would also limit cruise missiles.

The IG identified four options for dealing with phasing at this time:

• Option 1: Maintain the current phase distinctions.

• Option 2: Combine the phases with a direct limit on throw-weight below the current U.S. level of 1.9 mkg

• Option 3: Combine the phases but propose a higher throw-weight ceiling (e.g., about 2.5 mkg)

• Option 4: Move ALCM limits into Phase I now, but defer direct limits on throw-weight until Phase II; defer decision on SLCM limitations until after current studies are completed.

JCS supports Option 1 at this time, although we understand that after decisions are made on M-X and SLCM they would be ready to support Option 4. OSD and Ambassador Rowney support Option 2. ACDA supports both Options 2 and 3 but leans more toward Option 3.

We support both Options 1 and 4 for substantive and tactical reasons. At this juncture it is important to preserve the phased structure of our proposal, both because the Soviets have done nothing this round in Geneva to justify such a major structural change to our proposal and because it is important to be able, via a phased approach, to prevent the thorniest START problems from blocking agreement on the rest. We believe it is inevitable that a selective blending of the limitations in each phase will occur as the negotiations evolve (e.g., bringing ALCMs forward in return for Soviet agreement to tight indirect limits on throw-weight).

Tactically, however, the time does not seem ripe to seek such blending now (as JCS seems to agree), with decisions pending on M-X, the current round ending in two weeks, and the current political climate. Backing both Options 1 and 4 supports the principle of phasing, allies us with JCS on Option 1, and gives us the bargaining flexibility to back away from Option 4 at the NSC.

Accordingly, we plan to recommend this approach in the decision paper sent to the NSC.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, March 16–23, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by MacDonald; approved by Dean.
2. See Document 53.