Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I
58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1
SUBJECT
- START Issues Paper
The START IG has prepared the attached decision paper regarding the issue of possible U.S. initiatives in the START negotiations. It specifically focuses on the question of phasing in the U.S. START proposal, an issue that the IG was unable to resolve. Included with the decision paper is the START Developments Report, upon which the decision paper is based. All participating agencies concur in the contents of the decision paper and the report. The IG will report its recommendations on SLCM as soon as possible.
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of State2
Decision Paper on U.S. START Developments
In response to NSDD–78, the START IG has examined the issue of U.S. START developments, specifically, the issues of both a single aggregate for deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and phasing. The IG has prepared the attached START Developments Report,3 which addresses:
A. Developments in START to date (pp. 2–6)
B. Should the U.S. alter its phased approach to START? (pp. 7–18)
[Page 212]C. Should the U.S. shift to a single aggregate limit, including both ballistic missiles and bombers, with one-way freedom to mix? (pp. 19–23)
D. Possible developments in the Soviet START position (pp. 24–30)
E. Timing considerations (pp. 31–32)
There were no issues associated with sections A, D, and E. The IG reached a consensus on Section C, the single aggregate issue, and recommends that a decision on this issue be postponed until after the issuance of the report by the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces and a Presidential decision thereon.
ISSUE FOR DECISION
Whether to alter the current U.S. phased approach in its START position and, if so, how.
BACKGROUND
Last May the President decided on the present U.S. position in the START negotiations. A key feature of the position is its two-phased approach whereby the U.S. will seek direct limits on, inter alia, deployed ballistic missiles and ballistic missile warheads in a first phase of the negotiations and on ballistic missile throw-weight (at less than current U.S. levels, i.e., 1.9 million kg) in a second phase. Throw-weight is to be limited by indirect constraints in the first phase: a ceiling of 210 heavy ballistic missiles and medium ICBMs, of which no more than 110 can be heavy ballistic missiles. These constraints are designed to reduce Soviet throw-weight from its current level of 5.1 million kilograms (mkg) down to below 2.5 mkg. More recently, the President has decided that the second phase would also address direct limits on ALCMs.
As instructed by NSDD–78, the START IG has examined the question of phasing in the light of nearly three rounds of negotiations with the Soviets at START and the continuing evolution of U.S. strategic force modernization plans. Four options related to phasing were identified by the IG:
• Option 1: Maintain the current phase distinctions
• Option 2: Combine the phases with a direct ceiling on throw-weight below current U.S. levels (i.e., 1.9 mkg)
• Option 3: Combine the phases but propose a higher throw-weight ceiling (e.g., about 2.5 mkg)
• Option 4: Move ALCM limits into Phase I now, but defer direct limits on throw-weight until Phase II; defer decision on SLCM limitations until after current studies are completed
It should be noted that these are internal USG decisions. Should any decision be reached to modify the current U.S. position, the question of how and when it should be presented to the Soviets in order to [Page 213] maximize our tactical advantage could be determined by the U.S. Delegation in light of developments in the negotiations.
DISCUSSION
The following discussion presents the arguments of the supporters of each option:
JCS supports Option 1, maintaining the current phase distinctions. Under this approach, the U.S. would not alter the phased framework of our START proposal. The first phase would continue to focus on the most destabilizing systems by seeking equal ceilings on ballistic missiles (particularly ICBMs) and their warheads. Through specific indirect limits on heavy and medium ICBMs, the goal of the first phase would be to reduce Soviet throw-weight to 2.5 mkg. Limits on cruise missiles and a direct ceiling on throw-weight would be deferred until the second phase, during which we would seek a direct limit on throw-weight below 1.9 mkg, the current U.S. level. The phased framework is a source of negotiating leverage based on a probable Soviet desire to move cruise missile limits into the first phase, leaving direct limits on throw-weight for the second phase.
Tabling the Basic Elements document demonstrated that everything is on the table and that we are prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement meeting the legitimate concerns of both countries. Modification of this negotiating framework should not be considered until the USG has determined its SLCM position, resolved the strategic modernization issue (i.e., MX), and has decided that developments in the negotiations warrant consideration of such a move. Given the fact that the Soviets have not responded in any meaningful way to US concerns nor been forthcoming on their proposal, movement on our part at this juncture is not a prudent course of action.
OSD and the START Negotiator support Option 2, combining the phases with a direct ceiling on throw-weight at below current U.S. levels. ACDA favors combining the phases and could support either Option 2 or Option 3. These agencies believe that we should give up the notion of phases, whether in the sense of negotiations or reductions, and prepare a comprehensive, integrated position. Option 2 is such a position that would allow us to achieve our START objectives.
First and foremost, it maximizes the leverage which we possess by virtue of the Soviets’ interest in limiting cruise missiles. Since we have now proposed constraints for cruise missiles, even without indicating any numbers, we must expect the Soviets to attempt to “pocket” our willingness to discuss cruise missiles and seek to import the proposed constraints into the first phase. Indeed, it would hardly be credible to maintain that the U.S. be allowed to build now a cruise missile force that would exceed the ceiling which we would be willing to [Page 214] accept eight or ten years hence. The Soviets will probably attempt to move our proposed cruise missile constraints into the first phase, thus depriving us of the necessary leverage for achieving our second phase goals. Taking such a step unilaterally (Option 4) would be a drastic mistake and would virtually guarantee that the U.S. would never achieve its goal of limiting Soviet destructive capability and potential through a direct limit on ballistic missile throw-weight. Were this to happen, we would duplicate the mistake we made in allowing the ABM restraints of SALT I to take precedence over the restraints on strategic offensive arms, a procedure which virtually guaranteed that we would not achieve the goal of limiting the Soviet strategic offensive build-up to non-threatening levels.
