56. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
1991. Subject: Basic Elements of an Agreement on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms.
1. This is START III-042. Secret—Entire Text.
2. Following is the language handed over to the Soviets during the 1 March plenary.
Basic Elements of an Agreement on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms
I
Beginning on (blank), each party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms to equal levels and complete the reductions required to achieve these levels within (a specified period of time). Specifically, each party will:
A. Limit to no more than 5,000 the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles;
B. Limit to no more than 2,500 the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs;
C. Limit to no more than 850 the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;
D. Limit the number of its heavy bombers to no more than 400;
E. Limit to no more than 110 the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs and to no more than 210 the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs;
F. Limit the aggregate number of its non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs to no more than (an agreed) per cent of its allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.
II
Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section I in accordance with agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at two year intervals following the entry into force of the agreement.
III
Neither party will develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy new heavy ballistic missiles.
[Page 207]IV
Neither party will develop, produce, flight-test or deploy ICBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles or develop, produce, flight-test or deploy SLBMs with more than 14 reentry vehicles.
V
Neither party will flight-test or deploy reentry vehicles with a mass greater than approximately 200 kilograms on new ballistic missile systems.
VI
Each party will undertake constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles in addition to the limit on non-deployed ballistic missiles in section I. These will include:
A. A ban on ICBM rapid reload capability;
B. A ban on excess ICBMs and hardened storage facilities at ICBM complexes;
C. Limits on the quantity and type of ground support equipment at ICBM complexes;
D. Destruction of ballistic missiles that have been retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit;
E. Destruction of ballistic missiles of types which are no longer deployed;
F. Dismantlement or destruction of launchers associated with deployed ballistic missiles retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit; and
G. Storage of all non-deployed ballistic missiles in designated storage facilities.
VII
Beginning on (blank), each party will carry out additional reductions and limitations. Specifically, each party will:
A. Limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ballistic missiles to an equal level less than the current US level.
B. Destroy all its heavy ICBMs and dismantle or destroy all its launchers for heavy ICBMs;
C. Limit its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on heavy bombers according to rules establishing an average ALCM loading limit of (blank) per heavy bomber and an ALCM loading limit of (blank) for existing heavy bombers.
VIII
Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section VII of this document in accordance with agreed dismantling or destruction procedures and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at specified intervals.
[Page 208]IX
All of the preceding provisions will be carried out in accordance with agreed definitions, counting rules, and type rules, which would specify for the purposes of the limitations set forth in the agreement:
—The definitions of systems to be limited;
—The relationship among deployed ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, ballistic missile warheads, and ballistic missile throw-weight;
—Criteria to distinguish between deployed and non-deployed ballistic missiles;
—Physical and performance criteria to distinguish between existing types and new types of ballistic missiles;
—Criteria for determining ballistic missile throw-weight;
—Criteria for defining a heavy bomber; and
—Agreed numerical values to distinguish among and define light, medium and heavy ICBMs.
X
For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the preceding provisions each party will use national technical means of verification, supplemented by specific, agreed cooperative measures.
—Interference with agreed cooperative measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement by agreed cooperative measures or by national technical means.
—Encryption of telemetry during flight-testing of systems limited by the agreement will be banned and additional specific provisions regarding access to flight-test data will be adopted.
Prior to signature of this agreement, each party will provide data to the other for the purpose of establishing an agreed and substantial body of data concerning its strategic arms subject to limitations by the agreement.
—These data will reflect numerical values and characteristics of weapons systems covered by the agreement.
—This data base will be agreed during the course of the negotiations and established upon signature of the agreement and thereafter will be updated every six months.
XI
The agreement embodying these provisions will be of an agreed long-term duration subject to review at specified, regular intervals and will be subject to withdrawal after six months’ prior notification if a [Page 209] party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each party will be free to propose amendments at any time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830113–0042. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