By proposing a single set of restraints, we would obviate the need to address the question of whether we can, consistent with military requirements, propose ballistic missile and ballistic missile warhead limits below the 850 and 5000 level. The possibility of proposing further reductions in these categories now appears remote. In any case, it would hardly seem a realistic use of our time and energy to concern ourselves with the preparation of such a proposal.
This approach also serves our political interests in that it permits us to come forward with a new position that is conducive to progress in the negotiations while retaining maximum negotiating leverage. It rebuts Soviet criticism of the U.S. proposal as a non-comprehensive, non-serious proposal, which concentrates on U.S. concerns while relegating Soviet concerns to a meaningless second phase. By explicitly addressing ballistic missile throw-weight, an area of Soviet advantage, we help explain the priority the U.S. has placed on ballistic missiles in general, and on heavy ICBMs in particular. Otherwise, concentration on such demands as preferential constraints on heavy ballistic missiles risks appearing as an arbitrary attack on the way in which the Soviets have happened to structure their forces. The reductions which would be required through the direct limits on throw-weight (65%) is comparable to the reductions the Soviets would have to make in ICBM warheads (58%), ballistic missiles (64%), heavy and medium ICBMs (69%) and heavy ICBMs (65%), under our current Phase I proposal.
In the context of a single proposal, we should table both our proposed framework for constraints on ALCMs and our current second phase goal of a direct throw-weight limit of approximately 1.9 mkg in order to make explicit our right to a ballistic missile force equal to that of the Soviet Union in destructive capacity.
Our emphasis on throw-weight at this point will facilitate the negotiation of an agreement which accommodates our requirements in the bomber/cruise missile area. The sole unit of account which captures the ability of the Soviets to adapt their ballistic missile force to any [Page 215] change in the strategic situation is throw-weight. The recent debate concerning the survivability of CSB provides an example. A direct limit on throw-weight could considerably simplify our current approach by allowing us to eliminate, at a tactically advantageous time, the indirect constraints on throw-weight (i.e., 210 heavy ballistic missiles and medium ICBMs, with a sublimit of 110 heavy ballistic missiles).
While we would propose a unified set of constraints on strategic forces, we could, of course, take into account the practical problems of effectuating large reductions in forces by providing for gradual reductions in all units of account, in accordance with a schedule of agreed, equal intermediate ceilings.
ACDA favors combining Phases I and II in the US START proposal and could support either Option 2 or 3. Option 3 is essentially a modification of Option 2 that contains a higher proposed ceiling on throw-weight. A throw-weight ceiling at about 2.5 mkg would be consistent with the President’s original decision on the framework of the US START position which set an internal objective of reducing Soviet throw-weight to 2.5 mkg in the context of our Phase I approach. The goal of a 1.9 mkg throw-weight ceiling was originally set for Phase II, which included possible further reductions in RV and missile numbers (which now appears remote, as noted above). If accepted, this option would lead to deep reductions in Soviet throw-weight from their current level of about 5.1 mkg. Ceilings on throw-weight below the 2.5 mkg level, such as 1.9 mkg, would likely be perceived by the Soviets as a step backward by the U.S. from our current Phase I proposal. This option could make the U.S. position more attractive to the Soviets and increase their willingness to negotiate on the basis of our proposal.
State supports the Administration’s current policy of maintaining a phased approach to the START negotiations, and thus could support either Option 1 or Option 4. State believes that a decision to combine the phases is neither warranted nor desirable at this time.
The Soviet reaction thus far to the U.S. draft “Basic Elements” suggests that the main substantive differences between the two sides are in areas that would not be significantly affected by a decision to combine the two phases. In terms of perceptions, however, a proposal establishing direct limits on throw-weight at below current U.S. levels as an initial START objective (Option 2) would be seen by the Soviets and Western publics as a hardening of the U.S. position, particularly when linked to proposed ALCM loading limits that would have no effect on U.S. deployment plans. Raising the throw-weight level to 2.5 mkg (Option 3), while substantively similar to retaining our current indirect constraints on throw-weight (Options 1,4) would mitigate this perception only marginally. Moreover, both Options 2 and 3 would have the drawback of establishing throw-weight as a principal unit of [Page 216] account from the outset, which could create perceptions of U.S. inferiority if, as some believe, an eventual START agreement establishes a throw-weight level higher than 1.9 or 2.5 mkg.
State notes that Option 4 (like Option 1) would in no way alter the President’s throw-weight objectives or offer additional constraints on U.S. strategic programs, and thus could not be characterized as a unilateral U.S. concession; we would continue to seek to reduce Soviet throw-weight to below 2.5 mkg in the first phase and to below current U.S. levels in the second; at the same time, both Options 1 and 4 would have no impact on projected U.S. military requirements. In addition, by maintaining the principle of phasing, Options 1 and 4 would preserve the option to defer the difficult issue of SLCM limits until Phase II. Finally, a decision made now to combine the phases and seek a 1.9 mkg throw-weight limit could prejudice the outcome of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, which could require us ultimately to achieve throw-weight levels higher than 1.9 mkg (e.g., if the recommendation is for a sizable number of small mobile missiles).
In sum, State believes that in view of the Soviets’ intransigent stance in the latest round of the negotiations, we should not make any adjustment to our position that could be interpreted as a unilateral concession to the Soviets. But neither should we alter our proposal in a way that would be seen as a hardening of the U.S. position.